



MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN - MCAC

Officer Block 2 and Enlisted Block 3

An Introduction to the MCAC Region

CENTER FOR ADVANCED OPERATIONAL CULTURE LEARNING

Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program

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Introduction

One must distinguish between the study of regions, countries, and cultures. Chapters 1 through 6 in this document introduce a region and provide information about its countries and their relationships. They do not introduce a culture or cultures. Those chapters simply provide knowledge about the region and the environment in which people with different cultures live.

Regions and states do not have a single culture; instead they have multiple, diverse cultures. Cultures are not necessarily bound by national borders. There may be multiple cultures in a single state, while people sharing a single culture may live in more than one state.

The case study in Chapter 7 is about one specific culture in the region. Building upon the information provided in chapters 1 through 6, Chapter 7 introduces one of the many cultures in the Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean (MCAC) region, using concepts discussed in the Operational Culture General (OCG) document.

Why This Region is Relevant to You as a Marine


According to General John F. Kelly, U.S. SOUTHCOM Commander, the region is of increasing importance to the U.S. national interest.¹ His main priority is Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC). CTOC efforts concentrate on providing support to law enforcement in partner nations. This approach relies heavily on the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection, along with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).² General Kelly's second priority is to build partner capacity in collaboration with U.S. Northern Command.³ This objective involves providing critical infrastructure and operational support to Guatemala's efforts to disrupt illicit trafficking along the Guatemalan-Mexican border.⁴



Guatemalan Marines receive hand to hand combat training by the U.S. Marine Corps (Source: Marines.mil)

As a U.S. Marine assigned to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean region, your familiarity with the cultural and security-related aspects of this region will improve engagement efforts. By equipping you with knowledge of the cultures, challenges, and opportunities that exist in the region, you will be better able to interact positively with local and regional counterparts to accomplish your mission.

History and ongoing threats in the region show that developments there can affect the U.S. In recent years, the scope and reach of well-armed and well-financed drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have become a new concern, one that poses a challenge to stability throughout the MCAC region as well as the United States.



United States Marines with the captured flag of Augusto César Sandino in 1932, during the Banana Wars (Source: Wikipedia)

According to the United States' latest “Western Hemisphere Defense Policy Statement,” today’s threats to regional peace and stability stem from the spread of narcotics and other forms of illicit trafficking, gangs, and terrorism, exacerbated by natural disasters and uneven economic opportunity.⁵

The United States Department of Defense (DoD) provides assistance to regional governments through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) to reduce illicit trafficking and improve citizen security.⁶ Additionally, the seven countries of Central America, in collaboration with the CBSI, have developed their own regional security strategy which is supported by the U.S. Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI).⁷ CARSI was originally created in 2008 as part of the Mexico-focused counterdrug and anticrime assistance package known as the Mérida Initiative.⁸

The U.S. military, through the United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Northern Command (NORTHCOM) build regional security through “sustained engagement in order to deter adversaries, preserve stability, support allies and partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges.”⁹ Details of regional security challenges will be addressed in Chapter 7.

Geographic Overview

Why a Geographic Overview Matters to You as a Marine

Geographic features include physical and biological factors tied to location, topography, climate, soil, environmental hazards, flora, and fauna. These features influence human and social characteristics such as beliefs, behaviors, social organization, economy, and politics, to name a few. This is not to say that geography determines how people and societies behave, but rather that it has varying effects on what they believe and do.

The locations of rivers, mountains, deserts, and coasts have great influence on where people live, what crops can be raised, and what modes of transportation are suitable. Climate and weather influence how people dress, work, and earn a living. Natural disasters like hurricanes, flooding, and earthquakes can devastate a region, and dislocate a great number of people.

This chapter will cover:

- Region location
- Countries in the region
- Topography
- Sub-regions
- Rivers
- Climate
- Weather
- Environmental Hazards

MCAC Region: Global Location

This region is located in the Western Hemisphere. Mexico and Central America are located on a narrow strip of land connecting both North America and Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. The Caribbean is comprised of 16 independent island states, several foreign territories (from Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and the United States), and thousands of individual islands, scattered around the Caribbean Sea.¹⁰ Although they are distinct sub-regions, for the purposes of this chapter, we will refer to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean as one “region.”



Source: Wikipedia



Source: University of Texas

Although Mexico shares many cultural and historical similarities with Central America, it is geographically part of North America, and stands out as the largest country and economy in the region. For this reason, this chapter will examine Mexico as a sub-region in itself.

Topography – Major Features in the three Sub-Regions

Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are situated where the Caribbean tectonic plate meets four other major adjacent plates. This geologic convergence creates frequent earthquakes, occasional tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions.¹¹

Topography of Mexico

Mexico is situated atop three of the large plates that constitute the earth's surface, with most of its landmass situated on the North American plate.¹² The motion of these plates causes earthquakes and volcanic activities in Mexico and in its vicinity.¹³


Plateaus in the east occupy two-thirds of the national territory and a mountainous spine runs through the western third of the country.¹⁴ The interior north of the Mexico City metropolitan area is mainly high plateau—known as the Mesa Central and Mesa del Norte. Mexico has several massive mountain ranges, most of



Source: Wikipedia

which extend from northwest to southeast: the Sierra Madre Occidental in the west, the Sierra Madre Oriental in the east, and the Sierra Madre del Sur in the south.¹⁵ Mexico has extensive lowlands largely along the Gulf coast and in the Yucatan Peninsula.¹⁶

Mexico has nearly 150 rivers, two-thirds of which empty into the Pacific Ocean and the remainder into the Gulf of Mexico or the Caribbean Sea.¹⁷ Most rivers are short and non-navigable, running from coastal mountain ranges to the coast.¹⁸ The largest rivers - accountable for 52 percent for the average annual surface water volume - are located in the southeastern part of the country and flow into the Gulf of Mexico (*See Rivers circled in the map below*).¹⁹




Topography of Central America

The Central America region is comprised of the following countries:

- Guatemala
- Belize
- Honduras
- El Salvador
- Nicaragua
- Costa Rica
- Panama

The Sierra Madre mountain ridges continue from Mexico down through northern Nicaragua. About 80 percent of Honduras consists of extremely rugged and mountainous and numerous intermountain valleys.²⁰ Caribbean lowlands (eastern region) continue through Nicaragua, covering about half of that country; the lowlands consist of tropical-rain forest and pine savannas crossed by numerous rivers flowing to Caribbean.²¹ Central America is a region with abundant rivers.²² El Salvador and Nicaragua, each have 360 and 80 rivers respectively, despite the relatively small size of these countries.²³

Topography of the Caribbean



Source: Wikipedia

Geographically, this region has certain features that distinguish it from the rest of the mainland, with its numerous islands and cays scattered over a wide area between South America, Central America and North America. The larger islands in the northern part are known as the Greater Antilles: Cuba, Jamaica, Puerto Rico and Hispaniola (shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic).²⁴ The smaller islands in the east are called the Lesser Antilles (and are also called the Leeward and Windward Islands).²⁵

Topography in the Caribbean varies from the flat plains of Barbados to the rugged coasts of Martinique and Guadeloupe, with some islands such as Cuba and Jamaica with rolling hills and mountain ranges.²⁶ In the Caribbean, the archipelago of the Bahamas stands out in the region for consisting of approximately 700 flat, low lying islands in the western Atlantic Ocean.²⁷

Some elevated areas of the Caribbean are covered with dense, evergreen rain forests cut by swiftly flowing rivers.²⁸ The Yaque Del Norte River in the Dominican Republic flows through seven major drainage basins.²⁹

Caribbean countries can be grouped with other regions as well. For example, Belize is commonly considered a Caribbean country, due to its strong ties to that region. Puerto Rico stands out in this list as an **unincorporated territory** of the United States.

Unincorporated Territory: a territory that belongs to another state and has a commonwealth status. Its legal and political status is above a territory, but still below a state.³⁰

While there are numerous island nations and foreign territories in the Caribbean, this chapter will focus on the following Caribbean nations, based on their size and historical significance to the United States:

- The Bahamas
- Cuba
- Grenada
- Haiti
- Dominican Republic
- Jamaica
- Puerto Rico
- Trinidad and Tobago

Note: For historic, economic and cultural reasons the Guianas are connected to the Caribbean region, since the countries in this region were colonized by North Europeans (British, Dutch and French).³¹ Nevertheless the Guianas are geographically part of Latin America.

Climate and Weather

The climate in Central America and the Caribbean is tropical.³²

There are two main seasons: tropical rainy and tropical dry. On the Caribbean side, the long rainy season is from May through October while the dry season corresponds to winter in the northern hemisphere.³³

Individual climatic conditions are strongly dependent on elevation. Even during the rainy season, however, the precipitation range fluctuates greatly. The rainy season also coincides with the disastrous summer hurricane season (with the exception of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, which are too far south to be affected).³⁴ Hurricanes are a constant feature of most of the



Source: SEDAC/CIESIN – University of Columbia)

Caribbean, with a “season” of their own lasting from June to November.³⁵

In Central America, the rainy season runs from May to October.³⁶ Some areas receive over ten months of rain. Across the region, January through April tends to be dryer. As average temperatures are determined by altitude, mountain areas have a cooler, highland climate. Caribbean lowlands are generally hotter and more humid than the interior highlands.³⁷


In Mexico there are great climate variations due to considerable north-south extension and variations in altitude.³⁸ Most of the country has two seasons: rainy (June-September) and dry (October-April).³⁹ Generally there is low rainfall in the interior and in the north; abundant rainfall along east coast, in the south, and in the Yucatan Peninsula.⁴⁰

Environmental Hazards

The environmental hazards of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean can quickly represent a security and humanitarian threat that might require the assistance of U.S. military forces. The region experiences hurricanes that often lead to significant physical damage and loss of human life. The region's location in an area of significant seismic activity means that much of the terrain is also prone to earthquakes. The 1985 and 2010 earthquakes in Mexico and Haiti, respectively, are examples of the magnitude of some of these events, as well as their effects on human life, a country's overall stability, and the potential for U.S. involvement.

Hurricanes and Tropical Storms

Hurricanes can produce severe damage to physical infrastructure, local economies, and human life. In September of 2013, for example, two hurricanes, Ingrid and Manuel, made landfall on opposite coasts within a day of each other, killing at least 115 people in Mexico, affecting a population of more than 1 million, and causing 50,000 to be evacuated.⁴¹ Hurricane season in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean Sea is typically most active between mid-August through October, with the height of the season being mid-September.⁴² September has about as many major hurricane landfalls as October and August combined.⁴³



Hurricane hazard frequency and distribution (in deciles or percentages) (Source: SEDAC/CIESIN – University of Columbia)

Recommended Reading:

For a complete systematic and regional geographic survey of Latin America:


Brian W. Blouet and Olwyn M. Blouet, *Latin America and the Caribbean*, 6th Edition (John Wiley & Sons)

In this map, the lowest frequency (or deciles) of hurricanes is represented in blue and the highest frequency (or deciles) of hurricanes is represented in red (example: 8th to 10th deciles stands for 80% to 100% of the time).
Source: <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/deciles>

Volcanoes

Volcanoes are not randomly distributed over the Earth's surface. They are mostly concentrated on the edges of continents, along island chains, or beneath the sea forming long mountain ranges.⁴⁴ The region is located at the “Ring of Fire,” also called the Circum-Pacific belt, the zone of earthquakes surrounding the Pacific Ocean—about 90% of the world's earthquakes occur there.⁴⁵

Mexico and Central America have a number of active volcanoes, particularly in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Guatemala, although a relatively small country, hosts 22 volcanoes that have been active over the past 10,000 years, and three of these—Santa Maria, Fuego and Pacaya—erupted in 2009.⁴⁶



Source: USGS

Mexico's three most active volcanoes (Popocatepetl, Colima, and El Chichón) are located in the southern portion of the country. Popocatepetl, is just 70 kilometers (43.5 miles) from Mexico's largest city, Mexico City, from which the volcano can be seen.⁴⁷ In 2000, occurred the largest eruption of Popocatepetl in 1,200 years, forcing people to leave immediately.⁴⁸ Over 56,000 evacuees of the 40 villages within 12 km (7.2 mi) of the volcano crowded the roads heading away from the eruption.⁴⁹



Seismic activity – volcano total economic loss risk distribution (Source: SEDAC/CIESIN – University of Columbia)

In Mexico there is volcanic activity in the central-southern part of the country, where one of Mexico's most active volcanoes Colima (elev. 3,850 m), erupted in 2010, and continues to cause periodic evacuations of nearby villagers. It has been deemed a Decade Volcano by the International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth's Interior, worthy of study due to its explosive history and close proximity to human populations.

(Source: CIA World Factbook)



Popocatepetl Volcano (Source: The Smithsonian)

The volcano El Chichón in Mexico last erupted in 1982, in one of the most important volcanic events of the 20th century. Three explosive eruptions occurred over a period of a week, sending columns of gas and volcanic ash high into the stratosphere. The intensity of the eruption blasted away the summit dome of the volcano, and abundant ash fall and pyroclastic surges (massive burst of hot gas and volcanic rock fragments) destroyed nine towns. The eruption of El Chichón was one of the deadliest volcano disasters of the century. Destruction was the greatest within 10 km (6 mi) of the volcano, where more than 2,000 people were killed and 20,000 people left homeless.

(Source: USGS)



The explosive eruption of El Chichón in 1982 formed a new 1-km (0.6 mi)-wide crater that later was partially filled by a steaming acidic lake (Source: USGS)



Collapsed Juárez General Hospital killed 561 people in Mexico City (Source: Wikipedia)


In 1985 two major earthquakes struck central Mexico, affecting Mexico City. Between 5,000 and 10,000 people are believed to have died and 300,000 were left homeless in the worst natural disaster in Mexico's modern history.⁵⁰ Many victims lost their lives in modern high-rise buildings constructed in violation of safety codes.⁵¹

Earthquake in Nicaragua: One of the most lethal on record for the western hemisphere - occurred on December 23, 1972, when a strong shock destroyed most of the Nicaraguan capital of Managua. Hundreds of aftershocks were reported, but only two exceeded magnitude 5, and these occurred within an hour of the main shock. The earthquake broke ground, streets, and structures with its earth-heaving blows from below, and transformed the Central American nation's only major city into a ruined graveyard.⁵² The city laid in dreadful silence, cut off from the world except for

occasional broadcasts received from ham radio operators before Managua's power failed.⁵³ The dry-season winds increased the risk for fire, and the tremor torched it off with broken pilot lights and gas lines and severed electrical cables. Between 3,000 and 7,000 persons were killed by the earthquake, and some 15,000 were injured.⁵⁴ The full figure may never be known. Managua also suffered a disastrous earthquake in 1931 when some 2,000 were killed. A magnitude 4.5 earthquake damaged several hundred homes in 1968.



Nicaragua Earthquakes December 1972, Managua. Collapsed Three-story reinforced concrete Customs House office building (Source: USGS)



Aerial photograph of downtown Managua shows earthquake damage (Source: USGS)

Deforestation and Flooding

Mexico faces significant environmental challenges affecting almost every part of the country.⁵⁵ Tropical and subtropical forests in the south have been cleared for cattle raising and agriculture.⁵⁶ Deforestation has contributed to serious levels of soil erosion nationwide, especially in the north and northwest, where more than 60 percent of the land is severely or totally eroded.⁵⁷

Haiti also faces a severe deforestation problem. In 1923 forests covered nearly 60 percent of the country; today they cover less than two percent.⁵⁸ Deforestation has led to soil erosion, which has decreased agricultural yields and resulted in deadly landslides.⁵⁹ Severe flooding is a regular occurrence after torrential rains during the rainy season (April to June), when brown rivers of mud flow down the mountain sides and into the Caribbean Sea.⁶⁰

Severe Drought in the Americas

The U.S. and large regions of South and Central America, are experiencing the worst drought since the 16th century. Parts of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador are also affected by the drought, which has left 2.8 million people struggling to find food according to the World Food Program.⁶¹

Governments are working to subsidize increased food costs; Guatemala was forced to declare a state of emergency after 256,000 families lost their crops.⁶² The drought has had negative effects on food supplies; Central American countries that are being affected are major coffee producers, and have revised their outputs for the coming season.⁶³

Pollution

Mexico has serious air and water pollution problems in the national capital and urban centers along the US-Mexico border.⁶⁴ Additionally, Mexico City suffers from environmental problems associated with its location in a bowl-shaped valley allowing for temperature inversions that trap pollutants.⁶⁵ In the 1990s, Mexico City was considered to have some of the world's most polluted air, but today, efforts to clean the smog are showing visible progress, with international experts praising the country's progress.⁶⁶ Efforts in Mexico to reduce pollutants now include carbon taxation on fossil fuel sales, and on production and services.⁶⁷ Air pollution is also considered problematic in other urban centers in the region, including in Panama City, Kingston (Jamaica), and in Havana (Cuba).⁶⁸

Water pollution is a common issue among most countries in Central America.⁶⁹ It is generally caused by raw sewage and industrial effluents polluting rivers in urban areas.⁷⁰

Climate Change

A World Bank analysis state that with climate change, these conditions could worsen, thus directly affecting weather dependent economic activities, such as agriculture.⁷¹

In Mexico, a four degree Celsius increase in temperature by the year 2100 is expected to respectively lead to significant droughts and flooding in the north and south of the country.⁷² More drought could further exacerbate the country's water scarcity problems, leading to potential political and social instability.⁷³

In the Caribbean, climate change is expected to have a particularly harsh impact on the region's people and its economies, with hotter temperatures, a rise in sea level, and intensified hurricane activity.⁷⁴ This is expected to directly impact the life-blood of several Caribbean countries: tourism.⁷⁵ It is also theorized that climate change could create severe infrastructural and humanitarian issues, such as decreased water supply and the disappearance of low-lying areas and entire islands.⁷⁶ In Jamaica, for example, an increase of just eight inches in sea level has already caused parts of the island to disappear completely.⁷⁷

Recommended Reading:

For additional readings on the effects of **climate change** in the region refer to several reports produced by the "Environmental Change and Security Program" at the *Woodrow Wilson Center*. Available at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/environmental-change-and-security-program>

Also, see current publications at the *World Bank Climate Change Group*. Available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/climatechange>

Historical Overview

Why History Matters to You as a Marine

History provides knowledge of how people, institutions, and states in a region evolved into what they are today. It also provides insights into people's collective memory about their group and others. In other words, history not only shapes a region's current affairs, but also tells us something about the historical roots of the individual and group identities of its inhabitants.

History does not predict how groups, institutions, and states in a region may behave in the future. Instead, it provides insights into what is possible and probable.

Historical Overview

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean history can be summarized by six major periods:

- Pre-Hispanic** (Before 1492)
- European conquest** (15th and 16th Century)
- Colonial period**
- Independence**
- Post-independence**
- Twentieth century**

Pre-Hispanic Period

Prior to the arrival of Christopher Columbus to the Americas in 1492, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean were inhabited by numerous indigenous tribes. Mexico and Central America had seen the rise and fall of several well-developed civilizations, such as the Olmec's, the Teotihuacán's, the Toltec's, the Mayan, and the Aztecs.⁷⁸ When the Spanish arrived in this sub-region, the most notable indigenous groups were the descendants of the great **Mayan civilization**, as well as the **Aztec empire**.




A temple pyramid at Chacchoben, a Mayan site dating back about 1,300 years. Located at the Costa Maya region in Mexico (Source: CIA World Factbook)

The Mayan civilization - spread from present day Mexican Yucatán Peninsula and Guatemala, later extending into western Honduras (by the fifth century A.D.).⁷⁹

Mexico's many archaeological and architectural sites provide physical clues to the cultural heritage of the Aztec, the Mayan, and other advanced civilizations, seen in the ruins of their temples and in their artifacts.⁸⁰ New civilizations have been built on the ruins of the old, and in this ongoing process of cultural superimposition, many elements of the past have endured.

The Aztec civilization – Numerous nomadic civilizations lived in the Valley of Mexico prior to 1100 A.D., including the Toltec in central Mexico and the Zapotec and Mixtec in southern Mexico.⁸¹ Around A.D. 1100, the Mexica, the last nomadic group, more commonly known as the Aztec tried to settle in the valley.



Aztec Eagle warrior
(Source: Wikipedia, photo by Maunus)



The Aztec Pyramid at S. Cecilia Acatitlan, Mexico
(Source: Wikipedia, photo by Maunus)

Suggested Videos:


For viewing concise videos on the Aztecs civilization:

“The Aztecs.” *History Channel*. Available at:
<http://www.history.com/topics/aztecs>

The Caribbean had three major indigenous groups: the Ciboney, the Taino (or Arawak), and the Caribs.⁸² These Caribbean groups virtually disappeared soon after the arrival of the Spanish, due to the introduction of new diseases and harsh conditions imposed by slavery. Nonetheless, they left a marked imprint on the cultures of the Caribbean that is evident today. This influence is particularly noticeable in culinary traditions, traditional dances, as well as several words that have persisted in local vocabularies.⁸³

Cultural legacy of the Caribs and Arawak's: “Both groups left indelible influences on the languages, diet, and ways of life of the 20th century people who live in the region. Caribbean food crops, such as peanuts, cashew nuts, potatoes, tomatoes, pineapples, pumpkins, manioc, and maize, have spread around the world. The Amerindians’ habit of smoking tobacco has become widespread, and tobacco has become an important commercial commodity. Arawakan and Cariban words have permeated the languages of the region: words such as agouti, avocado, barbecue, *bobio* (a peasant hut), buccaneer, *calpulli* (an urban zone), *caney* (a thatched hut), canoe, cannibal, cassava, cay, *conuco* (a cultivated area), *quaqua* (a bus or truck), *quajiro* (a peasant), guava, hammock, hurricane, iguana, maize, manatee, and *zemi* (an icon).”⁸⁴

HISTORICAL TIMELINE: Pre-Hispanic Period



European Conquest and early Colonization (15th to 16th Century)

Christopher Columbus “discovered” America in 1492, the same year the Spaniards defeated the Moors in Spain in the Reconquest.⁸⁵ They arrived with a spirit of conquest, as warriors seeking “gold, glory and God.” One important factor that contributed to attracting Spaniards to the Americas was that in Spain there was little opportunity for upward social mobility, while the New World offered that opportunity, as well as riches. The Jesuits and other missionaries came to convert the natives and dedicated to the task of catechizing the Amerindians.

During the early sixteenth century, Spanish military conquistadors based in Cuba organized expeditions to the North American mainland, and⁸⁶ Hernán Cortés led the first major military expedition to invade Mexico in 1519. In 1521 Cortés and a few hundred men and other native allies of the Spaniards conquered the Aztec empire and executed the last Aztec king, Cuauhtémoc.⁸⁷ Cortés razed the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan and built Mexico City on its ruins.



Bust of Cuauhtémoc in Zócalo, Mexico City (Source: Wikipedia)

Devaluation of indigenous cultures: Despite Mexico’s rich pre-Columbian history with the Aztecs and Mayans, following the Spanish conquest in 1519, the Spaniards made a concerted attempt to “civilize and evangelize” while erasing all things related to indigenous cultures. The attempts to Europeanize and Christianize Mexico led to the devaluation of much of the indigenous culture for the next 400 years.⁸⁸

Throughout colonization in the mainland of the Americas, European conquerors pushed indigenous populations into less desirable areas. Spaniards preferred cooler highlands and avoided tropical areas, prone to mosquitoes, yellow fever, and malaria.⁸⁹

The diversity of Amerindian cultures in Central America meant that Spaniards penetrated Central America in stages, not all at once, and each conquest required the establishment of a new government, resulting in decentralization, only nominally under distant control of the European colonizers.⁹⁰

The Spanish colonists disregarded the indigenous people as subjects of the Crown, and forced them to work, pay taxes, and convert to Catholicism. In the Caribbean, the Caribs and the Arawaks were progressively wiped out, with the peaceful Arawaks being the most affected – victims of enslavement and epidemic diseases.⁹¹ The more scattered populations of the smaller eastern Caribbean islands survived much better physically and resisted the epidemics better.

The Spaniards recreated many aspects of their own society in the Americas such as the typically Spanish designs for cities and their richly complex societies.⁹² However, there was a shortage of Spanish women, which led Spaniards to



Portrait of Spanish man and indigenous woman with Mestizo child, 1770 (Source: Wikipedia)


take Indigenous women as their consorts.⁹³ The resulting mixed-blood children were usually illegitimate and were called mestizos. This was the beginning of the mestizo race which would become the dominant ethnic component of Spanish America.⁹⁴

In 1517, the Spanish crown agreed to regulate the treatment of the native populations and authorized the use of African slavery instead of the native people.⁹⁵ However, African slaves were not imported in significant numbers to Mexico and Central America, given the relatively abundant supply of indigenous labor in these areas. As such, the Spanish crown preferred to adopt the *encomienda* system of labor, along with slavery.

Encomienda - It was a Spanish institution that the Spanish government established in the New World as a series of rights and obligations between the *encomendero* (grantee) and the people under his care:⁹⁶

“The indigenous people were required to provide tribute and free labor to the *encomendero*, who was responsible for their welfare, their assimilation into Spanish culture, and their Christianization. In reality, the native population [of Mexico] was accustomed to a similar organization of tributary towns under the Aztec. In time, the *encomenderos* became the New World’s version of Spanish feudal lords. This new source of political power came to worry the Spanish authorities because of the dangers of a local nobility capable of contending peninsular authority.”⁹⁷

HISTORICAL TIMELINE: European Conquest Period



Colonial Period (1509 to 1821)

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean would eventually be carved up by numerous European powers, and their presence would have a disastrous impact on indigenous populations. The Spanish initially established colonies in Mexico, Guatemala, Cuba (1511), and Hispaniola (1502) - present-day Dominican Republic and Haiti.⁹⁸ With the exception of Panama, Central America and Mexico eventually became one large viceroyalty for the Spanish crown, called New Spain.⁹⁹



Map of West Indies (Source: Wikipedia)

Though the Spanish Crown proclaimed authority over the entire Caribbean, Spain was unable to secure the area, and the region became a contested territory for European explorers.¹⁰⁰ The Spanish were followed by the British, the French, and the Dutch. These three groups successfully fought to gain control of certain Spanish territories.

The Pirates of the Caribbean - Once the Spanish conquistadors discovered gold in the Caribbean islands, and in Mexico, the age of piracy began, lasting over two hundred years:¹⁰¹

“Spanish treasure ships, sailing through the Caribbean, were attractive targets for pirates and privateers (government licensed raiders). The Caribbean islands, with many bays and inlets, offered innumerable pirate bases, including Tortuga (off the north coast of Haiti, (New Providence in the Bahamas), and Port Royal, Jamaica (until destroyed by an earthquake in 1692). Spain responded by

fortifying ports (Cartagena, Veracruz, Havana, San Juan and St. Augustine) and organizing convoys (*flotas*).”¹⁰²

The British were relentless in several incursions against the Spanish Crown possessions: in 1625, the English settled Barbados and tried an unsuccessful settlement on Tobago; took possession of Nevis in 1628, and Antigua and Montserrat in 1632; planted a colony on St. Lucia in 1638, but it was destroyed within four years by the Caribs.¹⁰³ By 1655 the British seized Jamaica, the first territory captured from the Spanish. Trinidad, the only other British colony taken from the Spanish, fell in 1797 and was ceded in 1802.¹⁰⁴ By 1750 Jamaica was the most important of Britain’s Caribbean colonies, having surpassed Barbados in economic significance.¹⁰⁵

The French successfully settled Martinique and Guadeloupe, laying the base for later expansion to St. Barthélemy, St. Martin, Grenada, St. Lucia, and western Hispaniola (present day Haiti and Dominican Republic), which was formally ceded by Spain in 1697.¹⁰⁶ In the Caribbean, the Dutch joined the British in settling St. Croix in 1625 and then seized the minuscule, unoccupied islands of Curacao, St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba, on the Venezuelan and Guiana coast.¹⁰⁷

Colonial Societies

As demand for sugar continued to increase in Europe, the cultivation of sugar became the dominating trade in the Caribbean, which led to a profound change in the racial composition of the islands.¹⁰⁸ Africans continued to be imported to the British and French Caribbean to work on sugar plantations; and in Mexico and Central America to work in mines, agriculture, ports, and sugar mills.¹⁰⁹ Since the sugar trade only came later on to Cuba and Puerto Rico, the populations of these islands are not composed of an African-descent majority like most of the other Caribbean islands.¹¹⁰

Spanish colonial societies relied on “purity of blood,” as a basis for social class division.¹¹¹ Today, Latin Americans oftentimes continue to identify themselves and others according to ancestry, physical appearance, and perceived socio-cultural status.¹¹²

Caribbean colonial societies became strictly hierarchical, with masters and slaves, dominated by whites, while economic production was firmly controlled by the European colonial powers.¹¹³ The entire region followed the same societal organization of a three-tiered pyramid with whites on top, browns in the middle and blacks at the bottom.¹¹⁴

African slaves in Haiti – In Haiti, the original inhabitants were almost entirely replaced - as the indigenous population declined, African slave labor became vital to Saint-Domingue’s trade:¹¹⁵

“Slaves arrived by the tens of thousands as coffee and sugar production boomed. Under French colonial rule, nearly 800,000 slaves arrived from Africa, accounting for a third of the entire Atlantic slave trade. Many died from disease and the harsh conditions of the sugar and coffee plantations. Statistics show that there was a complete turnover in the slave population every 20 years. Despite these losses, by 1789 slaves outnumbered the free population four-to-one.”¹¹⁶

In Mexico and Central America the social structure consisted of a two-part elite: the Spanish-born bureaucrats (*peninsulares*) with their power base in the imperial court and the locally born landholders (*criollos*), whose power base was the city councils.¹¹⁷ In the center emerged mixed-bloods or mestizos

in Mexico (known as *ladinos* in Central America) – they were mostly wage laborers, small farmers, merchants or peddlers.¹¹⁸ The indigenous peoples and African slaves were at bottom of the social pyramid, which by the end of the colonial era was composed of only four percent white (*peninsulares* or *criollos*).¹¹⁹ Today, light skin is often associated with higher social status.¹²⁰

Religion

After effective missionary efforts, especially from Franciscans and Dominicans, the Catholic Church became an important source of power and authority in the region.¹²¹

Although Christianity was imposed on the native populations and later on the African slaves, there was a blend of Catholic ideas and practices with native religious beliefs.¹²²


Urban Patterns

The Spanish introduced in the Americas an urban-focused colonial system, linked to Europe by sea trade.¹²³ New World towns such as Mexico City were founded to expand the empire, exploit minerals and riches, which included a classic mercantile model of urban network development.¹²⁴ This system promoted the creation of large cities in the region and also contributed to the strong rural and urban divide, which persist to present times.¹²⁵



West Indian Creole woman with her servant, 1780s (Source: Wikipedia)

HISTORICAL TIMELINE: Colonial Period



Independence Period (19th Century)

In the early nineteenth century, major historical events brought significant changes to the colonies. The main events that influenced the colonies in this time period were Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808; and the egalitarian example of the American and French revolutions, which contributed to the movement for independence in the colonies.¹²⁶

The Independence of Mexico

The breakdown of Spanish royal political authority throughout the American colonies was the main factor that led to the eleven-year period of civil war in Mexico.¹²⁷ The French occupation of Spain created a vacuum of legitimacy, as it was no longer clear that the Spanish-born (*peninsulares*) administration represented any authority or interests other than its own.¹²⁸ It was in this context that a radical Mexico-born *criollo* parish priest, Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla, was able to lead the first truly widespread insurrection for Mexican independence.¹²⁹



Miguel Hidalgo,
1753-1811 (Source:
Wikipedia)

After more than a decade of insurrection, Mexico finally proclaimed independence through the Plan of Iguala in September 1821.¹³⁰ Agustín de Iturbide, a Spanish envoy, signed the Treaty of Córdoba recognizing Mexico's Independence, which was not honored by Spanish Government. The Republic was proclaimed after a military coup in 1822.

The Independence of Central America


In Central America, a continuing decline in cacao production and a drop in the prices of indigo between 1790s and 1810s fueled the *criollos'* dissatisfaction with Spain.¹³¹ After several rebellions against the Spanish, Central America gained independence from Spain in 1821. Panama became part of Gran Colombia, and the rest of Central America became part of newly independent Mexico.

In 1823, Central America declared independence from Mexico, forming the United Provinces of Central America.¹³² In the late 1830s, the present-day countries declared independence, leading to the eventual dissolution of this union in 1840. Panama separated from Colombia and gained independence in 1903, with U.S. assistance, in exchange for the right to construct the lucrative Panama Canal.

Independence of the Caribbean

The French Revolution (1789) with its motto of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity," heavily influenced a slave uprising in Haiti.¹³³ Toussaint Louverture led several years of slave rebellions against the French.¹³⁴ In 1804 Haiti became the first independent Caribbean nation and the world's first black-led Republic.¹³⁵

The Republic of Haiti controlled the entire island of Hispaniola for 22 years, but lost the eastern two-thirds of the island in 1844, when the Dominican Republic successfully fought for independence.



General Toussaint
Louverture

The remaining colonies of the Caribbean would gain independence later in the 19th century (Cuba) and in the 20th century. Several colonies remain to the present day

as overseas territories. These territories include Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Barthélemy, and Saint Martin, among others.


U.S. – Latin America Relations (19th Century)

In 1823, the U.S. under the Monroe Doctrine declared that all the newly independent countries and territories of the Americas were off limits to further European expansion.¹³⁶ The message was clear: “America for the Americans.” It became the cornerstone of U.S. Latin American policy for the next century.¹³⁷



Political cartoon depicting Theodore Roosevelt using the Monroe Doctrine to keep European powers out of the Dominican Republic (Source: Wikipedia)

HISTORICAL TIMELINE: Independence Period



Post-Independence Period (19th Century)

The Spanish American wars of independence were long and violent. They completely disrupted the economy of the new states; from trade, agriculture, and mining to the loss of the uniform monetary union and credit policies of the Spanish empire.¹³⁸ With the economy in shambles, there were fewer jobs and high unemployment. In Mexico, an estimate of 300,000 independence war veterans – representing 15 to 30 percent of the entire adult male population – had no job or income when the war ended.¹³⁹

Independence did not mean improved social transformation. An elite emerged, composed of *criollos*, which replaced the Spanish-born *peninsulares* – and now controlled the political, economic, and social power in the new states.¹⁴⁰ The new elite acquired land from the state, from the church, and from the indigenous people – who lost their lands, often communal lands.¹⁴¹


Poverty persisted after independence among the vast majority of the population, especially in the center and south of Mexico – largely of indigenous origin.¹⁴²

In Mexico two institutional power bases remained after independence: the church and the military.¹⁴³ The church was able to keep its immense wealth intact, and it allowed the church to maintain the largest banking operation in Mexico.¹⁴⁴ Its generous loans to large landowners allowed for the creation of a solid alliance with the new elite, fomenting dissatisfaction from the lowest classes that fueled future opposition.¹⁴⁵

The Rise of the Caudillos

In its forty years after independence, Mexico experienced significant political instability, during which presidents were replaced at least fifty times – most by military coups.¹⁴⁶ *Caudillos*, or military dictators, initially filled the vacuum left by the break-up of colonial rule. The most famous Mexican *caudillo*, Antonio López de Santa Anna, held the presidency nine times.¹⁴⁷

The text below summarizes this period (extracted from the guide *Working with Latin American Militaries* produced by the USMC – CAOCL).¹⁴⁸



Antonio López de Santa Anna (Source: Wikipedia)

“(…) the post-independence period saw the rise of the caudillos: strong men and political leaders in the 19th century wars of independence in the Americas who gained power. The first caudillos were often generals who, leading private armies, used their military might to achieve power in the newly independent states. They typically had both military skill and personal charisma. Competition for power among different caudillos led to long periods of civil war and instability. Note that caudillos were charismatic, authoritarian, willing to exert power, had disdain for weakness or compromise. The imperative need to preserve “face” and honor, illustrates Latin American “macho” culture.”

Recommended Reading:

Latin America's history:

Thomas E. Skidmore
Peter H. Smith and
James N. Green *Modern Latin America*, 7th Edition
(Oxford University Press)

Theresa A. Meade, *A History of Modern Latin America – 1800 to the Present* (Wiley-Blackwell)

A dispute with the United States over the boundaries of Texas led to the Mexican-American War (1846 to 1848) – which the Mexicans call the “War of the North American invasion.”¹⁴⁹ The Treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo brought a formal end to the war in 1848.¹⁵⁰ Mexico agreed to cede 55 percent of its territory to the United States, including parts of present-day Arizona, California, New Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming.¹⁵¹



U.S. Marines storming Chapultepec Castle (Source: Wikipedia)

The Spanish-American War (1895-1898)

The United States seized control of the rebellion in Cuba’s long and bloody struggle for independence.¹⁵² The violent conflict in Cuba captured the attention of Americans because of the economic and political instability that it produced in a region with such close geographical proximity to the United States.¹⁵³ The United States became involved after the *USS Maine* was sunk in Havana, leading the U.S. to declare war against Spain.¹⁵⁴ Spain lost the war and was deprived of all remaining assets in the western hemisphere.¹⁵⁵

Cuba gained independence in 1898. The U.S. had tutelage over Cuba’s affairs, occupying the country until 1902.¹⁵⁶ In 1901, the U.S. invoked the Platt Amendment, which stipulated the right of the United States to intervene in Cuba’s internal affairs and to lease Guantanamo Bay to the U.S., for naval operations.¹⁵⁷

After the Spanish-American War the U.S. became the predominant Caribbean power, taking control of Puerto Rico and assuming the right to control affairs in Cuba and the Dominican Republic.¹⁵⁸

Suggested Videos:

For viewing concise videos on Mexican-American War:

“The Mexican-American War.” *History Channel*.


Available at:

<http://www.history.com/topics/mexican-american-war>



Charge of the 24th and 25th Colored Infantry and Rescue of Rough Riders at San Juan Hill, Puerto Rico, 2 July 1898 (Source: Department of State, photo by Kurz and Allison)

HISTORICAL TIMELINE: Post-Independence Period



Main events of the Twentieth Century

- MCAC – relations with the United States (early 20th century)
- Independence of Panama
- “Banana Wars”
- The Mexican Revolution
- British Caribbean Independence
- Cold War Era - Revolutions in Central America
- U.S. Relations with Latin America (late 20th century)
- Other Significant Events of the Twentieth Century

Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean – relations with the United States (early 20th century)

The early 20th century was marked not only by political unrest, but also by overt U.S. political and economic involvement in several countries in the region. Most U.S. interventions occurred between 1900 and 1932: the United States intervened 14 times in Central America, under the auspices of the **Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine**.¹⁵⁹

Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine - presented by President Theodore Roosevelt in his address to the 1904 Congress.¹⁶⁰


“All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.”

Independence of Panama

In 1903 President Theodore Roosevelt decided that the best choice for the U.S. to gain inter-oceanic access was through the northern end of the Republic of Colombia, but the Colombian government, did not agree to surrendering territory to the American government.¹⁶¹ Therefore Roosevelt promoted an “independence movement” within the northernmost Colombian state of Panama and rapidly recognized the government of a pro-canal American sympathizer there.¹⁶²

Panama began its fight for independence from Colombia on November 3, 1903 and Roosevelt sent the U.S. Navy to assist Panama gain independence from Colombia.¹⁶³ Panama thus acquired nationhood through “Big Stick” diplomacy, with the Canal Zone becoming a de facto U.S. colony.¹⁶⁴

“Banana Wars”



Source: History and Museum Division, USMC

Companies such as the United Fruit Company (UFCO), which owned massive plantations in Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala, enjoyed enormous political influence and counted on authoritarian regimes to maximize profits and stifle worker unrest.¹⁶⁷ Known as the “Banana Wars,” this series of more than 35 U.S. interventions, from 1901 to 1934 in Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti were mostly carried out by U.S. Marines.¹⁶⁸

The Banana Wars were a response to perceived threats to American strategic, economic, and commercial interests in the region.¹⁶⁹ President Roosevelt asserted that too many of America’s southern neighbors had “fallen into the revolutionary habit.”¹⁷⁰ Washington believed that American intervention allow for the survival of pro-American regimes.

The U.S. Marines intervened so often in Central America that their reports on their strategies and tactics were compiled in *The Small Wars Manual*, which was published in 1940.¹⁷¹

These U.S. interventions became the focus of intense anti-Americanism and resentment in the region.¹⁷² In 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt took office, he launched his “Good

After the Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, each time a government that supported the U.S. was in danger, the U.S. would temporarily occupy the country or assist local governments in putting down the rebellion.

In Central America, coffee and bananas dominated the economy of many countries after the turn of the century: in strict economic terms only Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama were “banana republics” and Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua were “coffee countries.”¹⁶⁵ As American investment and military aid poured in, regional governments did everything possible to gain and sustain U.S. favor. Local currencies were invariably linked to the dollar, and U.S. companies were granted many special privileges.¹⁶⁶

Recommended Readings

For details on the USMC involvement in the Banana Wars:

Marines in the Dominican Republic 1916-1924 (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps) Available at: https://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Publications/The_Banana_Wars_1899_1934.aspx

William Rosenau et al., *United States Marine Corps Advisors* (DRM-2013-U-005404 Strategic Studies, CAN, August 2013): 7-25. Available at: <http://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/138/Hip%20Pocket%20Briefs/CNA,%20USMC%20Advisors%20Aug2013.pdf>

Neighbor Policy,” aimed to improve relations with the nations of Central America.¹⁷³

President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1933 “Good Neighbor Policy:”

“In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor—the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others. No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another. The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.”¹⁷⁴

The Mexican Revolution



President Porfirio Díaz
(Source: Wikipedia)

The Mexican revolution of 1910 is considered one of the most important historical developments in Mexico’s twentieth century history.

The period known as the “Porfiriato” (1876-1910) during Porfirio Díaz’s rule, represented modernization and economic success.¹⁷⁵ Ironically, Mexico’s economic success during the Porfiriato had negative social consequences: the rural peasantry bore most of the cost of modernization;

government seizure of private and communal land increased the landless rural population and led to further concentration of land ownership.¹⁷⁶

Recommended Readings

For details on the Mexican Revolution and Mexican culture:

Jorge G. Castañeda,
*“Mañana Forever?”
Mexico and the
Mexicans* (New York:
Vintage Books, 2012)

The wealth that flowed into urban areas during the Porfiriato fostered the growth of an urban middle class that identified strongly with the European manners and tastes adopted by the urban upper class.¹⁷⁷ This further aggravated the schism between urban and rural Mexico, breeding growing discontent, which led to years of civil war. The full blown revolution began when Francisco Madero issued the Plan of San Luis Potosí, promising democracy, federalism, agrarian reform and worker’s rights and declaring war on the Díaz regime.¹⁷⁸

By 1911 the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship came to an end, and Madero was elected president despite conflict and violence continuing through the next decade. The agrarian rebels Emiliano Zapata in southern Mexico and Pancho Villa in the north, both heroes of the peasant and working class, had higher goals and thus refused to submit to presidential authority. A new constitution was promulgated - the first-ever to recognize social guarantees and collective labor rights.

The Mexican Revolution brought a search for a new identity - The devaluation of much of the indigenous culture for 400 years was reversed in the 1920s during what has become known as the cultural phase of the Revolution:¹⁷⁹

“(…) a conscious effort was undertaken to search for a national cultural identity known as *mexicanidad* (“Mexicanness”). The search for this new national consciousness resulted in a renewed appreciation of the advanced civilizations encountered by the Spanish in 1519. Since the 1920s,

extensive scholarship has been devoted to native Mexican values and the cultural expressions of those indigenous values in contemporary society.”¹⁸⁰

British Caribbean Independence

In the 1950s, the British pushed for more efficiency, centralization and self-government of the Caribbean colonies.¹⁸¹ From 1957 to 1961, several island territories (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, and Montserrat) formed the Federation of the West Indies with the intention of gaining independence as a single state.¹⁸² However, with irreconcilable differences among the principal members (Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica), the Federation dissolved.

In 1962, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago became the first British colonies in the region to achieve independence.¹⁸³ The Bahamas became a Commonwealth in 1969 and gained complete independence in 1973. British Honduras in Central America was the last, becoming self-governing in 1964. Renamed Belize in 1973, it finally gained independence in 1981.¹⁸⁴ All negotiations were peaceful, as Britain wished to dissociate itself of its empire after World War II.¹⁸⁵

Cultural differences: There are extensive cultural and historical ties that bind the islands of the Commonwealth Caribbean. For instance, the islands’ populations clearly regard themselves as distinct from their Latin American neighbors and culturally identify more closely with the British Commonwealth of Nations than with Latin America.¹⁸⁶

World War II

“The Aztecs Eagles” Squadron 201 of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force - A Joint Mexican-United States Commission on Continental Defense was established soon after Pearl Harbor’s attack. In May of 1942, off the coast of Miami, a German U-boat sank two Mexican oil tankers. Mexico participated in the war effort mainly as a supplier of labor and raw materials for the United States, but Mexico also sent a squadron of fighter pilots to train and fly missions with the Americans, which became known as Squadron 201 of the Mexican Expeditionary Air Force.¹⁸⁷ The squadron fought in the Philippines in 1945 and came back to Mexico as heroes.¹⁸⁸ This was the first time in history that Mexicans fought in a foreign land, and it was also the peak period of United States influence on the Mexican armed forces.¹⁸⁹ In the immediate postwar years the Mexican military reorganized, using the United States armed forces as a model, but Mexico returned to semi-isolation.¹⁹⁰

The post war period witnessed much political instability and social unrest in the MCAC Region. The U.S. led the creation in 1948, of the Organization of the American States (OAS), which sought to prevent communists from acquiring control in Latin American countries by well meaning, if incomplete, social and economic aid.¹⁹¹

Cold War Era - Revolutions in Central America

During the Cold War, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were each fiercely trying to maintain their world view to prevail – democracy versus communism. In this context, Central America and the Caribbean became a major challenge for U.S. foreign policy. The dominant motive for U.S. policies in the region

became focused on security issues, “to keep things from veering out of control where they could be exploited by others viewed as hostile.”¹⁹²

The U.S.-sponsored Guatemala Coup

The first perceived communist threat in the region came from Guatemala, where democratically elected president Jacobo Arbenz made the mistake of allowing Communist party members in his government.¹⁹³ Arbenz, a nationalist who attempted to implement agrarian reform in Guatemala, ran into the implacable opposition of the United Fruit Company and the United States.¹⁹⁴ The Eisenhower Administration organized, through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), an exile invasion of Guatemala that overthrew Arbenz in 1954.¹⁹⁵ The coup marked a turning point in Guatemala’s history, as it virtually eliminated the political center, leaving only a left and a right, with the right in control.¹⁹⁶ The country was then plagued by military coups and human rights abuses with over 80,000 dead by the late 1980s.¹⁹⁷

The Cuban Revolution

The revolution in Cuba was fomented by decades of corrupt and brutal governments.¹⁹⁸ The Cuban Revolution was led by Fidel Castro, a radical nationalist who in 1959, aimed to destroy the ruthless government of Fulgencio Batista, a dictator who had dominated Cuba’s politics for 25 years.¹⁹⁹ Castro entered Havana as a national hero after Batista left the country, but he proceeded to execute thousands of opponents and dissenters by firing squads in the first days of the revolution.²⁰⁰ He imprisoned and tortured over 75,000 and forced 200,000 to flee to Florida.²⁰¹ By his second year in power Castro had nationalized the economy associated with the Soviet Bloc, established an authoritarian regime, and launched a de facto communist regime on the island.²⁰²



Fidel Castro (Source: Wikimedia)

In many ways, the Cuban communist revolution inspired and supported the violent guerrilla movements throughout Latin America. Armed groups called for the people to take up arms to overthrow their governments in order to implement state control of the economy. Later, three civil wars erupted in Central America (Guatemala, 1960-96; El Salvador, 1979-92; and Nicaragua, 1979-1990), with deadly outcomes.²⁰³

The Bay of Pigs Invasion:²⁰⁴

“In 1960, President Dwight D. Eisenhower directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to develop a plan for the invasion of Cuba and overthrow of the Castro regime. The CIA organized an operation in which it trained and funded a force of exiled counter-revolutionary Cubans serving as the armed wing of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, known as Brigade 2506. Following his election in November 1960, President John F. Kennedy learned of the invasion plan, concluded that Fidel Castro was a Soviet client posing a threat to all of Latin America and, after consultations with his advisors, gave his consent for the CIA-planned clandestine invasion of Cuba to proceed. Launched from Guatemala, the attack went wrong almost from the start. Components of Brigade 2506 landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961 and were defeated within 2 days by Cuban armed forces under the direct command of Castro.”²⁰⁵

The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 - Text extracted from the United States Department of State Office of the Historian:²⁰⁶

“The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a direct and dangerous confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and was the moment when the two superpowers came closest to nuclear conflict. After the failed U.S. attempt to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion, in July 1962 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev reached a secret agreement with Cuban premier Fidel Castro to place Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to deter any future invasion attempt.

Construction of several missile sites began in the late summer, but U.S. intelligence discovered evidence of a general Soviet arms build-up on Cuba, including Soviet IL–28 bombers and medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs). These images were processed and presented to the White House the next day, thus precipitating the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

On October 22, Kennedy ordered a naval “quarantine” of Cuba. The use of “quarantine” instead of “blockade” also enabled the United States to receive the support of the Organization of American States. That same day, Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev declaring that the United States would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba, and demanded that the Soviets dismantle the missile bases already under construction, and withdrawal of all offensive weapons.

Kennedy’s public television message was evocative of the Monroe Doctrine: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced a military readiness status of DEFCON 3 as U.S. naval forces began implementation of the quarantine and plans accelerated for a military strike on Cuba.

On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message with a statement that the U.S. “blockade” was an “act of aggression” and that Soviet ships bound for Cuba would be ordered to proceed. U.S. reconnaissance flights over Cuba indicated the Soviet missile sites were nearing operational readiness. With no apparent end to the crisis in sight, U.S. forces were placed at DEFCON 2—meaning war involving the Strategic Air Command was imminent.

On October 26, the crisis took a dramatic turn. ABC News correspondent John Scali reported to the White House that he had been approached by a Soviet agent suggesting that an agreement could be reached in which the Soviets would remove their missiles from Cuba if the United States promised not to invade the island. While White House staff scrambled to assess the validity of this “back channel” offer, Khrushchev sent Kennedy a long, emotional message that raised the specter of nuclear holocaust, and presented a proposed resolution that remarkably resembled what Scali reported earlier that day. “If there is no intention,” he said, “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.”

The next morning, October 28, Khrushchev issued a public statement that Soviet missiles would be dismantled and removed from Cuba. The crisis was over but the naval quarantine continued until the Soviets agreed to remove their IL–28 bombers from Cuba and, on November 20, 1962, the United States ended its quarantine.

The Cuban missile crisis stands as a singular event during the Cold War and strengthened Kennedy’s image domestically and internationally. Kennedy, Khrushchev, and their advisers, struggled throughout the crisis to clearly understand each other’s true intentions, while the world

hung on the brink of possible nuclear war. In an effort to prevent this from happening again, a direct telephone link between the White House and the Kremlin was established; it became known as the “Hotline.” Second, having approached the brink of nuclear conflict, both superpowers began to reconsider the nuclear arms race and took the first steps in agreeing to a nuclear Test Ban Treaty.”

The Alliance for Progress – It was a U.S. policy introduced by President John F. Kennedy. It grew out of the fear of increased Soviet and Cuban influence in Latin America, the 1961–1969 Alliance for Progress was in essence a Marshall Plan for Latin America.²⁰⁷ The United States pledged \$20 billion in assistance (grants and loans), to be matched by the other members of the alliance. However, twenty years later the Alliance did little to change basic conditions.²⁰⁸ The Alliance did not achieve all its lofty goals. According to one study, only 2 percent of economic growth in 1960s Latin America directly benefited the poor; and there was a general deterioration of United States-Latin American relations during the same period.²⁰⁹ With the end of the Cold War, the United States began to take a longer-term, more economically focused view of Latin America.

Nicaragua’s Sandinista revolution

The United States kept a contingent force in Nicaragua almost continually from 1912 until 1933.²¹⁰ After that, the Somoza dynasty era began with Somoza García and family directly controlling political power, with complete support of the United States. He did that directly as president, or indirectly through carefully chosen successor presidents, from 1936 until the last member of the Somoza’s dynasty presidency in 1977.²¹¹ Indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population and abuse of human rights by National Guard members further tarnished the international image of the Somoza government and damaged the economy.²¹²



Nicaraguan Contra Militia, 1987 (Source: Wikipedia)

By 1979 Somoza’s main opposition forces had been consolidated under the Sandinista guerrillas party FSLN and heavy fighting broke out all over the country.²¹³ By then, the FSLN was better equipped with weapons flowing from Venezuela, Panama, and Cuba, mostly through Costa Rica.²¹⁴ The FSLN army entered Managua, culminating the Nicaraguan revolution, with a death toll of approximately 50,000 and 150,000 Nicaraguans in exile.²¹⁵ The five-member junta entered the Nicaraguan capital the next day and assumed power, reiterating its pledge to work for political pluralism, a mixed economic system, and a nonaligned foreign policy.²¹⁶

The “Contras” - Text extracted from the United States Department of State Office of the Historian:²¹⁷

“Secretary of State Alexander Haig accused the Sandinista government of exporting terrorism to El Salvador and in April 1981, Reagan terminated economic assistance to Nicaragua citing its involvement in supporting Salvadoran rebels. After several failed diplomatic attempts to dissuade Managua from supporting FMLN activities, Reagan opted to support a clandestine guerrilla force to quash the Sandinista training and arming of Salvadoran guerillas. These “Contras,” [as in “counterrevolutionaries],” were primarily ex-Nicaraguan National Guard members who had gathered in Honduran territory. The Contras launched their first major attack against the Sandinistas in March 1982. In response, the Sandinistas

undertook a dramatic build-up of military manpower assisted by Soviet and Cuban advisers and weaponry, mostly from the Soviet bloc.”²¹⁸

El Salvador’s Civil War

Keeping with the anticommunist tone of the times, in El Salvador, the U.S. provided military training and assistance to the armed forces, especially to a paramilitary group called *Orden* – a peasant organization known as the Nationalist Democratic Organization (*Organización Democrática Nacionalista - Orden*).²¹⁹ *Orden*, provided a rural intelligence network for the security forces, with their membership totaling 100,000 by the late 1970s.²²⁰ By then the military was also confronted with left-wing terrorism in urban areas while popular support for radical leftist groups increased.²²¹ Leftist guerrilla groups stepped up their operations – assassinations, kidnappings, and bombings – as retaliation against government forces, which was part of a larger strategy of impelling the country further toward political anarchy.²²²

U.S. Invasion of Grenada

In 1983 American forces invaded Grenada to forestall installation of a Marxist regime.²²³ The invasion ended that Caribbean island nation’s four-year socialist experiment.²²⁴ President Ronald Reagan’s decision to occupy the country and replace the government proved to be quite popular in the United States, with polls indicating that 63% of the public supported the invasion.²²⁵

Tip: Marines operating in the region should be aware that the United States provided Cold War support for these repressive regimes and aid to their security forces. The history of U.S. support for regional governments is a sensitive topic for Central Americans and residents of the Caribbean and it contributes to significant present-day anti-American feelings. For some people, the presence of American troops in the region might not be viewed positively. Avoid discussing recent political history related to the 20th century and beyond, as the country you are operating in could still be very polarized on these issues.²²⁶

Transition to Democracy

Today, democracy has been restored and most countries have reached a general amnesty for actions committed on both sides. Cuba remains the only dictatorship in the Americas. No dictatorship in Latin America has been more brutal and lasted longer than the one in Cuba.

Mexico was a regional exception to the Cold War conflicts that took place in the region. Unlike Central America, there were no civil conflicts that became proxy wars for the United States during the Cold War. The country did not experience any coups, anti-Communist military dictatorships, or Marxist-fueled unrest. To the contrary, Mexico experienced political stability throughout much of the twentieth century due to the dominance of one political party from 1929 to 2000.

Other Significant Events in the 20th Century

1989: The U.S. invaded Panama to oust and arrest corrupt President Noriega, who had nullified a presidential election won by opposition candidate Guillermo Endara.²²⁷ The Code-named “Operation Just Cause” fighting lasted for five days. After taking refuge in the Vatican Embassy, Noriega

eventually surrendered to U.S. authorities and Endara regained his presidency.²²⁸ Noriega was tried in a United States court and convicted on charges of drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering.²²⁹

1990s: Central America and the Caribbean stabilized considerably from the volatile days after independence and during the Cold War. Much of the region transitioned to democracy and became more integrated into the world economy through several trade agreements. Mexico became one of the world's largest economies, and part of a free trade agreement with the United States and Canada, known as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). However, social inequality remained a considerable challenge for the region.

2000s - Present: Despite the relative political stability, all three sub-regions have faced significant security, political, and economic challenges. All have become important conduits for drugs to the United States and Europe, and are areas where well-funded and violent drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) operate.

Due to its proximity to the United States and the presence of highly funded and well-armed drug cartels, Mexico has become a central point of concern for the United States. Since 2007, Mexican drug cartels have engaged in a bloody feud against each other for regional control and against the Mexican government, leading to thousands of deaths. (*See details in Chapter 7, Regional Security*)

U.S. policy toward the region is now focused on improving security and governance conditions. The latest pillars of this policy include the Central American Regional Security Initiative, the Mérida Initiative, and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.^{230 231}

Recommended Reading:

For an analysis of the road to democracy and peace in Central America:

Jack Spence, "War and Peace in Central America," *Hemisphere Initiatives* (Brookline, Massachusetts: November 2004). Available at: <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/warpeace.pdf>


For a detailed narrative of the **USMC invasions of Grenada and Panama**:

Lt Col Ronald H. Spector, *U.S. Marines in Grenada 1983, History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps* (Washington, DC: 1987).

Available at: <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20Grenada%201983%20%20PCN%2019000309700.pdf>

Lt Col Nicholas E. Reynolds, *Just Cause: Marine Operation in Panama, 1988-1990* (Washington, DC: 1996). Available at: <http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Just%20Cause%20Marine%20Operations%20in%20Panama%201988-1990%20PCN%20190003134001.pdf>

HISTORICAL TIMELINE: Twentieth Century



Government and Politics

Why People and Society Matter to You as a Marine

Most people live in states governed by formal and informal institutions. Marines need to know how power and authority are distributed in the state by studying the formal and informal structures of governments in the region. In addition, Marines need to understand how people, groups, and institutions exercise power and authority, in other words, what comprises politics in the states.

Government and Politics

With the exception of Cuba, all of the Central American and Caribbean countries covered in this chapter, as well as Mexico, are democracies with a popularly elected government and universal suffrage. Some countries, such as Belize, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, are constitutional parliamentary democracies.²³² As former British colonies, they are also members of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of 53 independent countries, almost all of which were formerly under British rule.²³³ Cuba stands out in the region as the only communist state in the Western Hemisphere. Other islands of the Caribbean not covered in this chapter are overseas territories of other European nations and of the United States, such as the Turks and Caicos Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the United States' Virgin Islands.

Government Type, Suffrage and Elections:

Mexico: Federal republic; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age; universal and compulsory; *Elections:* president elected by popular vote for a single six-year term.

Guatemala: Constitutional democratic republic; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age; universal; *Elections:* president and vice president elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a four-year term (may not serve consecutive terms). **Note:** active duty members of the armed forces and police by law cannot vote and are restricted to their barracks on Election Day.

Honduras: Democratic constitutional republic; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age; universal and compulsory; *Elections:* president elected by popular vote for a four-year term.

El Salvador and Nicaragua: Republic; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age; universal; *Elections:* president and vice president elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a single five-year term.

Costa Rica: Democratic republic; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age; universal and compulsory; *Elections:* president and vice presidents elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a single four-year term.

Panama: Constitutional democracy; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age; universal and compulsory; *Elections:* president and vice president elected on the same ticket by popular vote for five-year terms

(president not eligible for immediate reelection and must sit out two additional terms (10 years) before becoming eligible for reelection).

Haiti: Republic; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age; *Elections:* universal president elected by popular vote for a five-year term (may not serve consecutive terms; prime minister appointed by the president, ratified by the National Assembly).

Dominican Republic: Democratic republic; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age, universal and compulsory.

Note: members of the armed forces and national police by law cannot vote.

Jamaica and the Bahamas: Constitutional parliamentary democracy and a Commonwealth realm; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age, universal; *Elections:* the monarchy is hereditary; governor general appointed by the monarch on the recommendation of the prime minister; following legislative elections, the leader of the majority party or the leader of the majority coalition in the House of Representatives is appointed prime minister by the governor general.

Belize and Grenada: Parliamentary democracy and a Commonwealth realm; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age, universal; *Elections:* hereditary monarchy; governor general appointed by the monarch; following legislative elections every 5 years, the leader of the majority party or the leader of the majority coalition usually appointed prime minister by the governor general; prime minister recommends the deputy prime minister.

Trinidad and Tobago: Parliamentary democracy; *Suffrage:* 18 years of age, universal; *Elections:* Tobago has a unicameral House of Assembly with 12 members serving four-year terms.

Cuba: Communist state; *Suffrage:* 16 years of age; universal; *Elections:* president and vice presidents elected by the National Assembly for a five-year term.

(Source: CIA World Factbook – 2014)

Although most countries in the region are democracies, the level of political freedoms and civil liberties in the region vary significantly from country to country. The table below lists some of the trends of political freedoms and civil liberties as presented in Freedom House's 2014 report:

Political Freedoms and Civil Liberties in the region:²³⁴

Honduras elections were deemed fair and competitive. While the vote was an indication of progress toward political normalcy after the 2009 coup that removed President Manuel Zelaya from office, Honduras still confronts high rates of poverty and spiraling crime statistics.

Cuba showed a modest decline in state surveillance, a broadening of political discussion in private and on the internet, and increased access to foreign travel and self-employment. Cuba also registered a small step forward due to the easing of visa restrictions and the growth of the private economic sector, though the island remains among the world's most repressive countries.

Nicaragua's political rights rating improved in civil liberties, advances in the corruption and transparency environment.

Belize received a downward rating due to reports of corruption across several government ministries related to the sale of passports and other documents, as well as an inadequate response by law enforcement agencies and gradual progress in women's rights and efforts to combat human trafficking.

The Dominican Republic's civil liberties rating declined due to a decision by the Constitutional Court to retroactively strip the citizenship of tens of thousands of Dominicans of

Haitian descent.

Panama's political rights rating declined due to concerns that authorities were not investigating allegations of corruption against President Ricardo Martinelli and other officials, as well as verbal attacks against, and the withholding of information from, journalists who write about government corruption.

Weak Judicial Systems

The **judicial branches** of many countries in the MCAC region tend to be politically vulnerable and inefficient, lacking the ability to provide proper checks and balances on the executive branch.²³⁵ Societies that do not trust their institutions are often societies that have a high crime rate, such as many of the countries in Central America.

Judicial branch is part of the government, along with the Legislative and the Executive. The Judicial branch is independent of the other branches. This branch has the sole authority to issue binding opinions on the constitution and laws.²³⁶

In the early 1980s a region-wide concern for re-democratizing Latin America's governance institutions led the way for judicial reforms. These reforms first occurred in the less advanced Central American countries, such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.²³⁷ The reason was a practical one, the donors, such as the United Nations and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) were active in these countries and provided funding to move the reforms ahead. In countries with peace accords (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua) judicial reform figured among the commitments made by the signatories.²³⁸ Unfortunately current studies point out that throughout Central America the results of such reforms have been far from satisfactory.²³⁹

“(...) judges still struggle with relatively small caseloads – an annual average of under 300, largely simple filings. As these countries were among the first to introduce new criminal procedures, it is particularly distressing that signs of improved performance are so few and that in some instances, the new rules have facilitated the reintroduction of old vices – offering more opportunities for bribes, stopping cases in their tracks. Available statistics suggest that police and prosecutorial closures of criminal investigations remain low, especially for the most serious crimes.”²⁴⁰

Additionally, in nearly half of the region's countries, observers have identified corruption networks centered in the supreme courts. Similar networks among police and prosecutors have also been identified.²⁴¹

Costa Rica stands out in the region with its long history of democratic stability. Even though enforcement of Costa Rica's laws against corruption has sometimes been limited, a series of high-profile cases in recent years involving directors of state-owned enterprises as well as two ex-presidents has resulted in some convictions.²⁴² The judicial branch is independent, but there are often substantial delays in the judicial process.²⁴³

Mexico's Judicial Reforms

Mexico's judicial system reform is an intrinsic part of the Mexico's current challenges and the sector receives direct technical and financial assistance from the United States as part of the Mérida Initiative (*details presented in Chapter 7*)

Mexico's 2008 constitutional reforms sought to overhaul the judicial system, changing it from the archaic inquisitorial system based on the Napoleonic code to the oral system, like the one in the United States.²⁴⁴ In Mexico's traditional inquisitorial system there was no trial by jury; it consisted of a series of fact-gathering hearings; the record of the proceedings was not available to the public, nor did the judge have to be present or even meet the defendant.²⁴⁵ The reform goals were meant to boost conviction rate and fair trials by introducing adversarial criminal procedures, offering more transparency, accountability; building courthouses open to the public and ultimately helping to improve efficiency and reducing corruption in the judicial system, with a complete rollout by 2016.²⁴⁶

Despite the judicial reforms passed in 2008, Mexico still lacks a way to effectively deal with corrupt judges. One explanation for that is Mexico's previous legal system has centuries of tradition and culture behind it.²⁴⁷ This refers to a well-known fact that Mexico has a **culture of impunity**. Studies indicate that at the time of the reforms' passage, little attention was given to the drivers of corruption in the judicial branch.²⁴⁸

Culture of impunity is a term often used in relation to countries in Latin America and elsewhere, where human rights abuses remain unpunished, with observance of the rule of law; with structurally inefficient judicial systems, in which crime and corruption is perpetuated.²⁴⁹

The U.S. has played a key role in assisting Mexico with its judicial system reform, which is a component of the U.S. \$1.9 billion assistance program to Mexico – The Mérida Initiative (*See details of the Mérida Plan on Chapter 7, Regional Security*). The package includes training 5,000 Mexican prison officials; training 7,500 Mexican judicial personnel at the federal level and 19,000 at the state level.²⁵⁰ Additionally, Mexican jurists run mock trials with American judges to prepare for the transition to oral hearings that will replace the enigmatic closed-door meetings.²⁵¹



Source: Insightcrime


Corruption in Politics and Governance

According to Transparency International, corruption affects every aspect of governance and undermines democracy:

“From children denied an education, to elections decided by money not votes, public sector corruption comes in many forms. Bribes and backroom deals don't just steal resources from the most vulnerable – they undermine justice and economic development, and destroy public trust in leaders.”

The 2013 Transparency International Perception of Corruption Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt a country's public sector is perceived to be. A score below 50 indicates a serious corruption problem. In Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, the Bahamas and Puerto Rico are seen as the least corrupt countries in the region with only a score of 71 and 62, respectively (the United States has a 73 score). However, all the other remaining countries in the region present high corruption indexes, with Haiti leading the countries with the highest corruption index in region, followed by a tie between the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Nicaragua, with a score of 29. No data was available for Belize or Grenada.

Mexico, Central America and Caribbean Corruption Perception Index:



Source: Transparency International – 2013

In addition to the main characteristics of the political systems described above, there are a few indicators that effectively provide an idea of the real state of democracy in a given country. Some of these indicators are freedom of press, social media, social unrest, and mobilization.

Freedom of Press

Most countries in the MCAC region have large and relatively free media sectors, with television broadcast, radio, and the press being the largest sources of information for most people. People's ability to get unbiased and objective information in Mexico, Central America and Caribbean has been increasingly threatened. Freedom House reports that the region has seen considerable backsliding in the past decade, with an increase of violence against journalists who report on crimes and political scandals, as well as “sustained government hostility” to media criticism.²⁵²

According to **Freedom House's rating methodology**, the level of freedom of press in Mexico has been rated “Not Free” since 2011 primarily because of ongoing violence against journalists carried out with impunity.²⁵³ Press freedom in Mexico has drastically declined over the past decade, and although journalism is flourishing in some aspects, the environment for media has become dangerous, unstable, and insecure.²⁵⁴

Freedom House's rating methodology: “Each country and territory is assigned two numerical ratings—from 1 to 7—for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The two ratings are based on scores assigned to 25 more detailed indicators. The average of a country or territory's political rights and civil liberties ratings determines whether it is Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. The methodology, which is derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is applied to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographic location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development.”²⁵⁵

Freedom of press in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua is considered “partly free” since journalists often face threats and practice self-censorship when covering drug trafficking, corruption, organized crime, and human rights violations.²⁵⁶ Threats come from public officials, drug traffickers, individuals aligned with companies operating in indigenous communities, and local security forces.²⁵⁷ For example, in Guatemala alone, in a period of only 10 months, as of mid-October 2013, there had been more than 80 attacks or threats against journalists.²⁵⁸

Costa Rica enjoys a “free” rated status, while Panama is also rated free but with a “partly free” rating for press.²⁵⁹ Cuba is completely “not free” (including internet).²⁶⁰

Political Institutions - Mexico

Peña Nieto’s presidency in 2012 was a clear victory for the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Institutional Revolutionary Party)-PRI (in Spanish), which had lost power in 2000 after seven decades governing Mexico.²⁶¹ Mexico has seen a dramatic change in its political system, with a profound democratic opening that has reshaped the country’s political landscape.²⁶² Mexico is now a truly democratic country with an outspoken media and extensive competition among political parties.²⁶³ Although all of these changes are extremely positive, there are some shortcomings to Mexico’s democratic shift: in many ways, it has taken place without consolidating the institutions that help make democratic governments accountable to its citizens and ensure rule of law.²⁶⁴ According to scholars in the field, these changes include:

“(...) the absence of sufficient counterweights for citizens to monitor and track what their local governments do, and for federal authorities to keep track of how federal expenditures that are transferred to state and local governments are spent. While the federal government has developed increasingly sophisticated mechanisms for citizens to access public records, most state and local governments remain painfully opaque. This has allowed patronage and the misuse of public funds to flourish even as competitive elections have become the norm.”²⁶⁵

Mexico has a tradition of “no reelection.”²⁶⁶ deputies and senators are not eligible to immediately succeed themselves. The Congress is one of the few democratically elected legislatures in the world that is completely renewed at each election. *Constitution of Mexico, 1917, article 50, 59* (amended in 1966)

People and Society

Why People and Society Matters to You as a Marine

Missions across the range of military operations require Marines to understand, and work with, foreign populations. Knowing the people in the region, including their ethnicities, languages, and religions, as well as the way they live in social entities, enables Marines to create a mental picture of the human dimension of the region.

Demographics

There are a total of 202.2 million people living in the three sub-regions of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean today.²⁶⁷ Approximately 80 percent live in Mexico, and Central America, with the remaining 20 percent living in the Caribbean.²⁶⁸ As the largest and most populous country of the entire region, Mexico's population accounts for more than 120 million people (2014) - almost 60 percent of the region's entire population.

Most of the population in this region tends to be concentrated in urban areas. Mexico is a highly urbanized country, with 78.1 percent of its population living in urban centers.²⁶⁹ However, despite a significant population concentration in urban areas in the region, there is still a sizeable rural population. In Central America, the rural population is estimated to be 47 percent.²⁷⁰ In the Caribbean, the percentage of rural population varies greatly by country: from a low 17 percent in the Bahamas, to 91 percent in Trinidad and Tobago.²⁷¹ From 1961 to 2000, Mexico's rural population density was the lowest of all Central American Nations.²⁷²



Recommended Reading:

For a detailed analysis on the Caribbean society:


Norman Girvan,
“Societies at Risk? The Caribbean and Global Change,” *Management of Social Transformations, Discussion Paper Series – N0.17*, (UNESCO).
Available at:
<http://www.unesco.org/most/girvan.htm#caribbean>

The population of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean is mostly made up of young people.²⁷³ This is especially true for Mexico and Central America, where the share of the population under the age of 15 varies between 31 percent (Panama) and 44 percent (Guatemala).²⁷⁴ In Mexico, one-third of its large population is between the age of 12 and 29. While the population in the Caribbean is also mostly young, it has a larger middle-aged population than in Central America. Cuba and Trinidad and Tobago are the exceptions in the region, with a middle-aged population comprising the majority of their populations.²⁷⁵

A large young population can become a security issue when youth unemployment rates are high. In Central America, 54 percent of the labor force is under 35 years of age, and in urban areas, youth unemployment is at 30 percent.²⁷⁶ Some unemployed youth can become potential recruits for gang violence or illicit drug trafficking. In Mexico, gangs have been known to actively target the youth as recruits.²⁷⁷




MCAC region population



(Source: CIA World Factbook, April 2014)

Population Distribution – Urban and Rural Areas

The map below shows that the urban centers and the border areas have a high population density. Population density along the U.S.-Mexico border is due to industrialization in the northern cities.




Source: SEDAC/CIESIN – Columbia University

The Human Footprint Index (HF) expresses as a percentage the relative human influence in each geographic area.²⁷⁸ HF values range from 0 to 100. A value of zero represents the least influenced - the “most wild” part of the biome with value of 100 representing the most influenced (least wild) part of the biome.

The MCAC region has a high urbanization rate, but urban growth has been concentrated in the largest cities and near the coasts, where one quarter or more of the total population resides.²⁷⁹ In Central America, approximately 70 percent of the population live in urban areas.²⁸⁰ Mexico presents a higher average of 78.1 percent.²⁸¹ There are more urbanization pattern differences in the Caribbean. While Cuba has an urbanization level of 75 percent, Trinidad and Tobago has only 13.7 percent, while Haiti and Jamaica are at 53.4 percent and 52 percent respectively.²⁸²

Urban agglomerations in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean - MCAC (2011):



Source: United Nations

Urban Areas and Urban Problems

Considered a megacity, Mexico City (22 million, estimate for metro area, which is nearly a fifth of Mexico’s 120 million people) is Latin America’s biggest city.²⁸³ Other cities such as Guadalajara – the country’s second largest city, and Monterrey attract migrants from rural areas as well, as populations have shifted from the countryside.²⁸⁴ The huge influx of migrants through the 1980s brought high unemployment and poverty. Water shortages and polluted supplies, and pollution from traffic have reached four times the World Health Organization limits.²⁸⁵

Guatemala City (2.5 million) is Guatemala’s principal manufacturing center, but up to half of its workforce is unemployed, and huge numbers occupy squatter settlements that lack sewage and electricity.²⁸⁶ In Panama, three-quarters of the economic activity takes place in Panama City and Colon, with significant income discrepancies between urban and rural areas.²⁸⁷

A similar phenomenon is seen in the Caribbean, where increasing urbanization continues as high unemployment and housing conditions continue to deteriorate.²⁸⁸ Many cities such as Kingston, Jamaica simply cannot cope with the high influx of people, resulting in more congestion, shanty towns, pollution and crime.



Mexico City (Source: Wikipedia)

Mexico's various regions create enormous inequalities between urban city dwellers and rural peasants. Wide disparities in wealth, social status, and educational levels exist across different sections of Mexican society and across the country's many regions.²⁸⁹ The Federal District around Mexico City continues to monopolize Mexico's economic, political, cultural, and financial essence, contributing to urban-rural divide. There are many reasons why social and regional differences exist (between northern and southern Mexico, for example): one of the most significant is infrastructure.

Rural Areas

From colonial times until the mid-20th century, agriculture in Latin America presented two extreme patterns throughout the region: great estates – *haciendas, estancias* – on one end, and on the other, small peasant plots growing subsistence crops.²⁹⁰ As land was often the basis of prestige in colonial societies, elite estate families, prominent in political affairs, resisted land reform.²⁹¹

Land reform has been promised by politicians since colonial times. Land re-distribution has been promoted mostly by left-leaning political parties, by the Roman Catholic clergy, and was part of the political agenda of violent guerrillas in the 1960s and 1970s.²⁹² Despite some positive successful land reform initiatives, problems remain. Land reforms still have many advocates but since urban areas now contain most of the population, the reform movement has diminished and lost a political base.²⁹³

Many migrants from rural areas perceived the urban areas as possible centers of advancement, with wage work in the city seen as preferable. The main reason for that perception was because rigid hierarchical rural societies offered little opportunities for societal mobility. Access to land was controlled by large landowning elites and rural areas lacked utilities, adequate education, and medical services.²⁹⁴

In Mexico, hunger persists in rural areas and over two million children under five are chronically malnourished, with a disproportionate number of the poor inhabiting the rural south.²⁹⁵ A majority of Mexican immigrants to the United States come from this region.²⁹⁶

Some highlights of the impact of geographic features in the cultures of the region, extracted from the guide *Working with Latin American Militaries* produced by the USMC – CAOCL:²⁹⁷

Regionalism and Culture – “The impact of geography on culture can be traced back to settlement patterns during the colonization of Latin America. The European conquerors pushed indigenous populations into less desirable areas. Geographic and climatic variations have produced relatively well-defined “ethno-cultural” groups in different regions of many countries. During colonization, for example, Spaniards preferred the cooler highlands and avoided the tropical areas (thus avoiding mosquitoes, yellow fever and malaria). These circumstances contributed to the deep regionalism that remains to this day. Regional sentiment however, has shifted from being focused on ethnicity to being mostly based along cultural lines of the various regions. Most Colombians in the Caribbean region, for example, are historically and culturally attached to the Caribbean Islands but, many of the officers and some of the NCOs come from the more affluent Andean regions. This economic gap between regions has affected access to education and services between the urban and rural areas. While most Latin American countries are highly urbanized, heavily populated metropolitan centers have seen considerable increases of their urban poor. This paradox remains a challenge for the entire region.”

Languages

Spanish is spoken in the former Spanish colonies of Mexico, most Central American countries, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto Rico. People in the former British colonies of the Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago speak English as their official language. Haiti, a former French colony, has two official languages: French and Haitian Creole.

Besides the official languages, a number of other languages are also spoken in individual countries. Some 70 Mayan languages are spoken by more than five million people in Central America. In Guatemala, for example, there are 57 Amerindian dialects spoken, while some of them have already become extinct;²⁹⁸ there are officially 23 indigenous languages, most of which are Mayan.²⁹⁹ There are 310 indigenous languages registered in Mexico, including Mayan and Nahuatl, but over 92.7 percent of the population speaks Spanish.^{300 301} Indigenous peoples in Belize, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua also speak their own native languages or dialects. In Jamaica, Creole is widely spoken by the native islanders. Haitian Creole is a musical mix of French, **Taino**, Spanish, and West African languages.³⁰²

Taino is a Caribbean indigenous language, originally spoken by indigenous groups that lived in what is now Puerto Rico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas, prior to the arrival of the Europeans.³⁰³

Religion

The Roman Catholic Church has historically exerted a strong influence on political and social behavior in Latin America. Since the time of the conquest, Catholic teachings were carried by Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans, resulting in an integration of Catholic faith into Latin America.³⁰⁴ However, this intertwining of Catholic faith and colonialism has proven to be problematic for the Catholic Church, since critics of the church contend that Catholicism took part in colonialism, imposing economic and political hardships in the region.³⁰⁵

Most of the former British colonies in the Caribbean are predominantly Protestant, and a significant Protestant population also exists in the region due to the arrival of missionaries in the 20th century.³⁰⁶

The Decline of Catholicism in Latin America

The majority of Mexicans, Central Americans and Caribbean people (about 92 percent) are Christian, with the Roman Catholic Church being the largest denomination.³⁰⁷ This trend has been primarily attributed to the rise of evangelical churches.³⁰⁸

One important fact that may be a boost for Catholicism in Latin America was the 2011 ascension of Pope Francis, the first Latin American Pope ever. Originally from Argentina, Pope Francis was at times vocal on his views regarding poverty and inequality, calling for greater efforts to lift up the world's poor.³⁰⁹ His views are in tune with most populist discourse currently prevailing in Latin America and may help revitalize Catholicism in the region.

Definition: The term, “evangelical,” is used in Latin America to describe various denominations, from Baptist, to Methodist and to Pentecostal - the fastest growing religion in Latin America.

Religious Affiliations:³¹⁰

Mexico: the most Catholic country in the region, with 88 percent Catholics and only 5 percent evangelicals, even though there are some 3,554 evangelical and 80 traditional Protestant associations.³¹¹ In the State of Chiapas, 21.9 percent of respondents in the 2000 census identify themselves as Protestant; however, some Protestant evangelical groups claim a much higher percentage.³¹²

Guatemala: 56.9 percent Catholics; 30.7 percent Evangelicals.³¹³ According to leaders of Mayan spiritual organizations and Catholic and Protestant missionaries, many indigenous Catholics and some Protestants also practice some form of indigenous spiritual ritual.

Nicaragua: 58.5 percent Catholics; 21.6 percent Evangelicals;

El Salvador: 52.5 percent Catholics; 27.6 percent Evangelicals;

Panama: 75 to 85 percent Catholics; 15 to 25 percent Evangelicals;

Cuba: 60 percent Catholics; 5% Evangelicals; while it is estimated that 80 percent practice religions with Western Africa roots, such as Santería or Yoruba.

Haiti: 54.7 percent Catholics, 25 percent Evangelicals, 2.1 percent Voodoo (The figure for voodoo represents only those who select voodoo as their primary religion. A much larger segment of the population practices voodoo alongside Christianity (most commonly with Catholicism) and considers Christianity their primary religion).

Dominican Republic: 39.8 percent “practicing Catholics,” 29.1 percent “non-practicing Catholics,” 10.6 percent no religion; 18.2 Evangelicals.

Trinidad and Tobago: Protestant 32.1 percent (Pentecostal/Evangelical), Roman Catholic 21.6 percent, Hindu 18.2 percent, 5 percent Muslim.³¹⁴

Liberation Theology

In the 1970s, when Marxism was disseminated in Latin America, a populist and social activist religious movement grew among the clergy in Peru. Gustavo Gutiérrez, whose 1973 book, *A Theology of Liberation*, gave the name to this religious movement, it combined elements of Marxist political activism with Catholic teaching.³¹⁵ Liberation theology viewed Jesus as a revolutionary, meant to liberate the poor and oppressed.

The movement challenged the church to reevaluate its theology and mission with a “preferential option for the poor.”³¹⁶

This doctrine of class struggle has remained a source of controversy in the larger church. Liberation theology was incorporated into violent guerrilla ideology throughout the region. For example, in Nicaragua, the role of the church’s “Base Ecclesial Communities – CEBs” was fundamental to spread Liberation Theology and collaborating in the revolution.³¹⁷ FSLN support grew immensely through the CEBs and was an effective grass-root in the revolution that triumphed in 1979 against the Somoza regime.³¹⁸

By the 1990s, as most of Latin America embraced democracy, the influence of liberation theology in Latin America diminished. Pope John Paul II moved the church doctrine to conduct more work on behalf of the poor but condemned the teaching of liberation theology.³¹⁹ However, its influence remains strong in Latin America.³²⁰

Religious Syncretism

Religious syncretism is defined as the “fusion of diverse religious beliefs and practices (...)”³²¹ Syncretism is vital to understand Caribbean religion and other blends of faith in Central America.³²²

In many countries, Christianity has fused with Amerindian and or with African beliefs. Most indigenous people retain their native beliefs while simultaneously practicing the Christian religion. The syncretism of African faiths with Catholicism is often termed Voodoo in Haiti, Santeria in Cuba, and Rastafarians in Jamaica.³²³



Voodoo ceremony in Haiti (Source: Wikipedia, photo by Doron)

During the colonization of the Americas, the Spaniards, in converting the indigenous people of to Catholicism, followed a deliberate strategy of syncretism that was used throughout the Americas.³²⁴ This process sought to substitute Christian saints for local deities, often using existing native temple sites as the location of churches.³²⁵ Historical missionary diaries and accounts revealed that the writers expected to find in each new religion they encountered a parallel to Catholicism:

“Thus, Shaman are “priests,” spirits are “devils,” or “angels,” and sacred trees are equivalent to the Holy Rood. In a policy that would change with the Bourbon Reforms of the 18th century, local customs were respected and even encouraged, since their maintenance added the glory of another kingdom within Catholicism. The Franciscans in New Spain expected their missionary work to make up for the loss of Protestants. (...) Although the missionaries intended to prove the superiority of Catholicism in their writings, by casting the previous beliefs in a religious homology with Christianity, they bestowed ecclesiastical and theological values on the first faith.”³²⁶

The Legend of The Cuban Madonna – also known as Our Lady of Charity of *El Cobre* [“copper” in Spanish] or “la Cachita” [The little box] for the Catholic; Ochun (a Santería’s Orixás) or Yemayá (Goddess of the Sea, African heritage).³²⁷

A historical testimonial before church authorities in 1687 registered the first account of the finding of a statue by two Taino boys. The Amerindians took a ten year old black boy, a slave, in a canoe into the

waters of the Bay of Nipe, looking for salt, when they found the statue floating in a box. A Franciscan friar was sent to inspect the image and concluded it was truly an icon of the Blessed Mother, but a tug of war ensued between the ecclesiastical authorities and the Amerindians and free Blacks to it in their site. The image ended up in a hospital for the mine workers – which was later destroyed by a hurricane. A new hermitage was erected to place the statue of the Our Lady of Charity El Cobre – it was possibly a replica, but it had darker skin. The legend continued to grow and become more miraculous with the passage of time, which included the apparition of Our Lady to a young girl that hears the voice of Mary, stating she wants the image to be placed on the hill where she saw lights – which in the reality of the baroque period in which these accounts took place consisted on a consensus of the community in which the solution of where to place the image cut across class, and racial lines. The lights on the hill constituted a syncretic symbol, valid in all religions represented among the people of mixed Taino, African and European backgrounds. There was an accommodation of all three races, which later on became emblematic of Cuba in its capacity to symbolize racial harmony and a resultant national identity as Cubans.³²⁸



Our Lady of Charity image portraying the “two Amerindians,” and the African boy
(Source: Wikipedia)



Our Lady of Charity of El Cobre Patroness of Cuban peoples at the Basilica of Nuestra Senora Caridad del Cobre (Source Wikipedia)

Later on the Virgin was taken to the town of El Cobre, on the outskirts of Santiago de Cuba, from Havana, and was consecrated on September 8, 1916 on the request of veterans of the wars of independence “since she had helped them reach independence.”³²⁹ More than 5,000 people travel to El Cobre each year for the festivities on September 8 - a national holiday.³³⁰

In 1936, Pope Pius XI declared the coronation of the Virgin of Charity of El Cobre and, in 1977, Paul VI consecrated the National Sanctuary of El Cobre, where the image is kept, as a Minor Basilica. In 1998 Pope John Paul II officially crowned the Virgin.³³¹

Religious Holidays

Many of the national holidays in this region are religious in nature and are heavily influenced by Catholicism. Some of the most important holidays include Easter “weekend” which may include Good Friday, and Easter Week. Christmas Eve and the day after Christmas are public holidays in several

countries. The U.S. Embassies list on their websites the main religious holidays that are observed in each country, such as Good Friday, Christmas Eve, Feast of the Assumption, and All Saints Day.³³² In addition to the public holidays and national religious holidays, most towns have their own local holidays, with their local patron saints celebrations called *Fiestas Patronales*, which are annual *ferias* (fairs) with processions, dances and other activities. There are also many local traditional fairs and indigenous religious celebrations.

Many public institutions in Latin American countries have religious allegiances. For example, the Guatemalans' *Virgen Del Carmen* (The Virgin of Carmen) is actually revered by the Guatemalan Infantry Marines and is their official patron.³³³

Officers place the image of *Virgen Del Carmen* in the inauguration of the Caribbean Naval Command Chapel (Source: CAOCL)



Religious Holidays:

Guatemala:³³⁴ Pilgrims from all over Central America come to Esquipulas (January 15) to worship at the shrine of the Black Christ; an icon sculpted in balsam-wood with the image of Jesus. The city of Antigua's Holy Week, in late March or early April, is the largest and most festive celebration in Latin America; it leads up to a Passion procession on the morning of Good Friday. Chichicastenango celebrates the day of St. Thomas (December 21) with a week-long fiesta that includes ritual dances of the Quiché people and the *Palo Volador* in which costumed men dangle by ropes from a 60-foot-high (18-meter-high) maypole.

The Garifuna of the Caribbean celebrate their arrival in Guatemala with *Yuriman*, a simulation of the first farm plantings. The reenactment is held in Livingston each year from May 13 to 15. This festival is accompanied by singing, dancing, and hand-clapping. Like the other nations in Central America (except Panama) Independence Day is celebrated on September 15, in honor of the region's declaration of independence from Spain in 1821.

Nicaragua:³³⁵ *La Purísima* is the most important holiday in Nicaragua; a week-long celebration of the Feast of the Immaculate Conception held around December 8.

Mexico:³³⁶ Holy Week commemorates the events leading up to and including the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus. Christmas celebrations have been influenced by American customs such as gift giving and Christmas trees (sometimes even in churches). Preceding Christmas are the colorful *posadas*, nightly celebrations that begin December 16 and commemorate Mary and Joseph's search for an inn in Bethlehem before Jesus was born. On November 2, the Day of the Dead, people visit the graves of their loved ones and leave behind fruits and flowers. December 12 commemorates the appearance of the Virgin of Guadalupe in 1531.

Haiti:³³⁷ Haitian culture reflects a profound reverence for one's ancestors; Ancestors' Day is a national holiday, celebrated on January second, the day after the celebration of Independence Day on January first.

Icons - Soccer

Fútbol (Spanish), or soccer, has a particularly unique place in Mexico, Central America and Caribbean societies. In Mexico, 1970 is viewed as one of the most important in the history of Mexican soccer: Mexico managed to pull off a good organization of the World Cup they hosted; the national team managed its best performance to that date, reaching the quarter finals of the competition; and it created a popularity boom for the game throughout Mexico and ever since that moment turning soccer the most important sport in the country.³³⁸

All countries in the region are members of the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football, known as CONCACAF, founded in Mexico in 1962.³³⁹ CONCACAF sponsor the Central American Cup. Costa Rica has won the cup eight times and was the 2014 champion.³⁴⁰ Costa Rica and Honduras have each hosted it three times, while it has been played in El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama twice.³⁴¹ Honduras is next with three titles, while Guatemala and Panama have won one each, while Belize, El Salvador and Nicaragua round out the list of participants.³⁴²

Fútbol has been the source of violence and passion. Outbursts of nationalistic excess or xenophobia disrupt soccer games all over the world: Mexicans voiced their anti-Americanism by hailing Osama bin Laden before a U.S. soccer team barely three years after 9/11 in the Jalisco stadium.³⁴³ A similar episode happened before a game for the 2010 World Cup finals, with 100,000-strong Aztec Stadium in Mexico City, booing the U.S. national anthem and tossing garbage and liquids at the American team.³⁴⁴

The 1969 “Soccer War between El Salvador and Honduras - The motive for the 1969 war occurred after the Honduran government forced repatriation of Salvadorans who had migrated there.³⁴⁵ This conflict broke out shortly after the two countries had played three bitterly contested matches in the 1970 World Cup qualifying match in Mexico.³⁴⁶ After the 3-week war some 130,000 to 200,000 Salvadorans had to return home, vastly expanding the land-poor population.³⁴⁷ The brief war cost several thousand lives, and a peace treaty between the two countries was not concluded until 1980.

Fútbol competes with *Beisbol* (Baseball) in the Caribbean, especially in countries such as the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, Panama and Cuba – countries that supply stars to Major League Baseball in the United States.³⁴⁸

TIP – Due to strong rivalries between teams and countries, it is best for Marines while in Latin America, to just play the game in mixed teams and talk about the sport at an international level.

Social Classes

Throughout Latin American societies, rigid social structures of a caste-like elite set at colonial times, based on class membership and skin color has promoted limited vertical mobility.³⁴⁹ These colonial societies had small elites at the top, composed of Spanish or other European descendant, who were educated, rich, and politically powerful.³⁵⁰ There was also a small middle class, composed of merchants and minor officials and a large lower class comprising workers and peasants.³⁵¹

This class system has evolved in the twentieth century, with modernization, industrialization, improvements in transportation, education, and rapid urban growth. However, in many ways the modern social structure still presents many traits of early rigid societies, one in which social class and status are important and govern daily social interactions.³⁵² Social classes are distinguished by occupation, life-style, income, family background, education, accent, and access to power.³⁵³

A 2013 report on the “Economic Mobility and the Rise of the Latin American Middle Class” asserts that after decades of stagnation, the size of the middle class in Latin America and the Caribbean have recently grown by 50 percent - from approximately 100 million people in 2003 to 150 million (or 30 percent of the continent’s population) in 2009.³⁵⁴ Over the same period, the proportion of people in poverty fell from 44 percent to around 30 percent.³⁵⁵

The report also explains that presently, the largest social group in the region is neither poor nor middle-class: they are a vulnerable group sandwiched between the poverty line and the minimum requirements for a more secure, middle-class lifestyle. The rise of the middle class reflects recent changes in economic mobility over the past 15 years, at least 43 percent of all Latin Americans changed social classes - most of them moving upward.

Nevertheless, the authors of that report point out that it is important to note that “intergenerational mobility” - a concept inversely related to inequality of opportunity - has improved only slightly during the last decade, remaining very limited. What this means is that both educational achievement and attainment, for example, remain strongly dependent on parental education levels.

Recommended Reading:

For more information on the Mexican Society:

Luis de la Calle and Luis Rubio, *Mexico: Poor No More, Developed Not Yet* (Woodrow Wilson Center).

Available at:

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Mexico%20A%20Middle%20Class%20Society.pdf>

Ethnic Groups

Mestizos, people of mixed European and Amerindian heritage, comprise the large majority of the populations of Mexico and Central America. Belize and Costa Rica are regional exceptions. While Belize’s population is more varied, with the largest ethnic groups being mestizo and of African descent,³⁵⁶ Costa Rica stands out in the region as predominantly European.³⁵⁷ Costa Rica’s unique demographic composition can be largely explained by the comparatively small population of Amerindians that lived in the area when the Europeans arrived.³⁵⁸ The Caribbean population is marked by a strong presence of African-descendants, given the demographic transformation caused by the slave trade during colonial times.³⁵⁹ In general, the Hispanic islands have a larger proportion of Euro-Caribbean descent than the areas with French, British and Dutch connections.³⁶⁰ In all of these sub-regions, the white population has been a small, but powerful minority.

While indigenous populations were virtually wiped out in the Caribbean, several indigenous groups still exist in Mexico and Central America.³⁶¹ Mexico has one of the largest indigenous populations of the Western Hemisphere, with a total of 10,103,571 at the last official count in 2005. Guatemala has at least 23 indigenous groups, including K’iche 9.1%, Kaqchikel 8.4%, Mam 7.9%, Q’eqchi 6.3%, other Mayan 8.6%, indigenous non-Mayan 0.2%, other 0.1% (2001 census).³⁶²

Most Central Americans are people of mixed Amerindian descent. There are also some people of African descent. For example, the culturally distinct Garifuna, a mix of African and indigenous Caribs and Arawak peoples, can be found along the Caribbean coastline of four Central American countries, namely Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.



Women of Emberá ethnicity in a parade in Chitré, capital of the Herrera Province in Panama (Source: Wikipedia, photo by Ayaita)



Emberá and Wounaan leaders of the *Tierras Colectivas* (Source: Wikipedia)

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean also have people of Asian descent, such as Chinese, Indians, Japanese, Koreans, and Filipinos. In Trinidad and Tobago, people of Indian descent make up 35.4% of the population.³⁶³ This is because many indentured servants from India were brought to the island to replace slaves following the abolition of slavery.

Ethnicity and Race

Definition - Ethnicity is defined as “the identification of an individual with a unique subgroup in a society, which is distinguished by specific behaviors, characteristics, and social symbols that can include a language specific to the group; symbols reflecting group membership; unique traditions, rituals and holidays; clothing unique to the group and/or a shared sense of history and attachment to a place or region.”³⁶⁴


Racial identification is extremely fluid in Latin America and is often based on social and cultural factors as much as physical characteristics or ancestry.³⁶⁵ Each country in the region present a slight variation around the same theme, for example, in Guatemala, ethnic and race relations between the descendants of Maya and whites and *Ladinos* (*Ladino* is how mestizos are called in Guatemala) have contributed to the country’s history of unrest.

Cultural change - Many Amerindians are entering the modern world and abandoning their traditional, ethnic traits. One of the main distinctions one could observe in the population would be the choice of clothing. If they wear western clothes they want to be called mestizo and likewise, if they wear traditional clothing, they still want to be identified by their indigenous background.³⁶⁶

Ethnicity and Economic Success

Mexico displays large discrepancies in wealth between various socio-economic classes. A large percentage of its 8.2 million indigenous peoples are poor – 72.3 percent (2012); almost every community with a population of more than 40 percent indigenous language speakers lived in poverty in 2012.³⁶⁷

Oaxaca and Chiapas are ones of the poorest municipalities in Mexico, and are also the ones with the greatest numbers of indigenous peoples (*see map below*). These numbers contrast with the richer tiers of the population, which are mostly of white, of European descent.



Source: CONEVAL

Machismo

Machismo: The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines *machismo* as:³⁶⁸ “Exaggerated pride in masculinity, perceived as power, often coupled with a minimal sense of responsibility and disregard of consequences. In machismo there is supreme valuation of characteristics culturally associated with the masculine and a denigration of characteristics associated with the feminine. It has for centuries been a strong current in Latin American politics and society. *Caudillos* (military dictators), prominent in the history of Latin America, have typified machismo with their bold and authoritarian approach to government and their willingness to employ violence to achieve their ends.”

Machismo represents the dominant ideal of manhood in Latin American society – it includes contradictory positive and negative traits; an authoritarian image, the breadwinner image, the virility image and the chivalry image. Among the negative attributes of machismo are bravado, violence, selfishness, disrespect, irresponsibility, and womanizing; while positive attributes include bravery, respect, responsibility, and altruism toward the family and less fortunate members of society.³⁶⁹

Machismo is a strong construct that affects the social order in the Latin American context. However, it is important not to generalize or view all men through the negative lens of the machismo stereotype. Machismo is expressed with variations between social-economic classes, age groups; differing from rural settings to urban areas, country to country. Recent social changes have promoted ideological shifts and behavior modification, minimizing gender gaps and behavior. In a broad stroke, for younger generations, more educated and in urban areas there is likelihood to display less *machista* tendencies, while the opposite is true for older age groups, less educated and in rural settings.

According to some social scientists, “Latino men are aware of mounting criticisms of traditional machismo from younger men and women of all ages.”³⁷⁰ However, despite many men having begun a transition regarding the dominant masculine ideals and the need for a more fair treatment of women, they may be unaware of patriarchal remnants in their beliefs and attitudes.³⁷¹ Behavior changes occur unevenly, resulting in contradictory combinations in everyday life where some historical aspects of machismo coexist with increased egalitarianism, perhaps in ways invisible to its actors.³⁷²

In rural Mexico for instance, Mixtec women in Oaxaca require male “permission” for all aspects of daily life: to visit relatives, to use family planning methods, to give birth in hospitals, to participate in community activities to study, to marry, and work.³⁷³ Machismo takes different forms in urban areas: it is still legal in Mexico for newspapers to publish advertisements seeking female employees that specify age limits and describe required physical attributes.³⁷⁴

Tip: Because of widespread machismo in Latin America, while interacting with Latin American armed forces members, never make a soldier lose face; especially an officer, much less a superior officer.³⁷⁵ Constructive criticism must be cautiously offered in a positive manner.³⁷⁶

Gender Inequality in Latin America

There are growing similarities between the United States and Latin America regarding the position of women in society. For example, different gender issues confront traditions and institutionalized social relations like abortion and family law. In most Latin American countries abortion is considered a crime, which is by and large because of the predominance of Catholicism in the region.³⁷⁷

In Latin America, indicators on gender inequality in primary school education, employment, and incomes have improved over the past decade, but there are still significant gaps between the status of women and men in this region characterized by highly patriarchal systems.³⁷⁸ For instance, in Latin America, a woman with 13 or more years of education still earns 37 percent less than a man with the same qualifications.³⁷⁹

Wherever educational opportunities are provided, women are more likely to enroll in higher education than men. In the majority of Latin American countries there are more females than males enrolled in higher education.³⁸⁰ The result is increasingly more women in executive positions and more women professionals.³⁸¹

Progress has also been remarkable for women’s representation in businesses at board levels, but forecasts indicate that equal participation for men and women is not expected until 2035.³⁸²

Recommended Reading:

For detailed and updated regional and country profiles on all gender related statistics and issues, refer to:

Gender Equality Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean (United Nations).

Available at:

<http://www.cepal.org/oig/default.asp?idioma=IN>

Gender Gap in Mexico: According to USAID, during the last 20 years, Mexico has made significant progress in addressing gender gaps in education; maternal mortality rates; political representation; labor force participation; more women are enrolling in university courses; seeking paid employment, and entering

politics.³⁸³ Despite these gains, Mexico remains near the bottom of gender equality rankings in Latin America and the Caribbean.³⁸⁴ Domestic violence reportedly affects at least 40 percent of women. Wage gaps remain high and women's labor force participation is constrained by unpaid domestic house work and family care.³⁸⁵

Violence Against Women

Violence against women is on the rise in the region; between 17 and 53 percent of women in the region are victims of violence, and this scenario is exacerbated because 92 percent of reported crimes go unpunished.³⁸⁶ The reality is that there is a mixture of age-old forms of violence that are reemerging, together with new phenomena linked to the illegal economy and organized crime, resulting in excessive violence that always affects the most disadvantaged and the weakest sectors.³⁸⁷

The Central American Integration System (SICA) and the Council of Ministers for Women in Central America (COMMCA) rank Guatemala as the country with the highest number of killings of women in the region, which is also one of the most violent in the world overall.³⁸⁸ Guatemala has a murder rate of 48 per 100,000, according to the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Central American Human Development Report 2009-2010.³⁸⁹ The Latin America average is 25 per 100,000 and a global average is nine per 100,000.³⁹⁰

El Salvador follows close to Guatemala's statistics in femicide, with "killings fueled by impunity, machismo, and the weakness of a state that has failed to understand the magnitude of the problem, according to women's rights groups."³⁹¹

Women in the Military

Since the middle of the 20th century the regional trend has been to incorporate women in the professional corps of the armed forces. Despite the low level of incorporation of women in the armed forces, and the fact that incorporation in military careers is still recent, many military institutions in Mexico, Central America and Caribbean have women in their cadres.

Women were allowed as officers and NCOs in the Guatemalan army, navy, and air force starting in 1997.³⁹² The dates are similar for Honduras, with the NCO cadres in the army being open to women only five years later.³⁹³ In El Salvador, women are not allowed into the navy, nor are they allowed to serve as NCOs in the army and the air force, but they have been allowed to serve as officers in the army and air force since 2003.³⁹⁴

Highest Ranks Achieved by Women in Latin America

El Salvador - The highest rank women can reach is division general; the first group of women entered the school of officers in 2003 and graduated as second lieutenants in 2006.³⁹⁵ Considering the year of admission, 27 years should elapse for them to reach the highest rank (division colonel) in accordance with seniority criteria.³⁹⁶ Besides time in service, they would need to be appointed by the executive branch to reach their promotion to division general.

Guatemala - Women officers currently hold the rank of colonel, and it is the highest rank women are allowed to achieve within the branch of services.³⁹⁷ Officers are required to have a combat arms occupational specialty (also called "arms officers") to aspire to the highest military hierarchy (generals).

Honduras - Women officers currently hold the rank of colonel and can only reach this rank, as they are within the branch of services.³⁹⁸ They have to be arms officers to aspire to the highest military hierarchy (generals).

The fact that military institutions' doors started to open to women has not necessarily translated into significant change. In many countries women still face various obstacles towards integration into the military.³⁹⁹ For instance, in 2009, of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which was mainly made up by Latin American forces, only 108 were women in a contingent of 7,030 military troops – just 1.53% female.⁴⁰⁰

Education

Most Central American countries have populations with low levels of educational attainment compared with other countries at similar levels of development. Only Panama and Costa Rica have levels of educational attainment above the Latin American average, and only Panama has levels above other countries at a similar level of development.⁴⁰¹



Before and after: Nearly a decade after its 36-year civil war ended, cultural and economic gaps persist in Guatemala. Education is plagued by a lack of access, poor teacher training and insufficient resources - especially for rural children. Although 60 percent of urban students complete third grade, only 30 percent of rural students do. Two-thirds of Maya first-graders are taught by instructors who do not speak their mother tongue, and 76 percent of rural children drop out before completing primary school. As part of its effort to improve teaching resources and methodologies, USAID helped establish libraries at 1,000 primary schools in six of Guatemala's poorest states, including this rural school in Sumpango, Sacatepequez (Source: USAID)

Availability of an educated labor force varies widely across the countries due to the differences in completion of different levels of education.⁴⁰² Central American countries have been largely successful in boosting primary enrollment rates, although completion is significantly lower than 100 percent in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. Except in Guatemala, most students today in Central America begin secondary school.⁴⁰³

Low secondary school completion, due to high dropout rates within the secondary cycle, is a common problem in Central American countries, including Costa Rica, where in 2009 less than 50 percent of those who started secondary school completed it.⁴⁰⁴ The gross enrollment rate in tertiary education varies from close to 15 percent in Guatemala and Honduras to close to 50 percent in Costa Rica and Panama.⁴⁰⁵

The average education completion in Central America varies from 4.1 years in Guatemala to 9.4 years in Panama.⁴⁰⁶ Educational attainment has increased at a modest rate of about one year per decade, with the most rapid increase found in El Salvador, where average attainment is now close to Costa Rica.⁴⁰⁷

According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), only 40 percent graduate from the secondary level across the region.⁴⁰⁸ Unfortunately, these 40 percent graduates are not getting a quality education. In comparison charts with the rest of the world, Latin America education rates at the bottom.⁴⁰⁹ In addition to low levels of educational attainment, the quality of schooling is lower than expected in Central America.⁴¹⁰

Student performance on international standardized tests is below that of students in other countries at similar levels of per capita gross national income in all Central American countries except Costa Rica.⁴¹¹ Even in Costa Rica, which has among the highest average levels of education quality in Latin America, there is significant inequality in access to high-quality education, resulting in a significant portion of students in low-quality education.⁴¹²

Recommended Reading:


For details on the state of education in the region:

UNESCO, *The State of Education in Latin America and the Caribbean: Towards a Quality Education for All – 2015*, (United Nations Regional Bureau of Education for Latin America and the Caribbean – Santiago Office).

Available at:

<http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Santiago/pdf/state-of-education-in-LAC-towards-2015.pdf>

Public expenditure on education as a percent of GDP (data for Honduras, the Bahamas, Haiti, and Puerto Rico not available)⁴¹³



Source: CIA World Factbook, 2014

Education in Mexico

Middle-income population with 40 percent of the college-age, makes up 32 percent of enrollment in higher education. The poorest segments make up just eight percent of enrollment.⁴¹⁴ Mexico's literacy rates lag behind many Latin American states, and while 98 percent of children attended primary school, only 70 percent were enrolled in secondary education.⁴¹⁵

Therefore, while across the region the proportion of the population with an incomplete primary education has fallen rapidly in the past 15 years, the proportions with secondary education and higher education have

not improved significantly over several decades.⁴¹⁶ In Panama, just over 20 percent of youth has attained at least 15 years of education, but this proportion is only slightly higher than for the 40-49 year age group.⁴¹⁷ In Costa Rica, the proportion is even lower, at 15 percent and, again, has stagnated, but surprisingly, El Salvador and Nicaragua, with lower levels of average completion, have similar proportions of higher completion as Costa Rica.⁴¹⁸ In Guatemala and Honduras, only about 5 percent of the youngest group attains higher education.⁴¹⁹


Unequal Access to Quality Education

Unequal access to quality education is a major challenge for the education systems in Central America because it perpetuates income inequality. According to the World Bank, in all countries except for Nicaragua, educational completion is related strongly to the socioeconomic background of the student's family, and this has not diminished over time.⁴²⁰ For example, students whose parents have less education and income are more likely to repeat primary and secondary grades, are more likely to drop out of secondary school, and are less likely to have any higher education.⁴²¹ In several countries, returns to education are influenced strongly by the socioeconomic condition of the student's household, and these differences may reflect the quality of the education received by the student:⁴²²

Social inequalities in the information age: In information age, socioeconomic differences are deepened because individuals depend largely on two educational sources: the one developed at home and in the family environment, and the one provided through the education and health systems.⁴²³

Healthcare

Access to healthcare in the region reflects acute socioeconomic inequality due to the region's high income disparities and various forms of discrimination.⁴²⁴ High income residents in urban areas have access to advanced healthcare facilities, while those living in poor, remote villages, and those who suffer discrimination, such as indigenous groups and individuals of African descent, tend to have far less access to health care services.⁴²⁵



Mortality rate, under age of 5 (per 1,000 live births) (Source: World Bank Data, 2014)

Recommended Reading:

For details on the state of health in the region:


See various reports from the World Health Organization (WHO). Available at:

http://www.who.int/management/country/latina_merica_caribbean/en/

Over the past 20 years, the region has made significant advances in improving maternal health and mortality rates have fallen over 40%.⁴²⁶ However, behind this drop, rates vary dramatically depending on a woman's ethnicity, social or economic status.⁴²⁷ In fact, deaths from pregnancy-related causes are three times higher amongst women from the region's indigenous communities.⁴²⁸

Access to healthcare and adequate nutrition also varies by country. Guatemala, for example, has one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world - it is estimated that one-half of all children under the age of five in that country are chronically malnourished.⁴²⁹

Haiti, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala face major healthcare challenges. Haiti is hampered by some of the world's worst health indicators.⁴³⁰ Several challenges faced by the Haitian health system and the government result in the inability and a lack of capacity to overcome numerous public health issues.⁴³¹



Malnutrition (weight for age, % of children under 5) (Source: World Bank, 2014)

Health in Haiti – US Assistance: Prior to the devastating earthquake, the U.S Government, through USAID and the CDC, provided access to health services for approximately 50 percent of Haitians. After the earthquake, the U.S. Government moved quickly to address new health needs such as disability care and infectious disease outbreaks while continuing to provide a basic package of health services, including maternal and child health, family planning, more sophisticated immunization services, and the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, as well as neglected tropical diseases (NTDs).


Towards Achieving Satisfactory Health Care

Just a few countries in the regions, like Costa Rica and Cuba, have relatively good healthcare. Due to considerable improvements in health and education, Panama and Costa Rica no longer need to receive aid, and USAID offices in these countries have been closed.⁴³²

In recent decades, important policies and strategic initiatives have been taken to strengthen health systems at the national, regional, and global levels. Several countries in the region have made recent efforts to transform their health systems with the necessary components to advance toward universal health coverage. These countries include El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, and the United States of America.⁴³³ For instance, Mexico's Popular Health Insurance (PHI) is now covering over 50 million people and is open to all those without access to social security.⁴³⁴ A pillar of the country's 2003 health reforms, the insurance package eliminated user fees and today includes over 200 primary and secondary level treatments.⁴³⁵


The World Bank and the Pan American Health Organization have jointly undertaken an effort to extend access to health care for the poor.⁴³⁶ The initiative looks at approaches to expand universal healthcare coverage and assess progress in reducing socioeconomic inequalities in health in nine countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁴³⁷

Health expenditure per capita, current US\$ (2009-2013)




Source: World Bank, 2014

Physicians (per 1,000 people):



Source: World Bank, 2014

Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)




Source: World Bank, 2014

In Jamaica, USAID works with the Ministry of Health and its partners to reduce HIV transmission among key populations. Activities also focus on reducing stigma and discrimination. Under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the United States government created a new Caribbean regional HI prevention and care program in 2009. This program is guided by a Partnership Framework between the U.S. and 12 partnering Caribbean countries, one of which is Jamaica. The primary shared goal of the six agencies working under PEPFAR is to support the Government of Jamaica's efforts to reduce the transmission of HIV over the next five years.



Source: USAID/Jamaica

Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)



Source: World Bank, 2014

Economic Overview


Why Economy and Infrastructure Matter to You as a Marine

The goods and services that people exchange, the infrastructure that people use to move them, and the formal and informal structures that make exchange possible all play critical roles in survival. A thorough understanding of a region is impossible without knowledge of its economy because the region's political, social, and cultural trends both reflect and shape economic developments and trends.

Recent Economic Trends – an Overview

According to the 2014 World Bank economic report on the region, growth remained broadly flat on average in 2013. There was considerable difference between the countries on slow export growth, since some of that was offset by domestic demand growth.⁴³⁸ On average across the region, GDP growth was down by a 0.1 percentage point to 2.4 percent in 2013, with Central America experiencing a sharp slowdown led by Mexico.⁴³⁹

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth (annual percentages):



Source: World Bank Data – 2014

The Caribbean economies also saw growth accelerate modestly on the back of the U.S. recovery in the second half of 2013: regional export growth in 2013 was weak, dampened by easing growth in China, falling commodity prices (Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico and others), and a growth slowdown in tourist arrivals

(Caribbean and Central America).⁴⁴⁰ A deceleration in growth rates is also observed across most of the economies in the Caribbean, with declines in growth rate ranging from -5.2 percent (Trinidad and Tobago) to 1 percent (Barbados).⁴⁴¹

Among the top performers in 2014 are Panama, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, with a number of other Central American countries also having growth rates above the median regional growth rate.⁴⁴² The countries whose economies are more dependent on the U.S. (such as Mexico, Central America, and much of the Caribbean) are likely to continue benefitting, to the extent that the U.S. sustains its expansion.⁴⁴³

Resources - Minerals and Oil

The mineral industry is a significant economic sector of Mexico and represents a major source of revenue for the Government.⁴⁴⁴ Increases in mineral prices and demand led to a 45% increase in the value of mineral production in 2011 compared with that of 2010, reaching the highest level ever at over \$20 billion; with 26,000 new jobs in the industry.⁴⁴⁵ Mexico's leading minerals are copper, gold, silver, and zinc.⁴⁴⁶

Mexico is one of the 10 largest oil producers in the world, the third-largest in the Americas after the United States and Canada, and an important partner in the U.S. energy trade.⁴⁴⁷ Oil is a crucial component of Mexico's economy, responsible for generating 13% of the country's export earnings in 2013, a proportion that has declined over the past decade.⁴⁴⁸ Indeed, Mexico's oil production has steadily decreased since 2005 as a result of natural production declines and mismanagement.⁴⁴⁹

In 2013, in an effort to address the declines of its domestic oil production, the Mexican government enacted constitutional reforms that ended the 75-year monopoly of *Petróleos Mexicanos* (PEMEX), the state-owned oil company.⁴⁵⁰

Panama is not a producer of crude oil, natural gas, or coal. However, the country serves as an energy transit point through its controls of the Panama Canal and Trans-Panama Pipeline. (*Read more on the Panama Canal under Infrastructure, Transportation*).

In the Caribbean, Cuba has the most diversified mineral resources, while Jamaica and the Dominican Republic produce bauxite, the ore used for aluminum, which is mostly exported to the United States and Canada.⁴⁵¹ Trinidad and Tobago exports oil and natural gas, which has brought irregular prosperity to the island.⁴⁵²

Agriculture


From 1961 to 2000, most of Central America's forest was converted to cropland and pastureland, which increased an average of 16%.⁴⁵³ Significant cropland expansion occurred, and kept pace with growth in pastureland, particularly in countries of higher population density due to the relatively large portion of land dedicated to subsistence.⁴⁵⁴

Recommended Reading:

For updated discussions on energy policies and climate change in Latin America, see the reports and articles published by the *Inter-American Dialogue*.

Available at:

<http://thediologue.org/energy>




Source: SEDAC / CIESIN – University of Columbia

The Nicaraguan Case – the expansion of cropland yielded no improvements for the region’s poor:

Cropland expansion did not necessarily translate to better conditions for the poor segments of these societies. The main reason is because agriculture offers the lowest return among economic activities and has historically concentrated the largest number of poor.⁴⁵⁵ In Nicaragua, for instance, the most important factor determining whether workers have a non-agricultural job is having primary and secondary education and being older and more experienced.⁴⁵⁶ Low levels of education among the poor limit their access to the vibrant manufacturing *maquila* sector - as jobs in this sector requires a completed secondary education.⁴⁵⁷ In addition to being important for finding employment outside of agriculture, more education means better paying jobs even within occupational categories and within sectors – since the more educated will get the best jobs available in that category.⁴⁵⁸ Nicaragua is the poorest country in Central America and the second poorest in the Western Hemisphere, and widespread underemployment and poverty prevail.⁴⁵⁹

Percentage of GDP per sector: Agriculture



Source: CIA – The World Factbook, 2014

Agriculture products ranking (*only the first three):

Mexico	corn, wheat, soybeans
Guatemala	sugarcane, corn, bananas
Belize	bananas, cacao, citrus
Honduras	bananas, coffee, citrus
El Salvador	coffee, sugar, corn
Nicaragua	coffee, bananas, sugarcane
Costa Rica	bananas, pineapple, coffee
Panama	bananas, rice, corn
The Bahamas	citrus, vegetables, poultry
Cuba	sugar, tobacco, citrus
Grenada	banana, cocoa, nutmeg
Haiti	coffee, mangoes, cocoa
Dominican Republic	sugarcane, coffee, cotton
Jamaica	sugarcane, bananas, coffee
Puerto Rico	sugarcane, coffee, pineapples
Trinidad and Tobago	cocoa, rice, citrus

Source: CIA – The World Factbook, 2014

Industry

Main Industries in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean (MCAC)	
Mexico	food and beverages, tobacco, chemicals, iron and steel, petroleum, mining, textiles, clothing, motor vehicles, consumer durables, tourism
Guatemala	sugar, textiles and clothing, furniture, chemicals, petroleum, metals, rubber, tourism
Belize	garment production, food processing, tourism, construction, oil
Honduras	sugar, coffee, woven and knit apparel, wood products, cigars
El Salvador	food processing, beverages, petroleum, chemicals, fertilizer, textiles, furniture, light metals
Nicaragua	food processing, chemicals, machinery and metal products, knit and woven apparel, petroleum refining and distribution, beverages, footwear, wood, electric wire harness manufacturing, mining
Costa Rica	microprocessors, food processing, medical equipment, textiles and clothing, construction materials, fertilizer, plastic products
Panama	construction, brewing, cement and other construction materials, sugar milling
The Bahamas	tourism, banking, oil bunkering, maritime industries, transshipment, salt, rum, aragonite, pharmaceuticals
Cuba	petroleum, nickel, cobalt, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, construction, steel, cement, agricultural machinery, sugar
Grenada	food and beverages, textiles, light assembly operations, tourism, construction
Haiti	textiles, sugar refining, flour milling, cement, light assembly using imported parts
Dominican Republic	tourism, sugar processing, ferronickel and gold mining, textiles, cement, tobacco
Jamaica	tourism, bauxite/alumina, agricultural-processing, light manufactures, rum, cement, metal, paper, chemical products, telecommunications
Puerto Rico	pharmaceuticals, electronics, apparel, food products, tourism
Trinidad and Tobago	petroleum and petroleum products, liquefied natural gas (LNG), methanol, ammonia, urea, steel products, beverages, food processing, cement, cotton textiles

Source: CIA World Factbook – 2014

Main economic characteristics of the countries in the region:

Mexico – This \$1.3 trillion economy has become increasingly oriented toward manufacturing in the 20 years since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force. Mexico has become the United States' second-largest export market and third-largest source of imports.⁴⁶⁰

Honduras - Historically dependent on the export of bananas and coffee, the country has diversified its export base to include apparel and automobile wire harnessing. Nearly half of Honduras's economic activity is directly tied to the US, with exports to the U.S. accounting for 30% of GDP and remittances for another 20%.

The Bahamas - One of the wealthiest Caribbean countries with an economy heavily dependent on tourism and offshore banking. Tourism, together with tourism-driven construction and manufacturing, accounts for approximately 60% of GDP and directly or indirectly employs half of the archipelago's labor force.

Puerto Rico - Has one of the most dynamic economies in the Caribbean region; however, growth has been negative for the past four years, and unemployment rose to nearly 16% in 2011. The industrial sector has surpassed agriculture as the primary locus of economic activity and income.

Trinidad and Tobago - Attracts considerable foreign direct investment from international businesses, particularly in energy, and has one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin America.

Source: The World Factbook – CIA

Regional Trade Groups

CARICOM – Caribbean Community and Common Market

Caribbean islands are heavily trade-dependent (except for Cuba) and the U.S. is a significant partner, with over 80 % of the Dominican Republic's exports going to the United States.⁴⁶¹ CARICOM is not a true common market, but it encourages cooperation and has produced some economic integration.⁴⁶²

CAFTA – Central American Free Trade Area, with the Dominican Republic

On August 5, 2004, the United States signed the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) with five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic.⁴⁶³ The CAFTA-DR is the first free trade agreement between the United States and a group of smaller developing economies.⁴⁶⁴ This agreement is meant to create new economic opportunities by eliminating tariffs, opening markets, reducing barriers to services, and promoting transparency.⁴⁶⁵ It facilitates trade and investment among the seven countries and furthers regional integration.⁴⁶⁶

CAFTA/DR Trade Facts: CAFTA/DR countries combined would currently be the U.S.' 14th largest goods trading partner with \$60 billion in total (two-way) goods trade during 2013. (Note: CAFTA/DR countries would have been the 10th largest if EU countries were grouped together as one entity, as well as NAFTA countries). Exports totaled \$30 billion; imports totaled \$30 billion; the U.S. goods trade deficit with CAFTA/DR was \$662 million in 2013.

(Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative)

NAFTA – The North America Free Trade Agreement



The Flags of NAFTA members – U.S., Canada, and Mexico (Source: USTR.gov)

Recommended Reading:

For updated discussions, webinars (under *events*) and reports (under *publications*) on NAFTA, visit the Mexico Institute, at the Wilson Center.

Available at:

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/mexico-institute>

NAFTA - On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States, Canada, and Mexico entered into force. All remaining duties and quantitative restrictions were eliminated, as scheduled, on January 1, 2008.

NAFTA created the world's largest free trade area, which now links 450 million people, producing \$17 trillion worth of goods and services. Trade between the United States and its NAFTA partners has soared since the agreement entered into force. U.S. goods and services trade with NAFTA totaled \$1.2 trillion in 2012 (latest data available). Exports totaled \$597 billion; Imports totaled \$646 billion. The U.S. goods and services trade deficit with NAFTA was \$49 billion in 2012.

(Source: Office of the United States Trade Representative)


Income Inequality

Income inequality and wealth distribution are two different concepts: Income inequality focuses exclusively on the income side of the equation, while wealth distribution looks at how the ownership of assets in a given society is shared among its members.⁴⁶⁷ However, both measures help chart the economic gap between a country's wealthiest and poorest citizens. The graphs below demonstrate the huge unequal income distribution in the region:


Honduras: The second poorest country in Central America, suffers from extraordinarily unequal distribution of income, as well as high underemployment.

Guatemala: The distribution of income remains highly unequal with the richest 20% of the population accounting for more than 51% of Guatemala's overall consumption. More than half of the population is below the national poverty line, and 13% of the population lives in extreme poverty.

Distribution of Income Shared held by Groups:



Source: World Bank, 2014



Source: World Bank, 2014

Remittances

Remittances are the international money transfers made by expatriate workers back to their home countries.⁴⁶⁸

It is estimated that Latin American and Caribbean migrants sent close to \$61.3 billion to their region in 2013, according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).⁴⁶⁹ The IDB states that remittances are a potential key to “banking the unbanked” as most of these transfers involved poor people traditionally excluded from formal financial systems.⁴⁷⁰

Every year Latin American and Caribbean migrants make about 250 million separate money transfers to their home countries.⁴⁷¹ Remittance flows to Latin America and the Caribbean remain an important source of income for millions of poor and vulnerable families.⁴⁷² Mexico remains the largest recipient of remittances in the region, with \$21.6 billion, followed by Guatemala, with \$5.1 billion, El Salvador with just under \$4.0 billion, and the Dominican Republic with \$3.3 billion.⁴⁷³ The United States is the source of about three-quarters of remittances to the region, followed by Spain.

Informal Economy

What is informal economy? According to the World Bank definition, informal economy refers to:⁴⁷⁴
“... activities and income that is partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation, and observation.”

The main attraction of the undeclared economy is financial. This type of activity allows employers, paid employees, and the self-employed to increase their take-home earnings or reduce their costs by evading taxation and social contributions. On the one hand, informal employment can provide a cushion for workers who cannot find a job in the formal sector. But, on the other hand, it entails a loss in budget revenues by reducing taxes and social security contributions paid, and therefore the availability of funds to improve infrastructure and other public goods and services. It invariably leads to a high tax burden on registered labor.⁴⁷⁵

Informal economy includes both illegal and legal economic activities. For example, selling drugs is illegal. However, taking tips as a waiter in a restaurant is legal activity (but not reporting this tip to IRS makes is part of the informal economy activity).

In many countries in the region, due mostly to lack of skills or formal jobs, up to half of the population is underemployed and earns a living by working within the informal economy.⁴⁷⁶ These include jobs such as low paying jobs in agriculture (rural areas) or odd jobs in urban areas, such as collecting garbage, shining shoes, or street vending, selling anything from fruit, candy or clothes to counterfeit merchandise and pirated goods such as illegal copies of movies, DVDs, CDs, etc. This informal category also includes the work of street children, selling gum or candy at traffic lights in major urban centers.

According to the World Bank, informality and labor market segmentation is an issue of growing significance in the developing world where most of the poor derive all of their income, or a great part of it, from informal work.⁴⁷⁷ Moreover, informal employment is often characterized by poor working conditions, poor pay and the absence of any labor standards for workers.⁴⁷⁸ Improving the economic position of informal workers is therefore a key instrument to raise living conditions of poor workers and reduce poverty.⁴⁷⁹

Infrastructure

According to the World Bank, “infrastructure helps determine the success of manufacturing and agricultural activities. Investments in water, sanitation, energy, housing, and transportation also improve lives and reduced poverty. And new information and communication technologies promote growth, improve

Recommended Reading:

Mega-Cities & Infrastructure in Latin America – What its people think, Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

Available at:

<http://publications.iadb.org/bitstream/handle/11319/6415/MegacitiesSurvey.pdf?sequence=3>


delivery of health and other services, expand the reach of education, and support social and cultural advances.”⁴⁸⁰

Substandard infrastructure in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean is one of the most significant barriers to development in the region.⁴⁸¹ Improving infrastructure is now a priority topic in policy debates.⁴⁸² The region’s oftentimes inadequate transportation system limits the movement of people and goods. Caribbean ports and the Panama Canal stand out as important global elements in international maritime shipping networks. The region is eager to invest in infrastructure development; however, a lack of resources is an ongoing problem. Access to utilities differs across countries and across sub-regions, with Central America having more access to electricity than the Caribbean, while Mexico faces serious power supply issues. Reflecting the region’s income inequality, water service delivery is uneven, with a large disparity between rural and urban areas. By contrast, cell phone and social media use is increasing exponentially.

The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has drawn the attention of regional authorities to the impact of insufficient infrastructure (in terms of quantity or quality) on the future development of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).⁴⁸³ This deficit, called the infrastructure gap, requires urgent measures to raise investment levels while strengthening and adapting the regulatory, organizational and institutional environment related to infrastructure services in order to favor inclusive, sustainable development.⁴⁸⁴ Recent studies show that the region would need to spend, on average, around 5.2% of GDP yearly in order to maintain the infrastructure investment flows required to meet the needs of companies and end users during 2006-2020.⁴⁸⁵

The Panama Canal is an important trade route connecting the Pacific Ocean with the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. While goods both destined for and originating from the United States are shipped through the Panama Canal, the route transports limited volumes of crude oil and refined petroleum products. The Canal is only 110 feet wide at its narrowest point, Culebra Cut, and many modern tankers are too large to travel through it. According to the Panama Canal Authority, 1.4% of total global maritime petroleum flows through the canal, and 78% of that flows from the South Atlantic to the Pacific. However, the Panama Canal is not a significant route for petroleum transit or for U. S. petroleum imports. In order to make the canal more accessible to larger tankers, the Panama Canal Authority began an expansion program that it expects to complete by the end of 2015, according to Reuters. The Trans-Panama Pipeline (TPP) is situated near the Costa Rican border, is another oil transit route that reduces transportation times and costs between the Atlantic and Pacific basins.


Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration⁴⁸⁶



Panama Canal Gatun Locks (Source: Wikipedia, photo by Stan Shebs)

Communications


In contrast, the communications sector is developing rapidly, with significant growth in cell phone usage.⁴⁸⁷ While internet and computer access has grown more slowly than mobile phone use, the region has become one of the most connected to social media websites. Internet usage averaged 46.2% in 2013, compared to the U.S. average of 84.2%.⁴⁸⁸



Internet users per 100 people (Source: World Bank)

Internet and computer access has grown more slowly than mobile phone use. Cost is one of the main obstacles preventing the wider use of internet services and personal computers. Central America is home to approximately 157,663,596 people; internet users (as of June 2012) stood at 51,452,595, or 32.6% of the population.⁴⁸⁹

Number of users who accessed the Internet in 2009. Statistics vary from country to country, and may include users who accessed the Internet at least several times a week, to those who accessed it only once within a period of several months.



Source: CIA World Factbook 2014

Despite the relatively limited access to the Internet in Central America and the Caribbean, the region has become strongly connected to social media websites. Facebook leads the social networking market in the region with 47,035,580 Facebook users in Central America and 6,674,100 Facebook users in the Caribbean.⁴⁹⁰




Enlace Quiché - which means “link” in Spanish — trained bilingual (Spanish-Mayan) educators to teach Mayan students and their families how to use and benefit from technology, especially computers, the Internet and video. The training has improved the quality of education for children of the rural poor. It has also made it possible for rural Mayans to cross the digital divide and strengthen their cultural and linguistic identity.

Community members use computers at rural school in Cunén, Quiché, Guatemala. Some assume that rural indigenous populations are not ready for information technology, that they are not interested in it, and that, in any case, there is not enough basic infrastructure to extend technology from urban to rural areas. Enlace Quiché, a technology program supported by USAID in the heart of the Quiché region in the Guatemalan highlands, has proven them wrong on every count (Source: USAID)

Cell Phones


Latin America has surpassed 100% cell phone usage. On average, there are 107 cell phones per 100 people across the region.⁴⁹¹ However, this does not mean everyone has a phone or that there is connectivity everywhere: the explosion in cell phone use in Latin America is in large part a result of *bypassing* traditional landline telephones, because much of the cell phone infrastructure of the region is built around G3 or G4 cell phone towers, since the earlier ones simply were never built.⁴⁹² What this means is that Latin America is moving rapidly into the 21st century with much more modern technologies at the core of its infrastructure.⁴⁹³

Total number of cell phone subscribers (data varies between 2011 and 2013):



Source: CIA World Factbook 2014

Cell phone subscriptions (per 100 people):



Source: World Bank Indicators

In Mexico there is adequate telephone service for business and government; improving quality and increasing mobile cellular availability, with mobile subscribers far outnumbering fixed-line subscribers. The domestic satellite system consists of 120 earth stations, an extensive microwave radio relay network, and considerable use of fiber-optic cable and coaxial cable. Despite opening to competition in January 1997, Telmex remains dominant; Fixed-line tele-density is less than 20 per 100 persons; and mobile-cellular tele-density is about 80 per 100 persons.


(Source: CIA World Factbook)

Transportation

The transportation sector in Central America and the Caribbean also lacks sufficient infrastructure. Within the countries, roads are the main mode of transportation, but they are often inadequate. In Central America, less than 20 percent of all roads are paved. In Mexico, the percentage of paved roads is considerably higher than in Central American countries. In the Caribbean, roads serving popular tourist destinations are unable to withstand increased traffic.

Railways

In Central America, railways previously used for bananas and other export commodities have fallen into disrepair or have been closed. Some countries still operate a few railways for freight and tourism, although the railways are significantly less used than in the 19th century. In Mexico the railway system is more developed and utilized; a large rail network provides reliable freight and passenger service throughout the country. However, rail freight is dominated by two companies with 30- year exclusive licenses which the current government is trying to nullify, claiming little investment in the sector warrants more competition to improve services.⁴⁹⁴



Ferrocarriles Nacionales de México, a train at Mexico City Station in 1984 (Source: Wikipedia)

Transportation Investment

Countries in the region have begun to invest in national and intraregional transportation development. This is part of an effort to reduce bottlenecks and infrastructural challenges to regional and international trade. This is evident through the expansion of the Panama Canal with its ambitious upgrades to allow larger freighters to transit; the Mesoamerican Infrastructure Project, which includes ten Central American countries and the Dominican Republic; and Mexico's new infrastructure projects aimed to connect its primary urban and industrial centers with new expressways and expand its ports.⁴⁹⁵ Since 2007, Mexico has invested in the modernization of 10,000 miles of roadways, and the current government has vowed to increase spending in infrastructure by 56 percent.⁴⁹⁶




Pan-American Highway, at David, Chiriqui, Panama (Author: William Jexpiere, Source: Wikipedia)




Pan-American Highway, at Quetzal, Guatemala (Source: Wikipedia)

Mexico, Central America and Caribbean Roadway Networks (Roadways compare the total length of the road network and include the length of the paved and unpaved portions):



Source: CIA World Factbook – 2104

Waterways




Waterways, in kilometers (Source: CIA World Factbook – 2014)

Mexico has the largest waterway infrastructure with 2,900 km of navigable rivers and coastal canals mostly connected with ports on the country's east coast.⁴⁹⁷ Nicaragua comes in second in the region, with 2,220 km of navigable waterways, as well as the use of the large Lake Managua and Lake Nicaragua, while rivers serve only the sparsely populated eastern part of the country.⁴⁹⁸

Air Transportation

Airport comparison of the total number of airports or airfields recognizable from the air (the runway(s) may be paved or unpaved):




Source: CIA World Factbook 2014

Water Supply and Sanitation


Due to the region's high rate of urbanization, urban areas have better access to utilities than rural areas – these include access to running water, gas, electricity, and sewage systems. However, lack of water supply and substandard sanitation in Central America and the Caribbean are a serious infrastructure problem. Reflecting the region's income inequality, water service delivery is uneven, with a large disparity between rural and urban areas.

Northern Mexico contains less than ten percent of the country's water resources.⁴⁹⁹ The country suffers from severe water scarcity due to high demand and low supply in the arid north, where most of the population is located.⁵⁰⁰ Mexico's economic and industrial center and agricultural activity are located in the north, a typically arid region that holds only one-third of the country's water resources. Population growth and economic development over the years caused a significant increase in demand which has not been met with commensurate supply.



Access to Water

Improved water source, urban vs. rural (% of urban vs. rural population with access)



Source: World Bank

Access to water services is still highly unequal in the region, as water and sanitation services are heavily weighted towards the urban populations, to the detriment of interior, rural communities.⁵⁰¹ But despite

enormous progress over the past 20 years, 30 million Latin Americans are still without access to safe drinking water.⁵⁰²


Additionally, in Mexico City for instance, 28% of the people think that the water supply service is “bad” or “very bad.”⁵⁰³ Water scarcity has led to conflict not only within Mexico (as states, municipalities, and different communities compete for the limited resource), but also with the United States.

Mexico and Texas share the Rio Grande River:⁵⁰⁴ A 1944 treaty between both countries requires that Mexico provide a minimum amount of water to Texas per year, as most of the storage reservoirs are located in Mexico. However, the Texas government argues that Mexico has not been complying with its obligations and is not experiencing a drought. Texas says that “the failure of Mexico to consistently deliver water in accordance with the 1944 water treaty between the United States and Mexico significantly harms Texas interests.”
(Source: Congressional Research Service)

Electricity

Trinidad and Tobago ranks fifth in the world for energy intensity (Btu per 2005 U.S. dollars), with its entire electricity sector being fueled by natural gas.⁵⁰⁵ Power outages are common in the region, with Mexico City reporting power outages 18% of the time.⁵⁰⁶ As might be reasonably expected, the lower classes in the region experience more power outages and power surges than the upper class.⁵⁰⁷

Electric power consumption (kWh per capita) (*no data available for Belize, The Bahamas, Grenada and Puerto Rico):



Source: World Bank

Regional Security Issues

Why Regional Security Matters to You as a Marine

A thorough understanding of a region is difficult without an account of its most significant security challenges. These challenges tend to affect not only relations between states in the region but also the behavior of its people and the choices they make. Regional security issues encompass a host of topics ranging from wars between states, to insurgencies, to organized crime, to weak institutions, to systemic corruption. Some of them involve violence, while others weaken states and societies and have the potential to turn low level conflicts into violent confrontations.

Regional Security Issues:

- The Drug Problem
- Criminal Violence
- Homicide
- Challenges to U.S. led “War on Drugs”
- Cyber Attacks
- Human Trafficking
- Mexico’s Drug War
- Regional Response and U.S. Security Assistance

Introduction

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean increasingly occupy the attention of the U.S. government. With security, governance, and human development issues occurring so close to the homeland, this region has evoked a U.S. response in the form of several security partnership initiatives with countries in the region. Because many of the most pressing security issues important to the United States are occurring in Mexico and Central America (with a focus on the overarching issue of drug trafficking and its multiple causes and consequences), much of this chapter will be focused on these two sub-regions, though the Caribbean will be mentioned.

The security challenges in the region are partly due to the region’s high level of inequality and social exclusion and its weak rule of law.⁵⁰⁸ Most countries in the region are marked by persistent poverty, inequality, and unemployment, providing few opportunities for their growing populations.

As noted in Lesson 5, a large segment of the region's population lives in poverty, and an extraordinarily high income disparity exists between the rich and poor. Making matters worse, the lack of social mobility, unemployment and underemployment creates an optimal environment for Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) to recruit from, thus increasing criminal activity and related violence. In a circular fashion, higher levels of crime are also impeding human development in the region, undermining economic growth, threatening human welfare through decreased citizen security, and hindering social development.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the violence afflicting Central America today is compounded by the inability of many governments to effectively deal with this growing problem. With the exception of a few countries in the region, such as Costa Rica and Panama, most governments tend to be institutionally weak, with corruption still ingrained in the political system. Additionally, underfunded governments are incapable of fully combating well-funded criminal organizations, leading to a growing sense of lawlessness in the region. Criminal elements feed off of corrupt and underfunded state institutions, which can themselves become involved in crime. This leads to a vicious cycle in which the convergence of crime, corruption, and weak institutions limit the country's full socio-economic potential.

The Drug Problem

The top U.S. security concerns in South America are the export of illegal drugs, high crime, widespread corruption, and powerful transnational organized criminal networks that threaten regional stability.

The term “drug problem” refers to any kind of crime related to the illicit production, traffic, distribution, trade, consumption, counterdrug efforts, counterdrug strategies, supply reduction efforts, demand reduction efforts, and any other action connected to the perpetuation of the drug trade or the countering of that trade, in the Americas. The relevance of the drug problem for the whole world is immense; it is also one of the main causes of destabilization of the Latin American countries, and the one that will most likely result in regional instability or conflict, especially in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean.

Drug Trafficking

Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean are key players in one of the most lucrative drug flows in the global narcotics trade. Located just south of the world's largest consumer of illicit drugs - the United States - many countries in this region serve as transshipment and storage points for illicit drugs trafficked from South America to the U.S. market. Their geographical location, therefore, makes them major “drug arteries” for the United States.⁵⁰⁹ It is estimated that between 95 percent of U.S.-bound cocaine crosses Central America and Mexico today.⁵¹⁰ The Atlantic coast of Honduras and Nicaragua and the Pacific coast of Guatemala are the major transshipment points of U.S. bound drugs.⁵¹¹

Recommended Reading:

For a detailed understanding of the **security concerns** in the region:


Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, USMC Commander, USSOUTHCOM Commander before the 113th Congress, *House Armed Services Committee* (26 February 2014).

Available at:

http://www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Documents/2014_SOUTHCOM_Posture_Statement_HASC_FINAL_PDF.pdf

General John Kelly, in his Posture Statement before the 113th Congress, summarized the challenge:

“Upon landfall in Central America, bulk cocaine is broken down into multiple smaller shipments for transit into Mexico and the United States, making large interdictions at the U.S. border extremely difficult, despite the heroic efforts of local law enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. If bulk shipments are not interdicted before making landfall, there is almost no stopping the majority of this cocaine as it moves through Central America and Mexico and eventually lands on street corners across America, placing significant strain on our nation’s health care and criminal justice systems and costing American taxpayers an estimated \$193 billion in 2007 alone, the most recent year for which data is available.”⁵¹²



Source: Wilson Center

Market Displacement

The Caribbean used to be a primary channel for cocaine trafficked to the United States through South Florida,⁵¹³ but enhanced monitoring of the region and displacement effects caused by successful counter narcotics operations in Colombia (this connection is explained further below) reduced the region’s primary role in the U.S. bound narco-trafficking network.⁵¹⁴ Although some Caribbean countries like the Dominican Republic and Haiti have seen a resurgence as important transshipment points in this network,⁵¹⁵ the Caribbean now plays a more significant role in trafficking drugs to Europe.⁵¹⁶

Countries in the region have always played an important role as transshipment points for U.S.-bound drugs, and several, notably El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, have gained prominence in recent years. This has occurred due to increased counter narcotics operations in Mexico and Colombia.⁵¹⁷ The success of these operations has caused Colombian traffickers—who preferred to use the Caribbean route for drugs transported to the United States—to have a diminished role in the transportation networks since the 1990s.⁵¹⁸ After Colombian groups were weakened, Mexico was able to assume greater control of the trafficking chain, thus leading to a shift in drug flows from the Caribbean to Central America, which is located closer to its borders.⁵¹⁹ At the same time, increased

counter narcotics operations in Mexico have pressured several Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), such as the Sinaloa and Los Zetas drug cartels, to increasingly take over local Central American DTO operations.⁵²⁰

Criminal Violence

The shift in drug channels to the U.S. from the Caribbean to Central America has contributed to exponentially higher levels of violence in Central America, particularly in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala – known as the Northern Triangle countries – where many turf battles between Mexican and local DTOs are taking place. In fact, the Northern Triangle is considered the most violent region in the world today, outside of active war zones.⁵²¹

The levels of violence are so high that people in Central America regard criminal violence as one of the most important issues currently facing their countries.⁵²² Crime has become “the paramount policy issue,” one that “decides elections and determines people’s views of the government,” depending on how successful the latter’s approach has been to reducing it.⁵²³

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs’ latest study on criminality in the region, *Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: Threat Assessment*, the rise of violence is explained the following way:⁵²⁴

“In many ways, the **territorial groups** act like a state within the state, and can easily move into other forms of criminality should their current portfolio of activities prove unprofitable. If cocaine trafficking were to disappear tomorrow, the impact on violence would be unpredictable. Diminished flows can actually exacerbate violent competition, and more direct forms of criminal income acquisition (such as extortion, robbery, and kidnapping) can cause more violence than drug trafficking. The flow of cocaine through the Caribbean has declined remarkably in recent years, but this reduction has not brought low murder rates. The key driver of violence is not cocaine, but change: change in the negotiated power relations between and within groups, and with the state.”

Text Extracted from the UNODC’s Report *Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: Threat Assessment*⁵²⁵

Recommended Reading:

Bruce Bagley, “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty-First Century,” *Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars* (August 2012). Available at:

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/B%20Final.pdf>

The Criminal Diaspora: The Spread of Transnational Organized Crime and How to Contain its Expansion.

Edited by Juan Carlos Garzón and Eric L. Olson. Available at:

<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/CriminalDiaspora>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), *Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment* (Vienna, Austria: UNODC, September, 2012).

Available at:

http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_CentralAmericaandtheCaribbean_english.pdf

Territorial Groups – “In Central America and the Caribbean, there are two main headings under which all organized crime groups fall:

- 1) **Territory-bound organized crime groups**
- 2) **Transnational trafficking groups.**

These two types of groups are completely different in character. Territorial groups are focused on controlling territory and taxing activity within this domain. Trafficking groups are hardly groups at all, but rather networks of suppliers, transporters, and receivers, as would be encountered in any licit supply chain. In the region, they are often referred to as “*transportistas*.”

Much of the violence in the region today is about the growing control of territorial groups over transnational trafficking. This produces conflicts between territorial groups and the *transportistas*, as well as conflict between territorial groups. Within these two broad headings, there are many distinct variations. Some territorial groups focus almost exclusively on preying on cocaine traffickers, and are known as *tumbadores* in the region. One type of territorial group, the street gang, is more about identity than illicit commerce. There are street gangs throughout the region, but those in the north, known as *maras*, are particularly violent.”

(Source: UNODC)

Gangs

Apart from Mexican cartels and local DTOs operating in Central America, the region is also home to several violent street gangs, known as Maras. Comprised almost entirely of young men under the age of 30, the Maras are expanding geographically⁵²⁶ and are involved in a host of criminal activities, such as migrant smuggling, human trafficking, and firearms trade.⁵²⁷

The two major factions in Central America are the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and the 18th Street gang (M-18), both of which have members in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and have ties to the United States. M-18 and MS-13 were formed in Los Angeles by respectively Mexican and Salvadoran youth. Their presence in Central America is mostly a result of thousands of criminal deportations from the United States after 1996.⁵²⁸

Gang leaders are known to recruit new members in prisons, and to have ordered several retaliatory assassinations in Northern Virginia.⁵²⁹ Approximately 54,000 young men in Central America belong to these street gangs, with El Salvador having the highest concentration (323 gang members for every 100,000 citizens).⁵³⁰

Recommended Reading:

For updates on **organized crime** in Latin America, see the organized crime database. Available at: www.insightcrime.com




Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) (Source: InSightCrime.org)

Gangs in El Salvador:

Gangs have taken control of drug dealing in El Salvador, displacing traditional dealers, converting them into employees and extending their reach into the international narcotics trade.⁵³¹ The gang members gradually have been separating from the organized crime groups to form their own structures.⁵³²

Homicide

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report (UNODC) homicide rates are significantly higher in the Americas in comparison to other regions. This is not a new phenomenon, since the Americas have consistently experienced homicide levels five to eight times higher than those in Europe or Asia since 1955.⁵³³ The graph below shows this consistent pattern:



The UNODC report on homicide states that intentional homicide and violent crimes represent a threat to civilian security, with increasing evidence that lack of security is associated with weak criminal justice systems.⁵³⁴ It stresses that overall, organized crime and gang-related homicide accounts for 30 percent of all homicides in the Americas. At the same time, the report indicates that the level of impunity for homicide in the Americas is rather high, exposing the weakness of the judicial system and of the rule of law in the region.⁵³⁵

Some countries such as Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador and Jamaica actually have very high homicide rates, above 30 per 100,000 population, which are higher than rates of conflict-related killings in some conflict zones.⁵³⁶

For example, in 2012, the rates of intentional homicide and civilian casualties were 6.5 and 9.34 per 100,000 population in Afghanistan, and 8.0 and 10.05 per 100,000 in Iraq.⁵³⁷ Even when combining these two rates, the levels of killings recorded in both countries in 2012 were well below 30 per 100,000 population.⁵³⁸




Latin America is the world's most violent region (Source: InSightCrime.org)

Homicide rates by country or territory (per 100,000 people):



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics 2013


Homicide rates have increased dramatically across Central America, even in the more developed and “safer” countries of the region’s south, namely Costa Rica and Panama. In these countries crime respectively increased by 63 percent and 140 percent between 2004 and 2009.⁵³⁹ The countries of Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are collectively experiencing the highest murder rates in the world today.⁵⁴⁰ Honduras in particular stands out as having one of the highest recorded murder rates in modern times, having doubled from already high levels in the last five years.⁵⁴¹



Homicide rates per 100,000 (2012 or latest year) (Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics, 2013)

Homicide “hot spots,” can remain hidden in the overall national rate of homicide in a given country. These hot spots are often associated with other risk factors like unemployment, poor standards of education, the presence of youth gangs and organized crime, poverty and inequality, and accessibility to firearms.⁵⁴²

Homicide rates at the sub-national level per 100,000 population (2012 or latest year):



Source: UNODC Homicide Statistics, 2013

The urban nature of homicide is particularly noticeable in Central America and in the Caribbean, where areas with 50,000 or more people record a disproportionate number of homicides.⁵⁴³ In Guatemala, 68 percent of all homicides in 2008 took place in urban areas, while in El Salvador, that number was 63 percent.⁵⁴⁴ However, the sudden increase in Mexico's homicide rate since 2007 has come after a steadily declining trend, from comparably high levels in the mid-1950s.⁵⁴⁵

The share of homicides related to organized criminal groups is the highest in the Americas, where violence is often linked to competition between organized criminal groups for control over territory or illicit activities including trafficking.⁵⁴⁶ Additionally, there is an extreme gender bias towards male victims in homicides related to organized criminal groups.⁵⁴⁷ In the Americas, for example, 96 percent of the victims of this type of homicide are male.⁵⁴⁸

Challenges to the U.S.-led “War on Drugs”

The U.S. has historically led the international forums, pushing for drug policies to be primarily focused on drug enforcement, the so-called “War on Drugs.” However, despite decades of anti-drugs efforts by the U.S. and partner governments – and billions of dollars spent by all parties involved, the war on drugs efforts in actuality caused the so-called “balloon effect” – in which efforts to eradicate drugs in one place just shifts it to another. For example, blocking the maritime routes for Colombian drugs led directly to the creation of powerful Mexican drug cartels and land-based routes into the United States.

As a result, there is a growing “anti-prohibitionist and anti-drug war” movement in Latin America with an agenda that aims to change most conventions in the drug enforcement regulations. Guatemala has been on the forefront of the anti-prohibitionist movement. After taking office in January 2012, Guatemalan President Otto Perez publicly announced his support “as a way to combat violence in the region.”⁵⁴⁹

The legalization movement's main arguments can be summarized as following:

“The foundations of the U.S.-led war on drugs -- eradication of production, interdiction of traffic, and criminalization of consumption -- have not succeeded and never will. When there is established demand for a consumer product, there will be a supply. The only beneficiaries of prohibition are the drug cartels.”⁵⁵⁰

The reality is that the internal instability generated by the drug problem varies in severity from country to country. Virtually every country in the region experiences a different level or stage of the negative effects of drug production; trafficking; violent crimes; strain on law enforcement capacity and security forces; and popular pressure for change. The severity of combination of these negative effects are fueling in some countries, adherence to the anti-prohibitionist and anti-drug war movement. It is important to note that public opinion is not unified - legalization proponents in Latin America face intense opposition internally.

An important characteristic of organized crime is that it is highly adaptive. If confronted, it will simply move to other businesses that are equally profitable and violent.⁵⁵¹ Indeed, along with the balloon effect, this adaptability of the criminal networks dealing with narco-traffic is also well documented in the hemisphere.⁵⁵² For example, as drug-trafficking is combatted or legalized, one possibility is the displacement of the problem to other industries across the region, as criminal gangs diversify their activities to offset lost income, they can take up activities such as criminal mining, illegal logging, oil theft, human trafficking, and money laundering.⁵⁵³

Recommended Reading:

For updated information regarding the **legalization debate** in Latin America see a series of *InSightCrimes.org* reports on this debate.

Available at:

<http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/gorilla-in-the-room>

Elyssa Pachico, David Gagne and Kyra Gurney, “U.S. Marijuana Reform: Impact in Latin America?”

Available at:

<http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/marijuana-reform-us-impact-latin-america-stand>

Guatemala Decriminalization Reforms - Guatemala hosted a meeting of OAS states in September 2014 to build a regional consensus on drug policy reform leading up to the UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on the world drug problem in 2016.⁵⁵⁴ Notably, Guatemalan President Otto Perez took aim at the United States during the meeting, saying, “Current drug policies are not responding to the interests and needs of our country, but rather to the interests of another.”⁵⁵⁵ They [United States] are fighting for prohibition and against personal consumption.”⁵⁵⁶

Illegal Weapons

The flow of weapons to criminals in Mexico and Central America is another contributing factor to the rising violence in the region. Approximately 77 percent of all murders in Central America, for example, are committed using a firearm.⁵⁵⁷ Local criminal organizations have access to large numbers of firearms that continue to circulate the region from the civil war period of the 20th century. Many of these firearms are “leaked” to criminal elements from legitimate civilian and law enforcement use, due to a current surplus of such weapons in the region.⁵⁵⁸ However, most handguns that make their way

into the hands of these organizations come from legal purchases made in the United States or duty-free in Panama.⁵⁵⁹

Several countries in Central America have a large number of firearms compared to the number of soldiers and police. This is due to the downsizing of the military during the peace process after several civil wars.⁵⁶⁰

The largest sources of firearms in the region are military and police stockpiles, particularly in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, as well as Nicaragua and Panama.⁵⁶¹


There is broad consensus on the number of illegal weapons in Central America. The Oscar Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress in Costa Rica estimates that there are some 2.85 million illegal firearms in Central America.⁵⁶² A recent UNODC meeting of experts in Mexico City put the figure at 3 million.⁵⁶³

From 2006 to 2011 the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) developed “Project Gunrunner” to stem the flow of firearms into Mexico with the goal of depriving the drugs cartels of weapons.⁵⁶⁴ The operation enlisted U.S. firearms dealers to sell traceable weapons that were illegally shipped across the border in order to capture cartel leadership in Mexico. However, the ATF was unable to track the weapons and hundreds of guns were lost to the Mexican cartels – and many wound up at crime scenes in Mexico and the United States.⁵⁶⁵ This brought up a major scandal that became known as Operation Fast and Furious.⁵⁶⁶

Cyber Attacks

Cybercrime is a transnational problem which is increasingly becoming a security concern in Latin America. Over half of Latin American companies reported cyber-attacks such as malware, fraud and phishing in 2012.⁵⁶⁷ Central America reported 50 percent incidence of attacks and Mexico 41 percent – a significant drop.⁵⁶⁸

A report by the Organization of the American States (OAS) entitled *Latin American and Caribbean Cybersecurity Trends and Governments Responses*, states that while organized crime groups, such as narco-traffickers, have



Registered, state, and unregistered firearms in Central America, 2011 (or latest year available) (Source: UNODC)

Recommended Reading:

For updated reports and analysis on Security Cooperation with Mexico, see “Security Publications” at the **Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center**. Available at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication-series/security-cooperation>

For updates on security in Latin America, see **dialogo-americas.com**, a news hub sponsored by USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM. Available at: <http://dialogo-americas.com>

Andrew Selee, Cynthia J. Arnson, and Eric L. Olson, *Crime and Violence in Mexico and Central America* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center and Migration Policy Institute, January 2013). Available at: <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-EvolvingPolicyResponse.pdf>

Read more about Fast and Furious: U.S. Department of Justice, *Review of ATF’s Project Gunrunner* (November 2010). Available at: <https://oig.justice.gov/reports/ATF/e1101.pdf>

embraced cybercrime, the governments of Latin American countries have not been able to keep up in terms of defending themselves against this type of crime.⁵⁶⁹

The U.S. is providing leadership on this front, and in 2013, the U.S. Southern Command, working with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS) at the National Defense University (NDU), brought together strategy and policy officers from the region to share information on current cyber security threats.⁵⁷⁰ General John Kelly, in his Posture Statement before the 113th Congress summarized the effort:

“Through Operation Southern Voice, fifty information operation practitioners from eleven Western Hemisphere countries shared capabilities and best practices. In the year ahead, we are partnering with Colombia to build information related capabilities in Guatemala and Panama, and with U.S. Northern Command to do the same in Mexico.”⁵⁷¹

Cyber-attacks in Mexico’s National Defense – In 2013, despite the continent wide crackdown on activists, hacker collective "Anonymous" launched a series of cyber-attacks against websites belonging to Mexico's security agencies and claimed to have stolen files from the Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA).⁵⁷² Anonymous announced on Twitter that they had managed to take offline the websites of SEDENA, as well as the Secretariat of the Navy (SEMAR), and the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN).⁵⁷³ On the SEDENA site, the group reportedly managed to post a Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) manifesto that remained for two hours.⁵⁷⁴ The two government agencies reported that there was “no damage to naval operations or national security.”⁵⁷⁵

Human Trafficking

Emigration has been the response of thousands of people from the region to its security crisis and human development challenges. Not everyone leaving the region can migrate legally to the United States – the top destination for most regional migrants – so many rely on clandestine routes through Central America and Mexico.⁵⁷⁶ In fact, Central America has become a “global pathway” to the United States for people from all over the world, not only for those from Central America.⁵⁷⁷ Other nationalities include people from the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia), South Asia (Bangladesh, Nepal, and India), China, and other African and Asian countries.⁵⁷⁸

While migrants often pay smugglers to assist them in their journey, they are also extremely vulnerable to being exploited by smugglers, and to becoming victims of human trafficking.⁵⁷⁹ The abuse suffered by some of these migrants by their smugglers can include poor living conditions and sexual exploitation.⁵⁸⁰ Some migrants are kidnapped for ransom, or charged “protection fees” from such activities.⁵⁸¹ The Zetas cartel is particularly feared by migrants in Central America for its extortion activities, having been behind several massacres and beheadings of migrants.⁵⁸²

Recommended Reading:

For updated analysis and reports on **Migration and Migrants**, see the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Available at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication-series/migration-and-migrants>

In 2011, for example, police investigations found the Zetas to be behind the massacre of a total of 193 migrants in San Fernando, Mexico.⁵⁸³ This was a year after the Zetas had been implicated in the massacre of 72 other migrants.⁵⁸⁴ All migrants were attempting to reach the United States through Mexico, and were kidnapped and murdered after failing to pay the “protection fees.”

It is estimated that there are presently 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the U.S, with a half-million entering during the past four years.⁵⁸⁵ In the summer of 2014, the U.S. government has confirmed that 68,434 of these illegal immigrants were actually unaccompanied children, many of them emigrating from the impoverished and cartel-violence-torn countries of Central America.⁵⁸⁶ This sudden influx prompted the Obama Administration to declare it a humanitarian crisis.⁵⁸⁷ Carl Meacham from the Center of Hemispheric International Studies, summarizes the complex challenge of the current crisis:⁵⁸⁸

“Insufficient border policing and lackluster enforcement of existing immigration legislation certainly grease the proverbial wheels for migrants seeking entry into the United States. But ultimately, it is not poor enforcement alone that motivates their decisions to leave home - rather, it is a fundamental lack of opportunity coupled with rampant violence and transnational crime in their countries of origin.”⁵⁸⁹

Mexico's Drug War

Mexico is a major producer and supplier of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana, and a major transit country for more than 95 percent of the cocaine sold in the United States.⁵⁹⁰ Prior to Colombia's successful counter narcotics operations, the Mexican cartels acted as mere couriers for Colombian drugs. However, with Colombian cartels weakened, Mexican cartels shifted to being wholesalers of illicit drugs produced in South America. Mexican drug trafficking organizations expanded both locally and regionally, as they were able to create a large network of corruption that ensured their operations, many times with the protection of corrupt government officials in exchange for lucrative bribes.

Since 2006, the Mexican government has been engaged in a massive crackdown of Mexican DTOs, which has resulted in a dramatic escalation of drug-related violence. While the cartels have violently resisted law enforcement efforts, they have also engaged in bloody turf battles with one another following the power vacuum left by the arrest or death of many cartel leaders. The escalation of cartel-related violence has led to almost 70,000 deaths between 2006 and 2013.⁵⁹¹ These include massacres of civilians, beheadings, and the assassination of more than 20 sitting mayors. The inhospitable

Recommended Reading:

For details on the current **Immigration Crisis at the U.S. border:**

Carl Meacham, “What Are the Domestic and International Implications of Inaction on U.S. Immigration Reform,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies – CSIS*.

Available at:

<http://csis.org/publication/what-are-domestic-and-international-implications-inaction-us-immigration-reform>

Recommended Reading:

For details on **Mexico's Drug War:**

Brianna Lee, “Mexico's Drug War,” *Council on Foreign Relations* (March 5, 2014). Available at:

<http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689>

environment in Mexico has also forced the cartels to seek new routes, particularly along the Guatemalan and Honduran border, leading to an escalation in violence in this region as well.⁵⁹²

In Mexico's drug war, the government has increasingly turned to the military, given high levels of corruption of the police forces, and their alleged ties to the cartels.⁵⁹³ From 2006 to 2012, 50,000 soldiers were deployed to Mexico's streets, many times replacing the police force.⁵⁹⁴ The government also spent billions of dollars in training and equipping these forces for their new mission. Military and police operations have been responsible for a record number of arrests, interdictions, extraditions,⁵⁹⁵ as well as the capture of 25 of the 37 most wanted drug lords in the country.

Mexico's president, Enrique Peña Nieto, who took office in December 2012, has pledged to continue the war on drugs. However, he has argued for greater focus on reducing violence, rather than on arresting cartel leaders and reducing the flow of drugs to the United States. Since taking office, President Peña has invested \$9.1 billion in building more schools, creating more jobs, parks, and cultural activities in 220 of Mexico's most violent neighborhoods.⁵⁹⁶

However, Mexico's military strategy has also resulted in accusations of human rights abuses, with more than 170 alleged cases of torture, 39 disappearances, and 24 extrajudicial killings.⁵⁹⁷ The latest incident was confirmed publicly in October 2014, with Mexico's National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) determining that the army summarily executed 15 of the 22 suspects killed in a warehouse in June of the same year.⁵⁹⁸


In Mexico, one of the most important changes to organized crime in the last few years has taken place in states like Guerrero, Michoacán, and Tamaulipas. There, criminals not only have attempted to monopolize drug transshipments, but now their greatest objective is to take control over city administration and its resources in order to extract local wealth through forced taxation.⁵⁹⁹ The organized crime – de facto authorities in the area – carry out major barbaric massacres and “**exemplary executions**” when their interests collide with—or they perceive actions to confront them by—social organizations, civil society or community.



Families demand answers in disappearance cases
(Source: InSightCrime.org)

“Exemplary executions” – One of the most recent example of capos running the government took place in October 2014, in the small city of Iguala, 120 miles south of Mexico City: Forty-three student teachers were rounded up after a day of protests and were massacred by local police and gang members, who prosecutors say control the city and its officials.⁶⁰⁰ Prosecutors claim that police acted under the orders of the gangsters, with no restraint, “crime bosses rule - with apparently no patience for pesky protesters and other such democratic nuisances.”⁶⁰¹ Duncan Wood, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington D.C, made a strong remark about the incident:⁶⁰² “Iguala is just one example of the level of decay in state and municipal security institutions, it is probable that it will not be the last example of its kind and it has made the need for meaningful nationwide police and justice reform horrifically clear.”⁶⁰³

Mexico's Criminal Groups



Source: InSightCrime.org

According to Mexico's Attorney General's Office, there are nine major criminal cartels working with some 43 gangs in the country, further indication of just how much Mexican organized crime has fragmented, as well as the degree to which the cartels are leaning on smaller gangs to act as muscle.⁶⁰⁴ Mexico's large criminal organizations have fractured significantly since former President Felipe Calderon initiated his assault against organized crime in 2006.⁶⁰⁵

Regional Response and U.S. Security Assistance

The wave of crime afflicting Central America has caused several countries to adopt more aggressive law enforcement approaches, especially the Northern Triangle countries.⁶⁰⁶ These policies include increased military involvement in efforts to combat organized crime. Thousands of troops have been deployed to assist police forces in arrests and interdictions. This more aggressive approach has also led to severe crowding of prisons, as well as growing concerns for human rights abuses.

Another approach has been to broker a truce between warring criminal factions, believed to be behind much of the rise in violence. Countries are also starting to discuss a regional response to criminal violence, particularly through the framework of the Central American Integration System (SICA), a regional economic and political organization.⁶⁰⁷ Although most governments agree on a regional

Recommended Reading:

For information regarding **current criminal groups** in a select number of countries in Latin America, access the *Country Profile* page of the criminal database of the Americas at *InSightCrime* which provide updates on these groups, explains how they came to be and what kind of threats they pose. Available at: <http://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news>

For a detailed analysis on **gangs** in Mexico:

Nathan P. Jones, "Understanding and addressing youth in "gangs" in Mexico," Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Available at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/jones_youth_gangs.pdf

approach, there is significant disagreement as to the biggest threats facing the region and the best ways to combat them.

In response to the growing regional crisis, the United States has responded with several major security assistance initiatives, including the **Mérida Initiative**, which is focused primarily on Mexico, the **Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)**, and the **Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)**. These initiatives seek to assist local governments through training and the provision of equipment in fighting organized crime and its related violence. They also focus on improving the governments' institutional capacity, by promoting justice sector reform and combating corruption.

Text Extracted from the U.S. Department of State website:⁶⁰⁸

The Mérida Initiative is a partnership between the United States and Mexico to fight organized crime and associated violence while furthering respect for human rights and the rule of law. **Enhancing Citizen Security:** partnership to strengthen institutions, improve citizen safety, fight drug trafficking, organized crime, corruption, illicit arms trafficking, money-laundering, and demand for drugs on both sides of the border. Bilateral efforts are being accelerated to support democratic institutions, especially police, justice systems, and civil society organizations; to expand our border focus beyond interdiction of contraband to include facilitation of legitimate trade and travel; and to build strong and resilient communities able to withstand the pressures of crime and violence. **Mérida Programs and Initiatives:** Mexico's implementation of comprehensive justice sector reforms has been supported through the training of justice sector personnel including police, prosecutors, and defenders; correction systems development; judicial exchanges; and support to Mexican law schools.

The Mérida Initiative is the largest of the three. From 2008 to 2012, the U.S. appropriated \$2.1 billion in Mérida assistance for Mexico.⁶⁰⁹ Funding for the Mérida Initiative, however, is being gradually reduced in favor of CARSI, thus demonstrating the United States' growing focus on Central America rather than Mexico.⁶¹⁰

This shift is justified based on the deteriorating security situation that threatens citizen safety as narcotics traffickers continue to establish trafficking routes to and through Central America.⁶¹¹ Additionally, continued expansion of national and transnational gangs creates communities of fear where gangs are effectively in control.⁶¹² Finally, organized crime, which includes extortion and corrupt acts by government officials, robs citizens of confidence in their ability to earn a livelihood, provide for their families, and trust public officials for solutions.⁶¹³

Central American governments have expressed appreciation for increased U.S. funding, but they have maintained that the assistance is insufficient for the confronting the challenges affecting the region, and argue that the region's priorities should be taken more into account.⁶¹⁴ Some regional leaders argue the initiatives pay too much attention to the supply side of the narcotics issue (that is, the role played by countries south of the U.S. border), rather than the demand side (the U.S. market).⁶¹⁵ This position is a major point of contention in U.S.-Mexican relations, in particular.



Brigadier General Daniel Hokanson, Deputy Director for Strategy, Policy & Plans (J5) USNORTHCOM, presents the keys and the aircraft log book to Rear Admiral Jorge Carlos Morales, Director of Naval Aviation, Mexico, during a ceremony marking the turnover of three UH-60 Helicopters to the Mexican Navy (Source: USNORTHCOM images)

Recommended Reading:

For additional information on the **Mérida Initiative**:

Clare Ribando Seelke and Kristin Finklea, “U.S.- Mexican Security Cooperation: The Mérida Initiative and Beyond,” *Congressional Research Service* (April 8, 2014). Available at:

<http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41349.pdf>

Text Extracted from the U.S. Department of State website:⁶¹⁶

The Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI):

“CARSI is an Integrated, Collaborative Regional Security and Rule of Law Program. CARSI responds to these threats and supplements the strategies and programs the nations of Central America are implementing on their own and in cooperation with other countries. CARSI is coordinated with other nations, international financial institutions, the private sector, civil society, and the Central American Integration System (SICA). It is a coordinated approach that draws upon the expertise and efforts of like-minded donors supporting the citizen safety goals of Central American countries.

U.S. Assistance – Meeting the Threat – Building Capacity: The \$642 million in U.S. CARSI assistance since 2008 supports the following priorities in the Central American countries of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama:

- Assist law enforcement and security forces to confront narcotics and arms trafficking, gangs, organized crime, and border security deficiencies, as well as to disrupt criminal infrastructure, routes, and networks;

- Build the capacity of law enforcement and the justice sector to serve citizens and to address regional threats;

- Advance community policing, gang prevention, and economic and social programming for at-risk youth and communities disproportionately affected by crime.



U.S. Marines with Detachment Martillo, II Marine Expeditionary Force, setting up communication equipment on Guatemalan navy special operations boats during Operation Martillo in Puerto Quetzal, Guatemala, Aug. 17, 2012. Operation Martillo is a joint, interagency and multinational collaborative effort to deny transnational criminal organizations air and maritime access to the littoral regions of the Central American isthmus. (Source: Defense Imagery)

Recommended Reading:

For additional information on the CARSI:

Peter J. Meyer, Clare Ribando Seelke, "Central America Regional Security Initiative: Background and Policy Issues for Congress," *Congressional Research Service* (May 7, 2013).

Available at:

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41731.pdf>.

Text extracted from the USSOUTHCOM website:⁶¹⁷

Operation Martillo – “is a critical component of the U.S. government’s coordinated interagency regional security strategy in support of the White House Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime and the U.S. Central America Regional Security Initiative. Fourteen countries are participating: Belize, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Chile has also contributed to the operation.”⁶¹⁸

“SOUTHCOM is undertaking operational and tactical activity in support of whole-of-government efforts to counter transnational organized crime in the maritime approaches to Central America. A primary focus of SOUTHCOM’s Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) efforts is supporting the interdiction of drug trafficking. SOUTHCOM collaborates with other agencies and nations to support CTOC efforts through detection & monitoring, information sharing, and partner nation capacity building.”⁶¹⁹

Text extracted from the U.S. Department of State website:⁶²⁰

The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) – “is one pillar of a U.S. security strategy focused on citizen safety throughout the hemisphere. Launched by President Barack Obama at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in April 2009, the United States has committed more than \$263 million in funding. The United States, CARICOM member nations, and the Dominican Republic are improving citizen safety throughout the Caribbean by working together to substantially reduce illicit trafficking, increase public safety and security, and promote social justice. The United States and Caribbean countries have identified three core objectives to deal with the threats facing the Caribbean:

Substantially Reduce Illicit Trafficking: through programs ranging from counter narcotics to reducing the flow of illegal arms/light weapons.

Increase Public Safety and Security: through programs ranging from reducing crime and violence to improving border security.

Promote Social Justice: through programs designed to promote justice sector reform, combat government corruption, and assist vulnerable populations at risk of recruitment into criminal organizations. These objectives are not just about drug interdiction. CBSI is a whole of government approach to citizen safety.”

In his 2013 Posture Statement to the 113th Congress, General Kelly reported the following accomplishments in support of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI):

“We are working to improve maritime patrol and intercept capabilities of our Caribbean partners. Through CBSI, a maritime Technical Assistance Field Team - comprised of joint Coast Guard and Department of Defense personnel - provides hands on technical assistance, in-country mentoring, and training to 13 CBSI partner nations, with the goal of helping these countries develop accountable and sustainable engineering, maintenance, and logistics and procurement systems.”⁶²¹

Police Reform

The failure to construct effective state institutions in the region has enabled criminal organizations to penetrate all levels of government, including the police forces.⁶²² Therefore, strengthening the judiciary and law enforcement services are of ultimate importance in the Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean region.

Unfortunately, the region’s ineffective and corrupt legal systems severely hamper efforts by weak, underfunded and sometimes corrupt governments to conduct police reform.⁶²³ In response to that challenge, and in addition to providing assistance to judicial reform, the U.S. is providing Mexico with advice and training for its police forces through the Mérida Initiative, and for the rest of the region through CARSI and CBSI.⁶²⁴

Police reform in Mexico has been the centerpiece of the government security strategy and one of the most important components of the Mérida Initiative. However, after six years and millions of U.S.-supplied dollars later, Mexican authorities are acknowledging they are still a long way from purging and improving federal police forces, among the most corrupt institutions in the country.⁶²⁵

Official estimates claim that more than a quarter of state and local police officers have yet to go through the vetting process, and even where the vetting is complete, as it is for the federal police force, continued incidents of serious criminal activity by members of that very group undermine confidence in the process.⁶²⁶

Recommended Reading:

For a detailed analysis of **police reform** in Latin America and the U.S. involvement in this process:

Daniel M. Sabet, *Police Reform in Mexico* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

Stephen Johnson, Johanna M. Forman and Katherine Bliss, *Police Reform in Latin America - A Report of the CSIS Americas Program*, (Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2012).

Available at:
<http://csis.org/publication/police-reform-latin-america>

One of the main reasons behind this delay in vetting the police has been Mexico's failure to use up to 88 percent of the federal funds available to them for vetting their police.⁶²⁷ The deadline for the completion of the police trustworthiness evaluations had to be extended at least three times by Mexico's federal congress, and the last deadline of October 29, 2014, was also missed.⁶²⁸

The lack of municipal and state police capacity to combat multinational gangs is a serious obstacle, as there can be no enduring solution to Mexico's security challenges without more capable state and local agencies.⁶²⁹ It is also the only way to reduce the reliance on federal troops and special armed forces on Mexican streets.⁶³⁰

Without state and municipal political will to effectively use the federal funds available to conduct the police vetting process, the country's pressing security problems cannot be resolved.⁶³¹ However, this lack of political will to utilize federal funds might indicate a more grim reality: Have these states' institutions already become so corrupted by the organized crime that it actually blocks the vetting process altogether? If this hypothesis is proven true, Mexico's entire Federal system might be in jeopardy, and the Mérida Security Cooperation might need to be boosted in all forms.



Mexico's states are failing to reform police (Source: InSightCrime.org)

Case Study: The Haitians

The case study in this chapter introduces a culture from the MCAC region, using the concepts introduced in the Operational Culture General (OCG) document (see attached document).

Introduction

In the previous chapters, you reviewed various aspects of the physical and human terrain of Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, and the security issues of the region. This chapter explores Operational Culture in a case study of a distinct group in the Caribbean: The Haitians, viewed as a cultural group, through the lens of the Five Dimensions of Operational Culture. The case study also points out some of the Culture General Concepts that are found in this cultural group, such as identity, holism, change, variation, and mobilization. As you read through the chapters of this case study, please keep in mind the Culture General Concepts and the Five Dimensions approach you have previously encountered.

Haitians have contributed to some of the most remarkable episodes of human history. A former French colony, Haiti was the first independent Caribbean state, and the world's first black-led republic. It is the only country in the world to have gained independence after a successful slave revolt, and was only the second in the Western Hemisphere (after the United States) to declare independence, on January 1, 1804.⁶³²

Despite these historical achievements, Haitians live in one of the poorest countries in the world, with significant vulnerability to natural hazards that exacerbates the country's chronic and historical socioeconomic woes.


Recommended Reading:

For general information on Haiti:

“Country Profile: Haiti,” *Library of Congress – Federal Research Division* (May 2006). Available at: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Haiti.pdf>

“Haiti Country Profile,” *BBC News* (October 17, 2012). Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1202772.stm

Historical Timeline: HAITI



The Physical Environment



Source: University of Texas, Perry-Castañeda Maps

Haiti is a country of only 28,000 square kilometers (10,811 square miles), about the size of Maryland.⁶³³ Haiti is located on the mountainous western side of a Caribbean island called Hispaniola, and the Spanish-speaking country of the Dominican Republic occupies the eastern half of the island.

Terrain

Haiti's land area includes numerous small islands as well as four large islands.⁶³⁴ Five mountain ranges dominate Haiti's landscape and divide the country into three regions – northern, central, and southern.⁶³⁵



Source: University of Texas, Perry-Castañeda Maps

Environmental Hazards


Throughout Haiti’s history Haitians have had to deal with a harsh environment. Haiti is one of the Caribbean’s most disaster-prone countries. Haiti sits on a 500-kilometer fault line that has caused many devastating earthquakes, whose destructive effects have been compounded by poor infrastructure.

Haiti’s 7.0 magnitude earthquake in 2010 led to more than 220,000 deaths, displaced more than 1.5 million, and affected more than 3 million.⁶³⁶ In contrast, due to a significant difference in building codes and infrastructure, a month later, the South American country of Chile was struck by an 8.8 magnitude earthquake, much stronger than the one that hit Haiti,⁶³⁷ yet the number of casualties was significantly lower, with less than 800 deaths.⁶³⁸


The massive displacement crisis caused by the 2010 earthquake spread 1.5 million Haitians to find shelter in 1,500 camps spread across Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas.⁶³⁹ All but 147,000 of Haiti’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) have now left the camps that were established after the earthquake, the majority of which have now closed.⁶⁴⁰ Yet, the 2,500 households living outside of camps in Port-au-Prince show that the sustainable resolution of displacement in Haiti remains an unmet challenge.⁶⁴¹

A recent study by the Brookings Institute indicates that the overall living conditions have declined since the disaster:⁶⁴²

“Poor Haitians – displaced and non-displaced alike – are confronted by many serious and similar problems, including lack of access to schools, health care and jobs. But the experience of displacement has made a hard situation worse for many residents of Port-au-Prince: almost 61 percent of displaced families indicate that their overall living conditions have declined since the disaster, compared to 38.9 percent of non-displaced households. Families who were displaced




Source: USGS



Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas

by the earthquake were twice as likely to experience a decline in their housing situation, and continue to face significantly reduced access to water, latrines and health care.”⁶⁴³



Source: United Nations

Recommended Reading:

For a complete understanding of the effects of the 2010 Earthquake in Haiti:

“Haiti – 6 Months after...” United Nations.

Available at:

[http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/documents/6months after commemoration.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/documents/6months%20after%20commemoration.pdf)

“Report of the United Nations in Haiti 2011,” *United Nations*.

Available at:

http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/download/Report_Center/un-haiti-

A summary of the destructive effects of Haiti’s 2010 Earthquake:

- 222,570 dead and 300,572 injured;
- 1.5 million children and young people under 18 were directly or indirectly affected by the quake;
- 4,992 schools were affected by the earthquake – 23% of all schools in Haiti;
- Total damages and losses: US \$7.8 billion - more than 120% of Haiti’s 2009 GDP;
- 2.3 million people, including 302,000 children, were out of their homes, at the peak of displacement;
- After the earthquake, 604,215 people left Port-au-Prince. An estimated 160,000 persons moved from Port-au-Prince to the border area with the Dominican Republic;
- 105,000 houses were completely destroyed and 188,383 houses collapsed or were badly damaged across all affected areas;
- 60% of government, administrative and economic infrastructure was destroyed.

(Source: United Nations)⁶⁴⁴

Deforestation

Deforestation leads to soil erosion, decreasing agricultural yields and causes floods, landslides, and migrating to the cities, augmenting the urban poor in the slums. As detailed in Chapter 1, deforestation

has contributed to serious levels of soil erosion nationwide, especially in the north and northwest, where more than 60 percent of the land is severely or totally eroded.⁶⁴⁵ Depletion and degradation of land and water pose serious challenges to producing enough food and other agricultural products to sustain livelihoods.

Climate

Haiti has a tropical climate with distinct dry and rainy seasons – with the dry season taking place from December to February and the rainy season between April and November.⁶⁴⁶

Haiti's soil erosion problems exacerbate the effects of Haiti's deadly tropical storms, with severe flash floods causing significant loss of life.⁶⁴⁷ In 2012, Hurricane Sandy had a particularly negative impact on Haiti's continued struggle to recover from the 2010 earthquake. Fifty-four people were killed, and the livelihood of many farmers was severely threatened by flooding.⁶⁴⁸

Other Recent Haiti Flooding

In May 2004 nearly 3,000 people lost their lives in flash floods in Mapou, the southeast department, along the Dominican border. In September of the same year, Hurricane Jeanne caused disastrous floods in northern Haiti, affecting Gonaives, capital of the Artibonite department. It caused more than 2,000 deaths and affected an estimated 300,000 people through loss of homes, schools, health facilities, roads, crops, and livelihoods.⁶⁴⁹ At the height of the flooding, the water was 9 feet deep in Gonaives.⁶⁵⁰ The current was so strong it swept away military trucks. UN helicopters were used to pluck people from their rooftops.⁶⁵¹



Flooding in Gonaive, Haiti, 2008 (Source: Wikipedia)



Satellite image depicting the deforestation on the border between Haiti (left) and the Dominican Republic (right) (Source: CIA)

Urban and Rural Areas

Some 53.4 percent of Haiti's population live in urban areas.⁶⁵² Port-au-Prince is the country's largest city, with 2.2 million people in the metropolitan area. Most urban centers, including Port-au-Prince, suffer from a lack of sanitation – there are vast slum areas, filled with people living in squalid, unsanitary conditions.⁶⁵³

Port-au-Prince also includes Haiti's largest slum, Cité du Soleil, with 250,000 to 300,000 people living in abject poverty.⁶⁵⁴ Most of Cité Soleil houses are made out of discarded cardboard, sheet metal and other scavenged building materials.⁶⁵⁵




Slum in Haiti (Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas)



Street in a slum in Haiti (Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas)

Haiti Population Density (Source: SEDAC/CIESIN)



The Economy

Economic Overview - Haiti is a free market economy that enjoys the advantages of low labor costs and tariff-free access to the U.S. for many of its exports. Poverty, corruption, vulnerability to natural disasters, and low levels of education for much of the population are among Haiti's most serious impediments to economic growth. Haiti's economy suffered a severe setback in January 2010 when a 7.0 magnitude earthquake destroyed much of its capital city, Port-au-Prince, and neighboring areas. Currently the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with 80% of the population living under the poverty line and 54% in abject poverty, the earthquake further inflicted \$7.8 billion in damage and caused the country's GDP to contract.

In 2011, the Haitian economy began recovering from the earthquake. However, two hurricanes adversely affected agricultural output and the low public capital spending slowed the recovery in 2012. Two-fifths of all Haitians depend on the agricultural sector, mainly small-scale subsistence farming, and remain vulnerable to damage from frequent natural disasters, exacerbated by the country's widespread deforestation. US economic engagement under the Caribbean Basin Trade Preference Agreement (CBTPA) and the 2008 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE II) Act helped increase apparel exports and investment by providing duty-free access to the US. Congress voted in 2010 to extend the CBTPA and HOPE II until 2020 under the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP) Act; the apparel sector accounts for about 90% of Haitian exports and nearly one-twentieth of GDP. Haiti suffers from a lack of investment, partly because of weak infrastructure such as access to electricity. Haiti's outstanding external debt was cancelled by donor countries following the 2010 earthquake, but has since risen to \$1.1 billion as of December 2013. The government relies on formal international economic assistance for fiscal sustainability, with over half of its annual budget coming from outside sources. In 2012, private investment exceeded donor assistance for the first time since the 2010 earthquake.

(Source: CIA World Factbook, January 6, 2015)

Historical Overview

"Haiti's descent into the abyss of underdevelopment started two hundred years ago, when the country's economy was devastated by the war of independence." **Phillippe Girard, Historian**

The thirteen years of the war of independence cost half of the nation's population. Jean-Jacques Dessalines was the first leader of independent Haiti and its first dictator. Dessalines called for vengeance against the French and the entire remaining white population. In 1804, under his personal supervision the white population was brutally decimated, including all white business owners, engineers, and in sum all cadres, leaving behind a vast majority of Haiti's population which was illiterate and unskilled.⁶⁵⁶

Due to the economic interest and racism of slaveholding societies at the time, after independence Haiti became the most impoverished, ecologically ruined outpost whose population was afforded no way to rebuild an economy on the ashes of the destroyed sugar monoculture. Ultimately, the Haitians had little chance to outlive seemingly unsurmountable hardships of the time:

“Universally illiterate, devoid of agricultural and technological know-how, exhausted from a war that had taken thousands of lives and nearly all young, able-bodied men, the remainder of Haiti’s people turned to digging in the soil with sticks to eke out a subsistence.”⁶⁵⁷

In 1825 France extorted from Haiti indemnity (protection, security) in exchange for recognition of Haitian independence.⁶⁵⁸ This arrangement protected Haiti from French aggression, but it emptied the treasury and mortgaged the country’s future to French banks, which eagerly provided the balance of the hefty first installment.⁶⁵⁹ Most nations, including the United States, shunned Haiti for almost forty years, fearful that its example could stir unrest there and in other slaveholding countries.⁶⁶⁰

Current Socioeconomic Woes

Today, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and one of the poorest countries in the world. While 78% of Haitians live on less than \$2 per day, the richest 1% of the population controls nearly half of Haiti’s income.⁶⁶¹

In addition, the unemployment rate is particularly high, at approximately 40.6%,⁶⁶² while more than two-thirds of people do not have a formal job.⁶⁶³



Street vendors (Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas)



Most Haitians do not have formal jobs (Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas)

Most Haitians experience several socioeconomic hardships on a daily basis, including access to the most basic needs in life, such as clean water and sanitation.⁶⁶⁴ These deprivations, along with low levels of education and widespread corruption, significantly limit the population’s potential to contribute to the economy.⁶⁶⁵ The vast majority of the Haitian labor force—approximately two-fifths—works in small-scale, mainly subsistence farming.


These compounding chronic challenges have prompted many Haitians to leave the country in successive waves of emigration. Currently, the Haitian diaspora extends to the United States, Canada, and France. Haitian expatriates also live in several Caribbean states, including the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, and French territories, such as St. Martin and Guadeloupe.⁶⁶⁶ Early in Haiti’s history, many members of the professional elite emigrated, leading to a depletion of skills needed to develop the country further.

Later migrations have included individuals of all social classes, not only the elite. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Haitians migrated under hazardous conditions in makeshift boats to neighboring countries, including to the U.S. On several occasions these immigrants were turned away or detained.

Transportation

The public transportation consists mainly of buses, vans and trucks and is mostly privately owned in Haiti. Most Haitians rely on walking, riding bikes and **tap-taps**.

Tap-taps: Since only around 3 percent of Haitians own their own car, vans and commuter buses called tap-taps are popular in Haiti. They display vibrant art and go all over the cities and all over the country. They are cheap, it only costs a few cents to go across town.⁶⁶⁷



Tap-tap vans (Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas)



Tap-tap buses (Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas)



Tap-tap trucks (Source: Courtesy of Nancy Thomas)

Remittances

Many Haitians rely on money sent from relatives that have migrated abroad in search of better job opportunities and living standards. As a result, these remittances are a significant contributor to Haiti's economy, being five times greater than export earnings in 2012, and equaling 20% of the country's GDP.⁶⁶⁸

Food insecurity

Food insecurity and malnutrition affects a high proportion of Haitian population. Those issues have been aggravated by natural disasters such as Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in October 2012.⁶⁶⁹

Following Hurricane Sandy, some 1.5 million people faced severe food shortages, or food insecurity, while six million more were vulnerable to it.⁶⁷⁰ According to a USAID report, chronic food insecurity is directly related to insufficient food intake (quantity and quality) and precarious environmental and health conditions.⁶⁷¹ Food insecurity is concentrated more in regions of the country with drought, poor road conditions and poor access to markets.⁶⁷² Moreover, it leads to increased food prices in those markets based on the lack of supply to local markets and mainly by low purchase power of habitants of those rural areas.⁶⁷³

Rice, beans, maize, wheat and edible oils are considered staple foods in the Haitian diet and also are important food security crops in Haiti, especially since the initiation of liberal trade policies in the

1980s.⁶⁷⁴ Rice is particularly important, and consumer demand for rice has significantly increased because of a change in diet and population growth.⁶⁷⁵

The Rice Industry

Rice has been the center of controversies in recent years. Despite substantial technical and financial assistance especially from the U.S., domestic production accounts for only 16 percent of the consumption while imports have tremendously increased in the last 25 years.⁶⁷⁶ The main problem with the Haitian rice industry is the fact that the prices of locally produced rice is higher than international prices.⁶⁷⁷

Former U.S. President Clinton's decision to grant subsidies to rice farmers in Arkansas was at the center of the rice controversy in Haiti. After the 2010 earthquake, Clinton called the subsidies "a mistake because it undercut rice production in Haiti" and said he had struck "a devil's bargain" that had ultimately resulted in greater poverty and food insecurity in Haiti.⁶⁷⁸ "It may have been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked," he said.⁶⁷⁹ "I have to live every day with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a rice crop in Haiti to feed those people, because of what I did."⁶⁸⁰

Suggested Video:

This video portrays local narratives on how Haitians perceive foreign interference and assistance.

"A Brief History of Haiti that Every American Should Know." Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YxUk2NSwcEs>

Food sovereignty carries immense symbolism in Haiti - a country where foreign NGOs and the United Nations are more visible than the national government.⁶⁸¹ Mostly, Haitians fear they are losing their identity and want to regain their autonomy.

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Holism - second and third order effects:

The rice controversy in Haiti is a good example of how the Operational Culture General (OCG) Concept of Holism works. According to the OCG, "Looking at culture holistically means thinking about how your question or action might affect or be affected by many different things."⁶⁸² In this case, would the U.S. be helping or hurting Haiti's economic system with exports of cheap rice? The intention was to make rice accessible to most Haitians but it had the unwanted consequence of undermining Haiti's rice industry. As noted in the OCG: "You can't ever be 100% positive that you have considered all possible connections. Still, going through the process of holistic assessment of a situation greatly increases the likelihood that your actions will have the effect you intend. It also helps you anticipate and mitigate or leverage potential second and third order effects."⁶⁸³

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Holism - the local narrative:

The Operational Culture General (OCG) Concept of Holism can be clearly observed in the Haitian culture.⁶⁸⁴ Haitians have a long history of political violence and corruption, social and racial discrimination, and natural disasters which contribute to socioeconomic stagnation, poverty, substandard or lacking infrastructure, inadequate education and an unskilled labor force; all combining to hinder prospects for a prosperous future. These problems and challenges originate from all Five Dimensions of Operational Culture and are all interconnected through many layers. In order to utilize the Five Dimensions approach to understand Haitian culture and sort these issues into Five Dimensions can be a challenge in itself, as

noted in the OCG. “Holism also explains why some information may seem to fit in more than one place in a database or checklist.” According to the OCG, it is important for Marines to “figure out the local version of these inter-connections.”⁶⁸⁵ One aspect that is prevalent in the Haitian narrative on the inter-connection of their problems is to repeatedly blame foreign imperialism for their internal socioeconomic situation.⁶⁸⁶

One example of the Haitian narrative blaming foreign imperialism for the country’s woes occurred in 1978. An epidemic of African Swine Fever (ASF)—a highly contagious and fatal disease—plagued pigs in the Dominican Republic.⁶⁸⁷ The United States feared that the disease would spread to North America and pressured the Haitian government to slaughter the entire population of pigs and to replace them with animals supplied by the United States and international agencies.⁶⁸⁸ The Haitian government complied with this demand, but the incident produced deep bitterness among the peasantry.⁶⁸⁹ Black Haitian pigs were not only a form of a “savings account” for peasants because they could be sold for cash when necessary, but they were also a breed of livestock well-suited to the rural environment because they required neither special care nor special feed. The replacement pigs required both.⁶⁹⁰ This incident caused deep resentment against the U.S. for interference in Haiti’s affairs.


Social Structure

In order to understand social structures of the present, we must step back in time and explain some of the history of the Haitian people. The first Spanish settlement in the New World was built in Haiti.⁶⁹¹ The native Arawak (also known as Taino) Amerindians inhabited the island of Hispaniola when it was discovered by Columbus in 1492.⁶⁹² They were virtually annihilated by the Spanish settlers within 50 years.⁶⁹³

Spain ceded the western third of the island of Hispaniola to France in 1697.⁶⁹⁴ Soon, French adventurers began to settle the colony, turning the French portion of the island, renamed Saint-Domingue, into a coffee-and sugar-producing titan.⁶⁹⁵ The French plantation system was so profitable that it earned colonial Haiti the name Pearl of the Antilles.⁶⁹⁶

The colonial social structure followed a stratified society-class system. By the mid-eighteenth century, society on the island had settled into a rigid hierarchical structure based on skin color, class, and wealth.⁶⁹⁷ At the bottom of the social ladder were the African-born plantation slaves; slightly above them were the mixed-race mulatto slaves and the mulatto-freedmen; and the whites were at the top.⁶⁹⁸

African slave labor became vital to Saint-Domingue’s economic development. Under French colonial rule, nearly 800,000 slaves arrived from Africa, accounting for a third of the entire Atlantic slave trade.⁶⁹⁹ This was a brutal slavery system, and many slaves died from disease and the harsh conditions of the sugar and coffee plantations.⁷⁰⁰ Despite all the deaths, by 1789 slaves outnumbered the free population - there were 452,000 slaves in a population of 520,000.⁷⁰¹ By 1791 a slave rebellion erupted on the island and by 1798 Toussaint Louverture – a former slave himself - was the most important leader of the revolt.



The burning of the Plaine du Cap in 1791 (Source: Wikipedia)

As the French army finally left the island after having lost 40,000 troops in fierce battles against the insurgents, they destroyed everything on their path.⁷⁰² They set fire to cane fields, leveled towns and villages, and killed every man, woman and child they encountered.⁷⁰³ Fearing that the news of the successful slave rebellion would spread to other Caribbean colonies, the French government ordered the military to eliminate every black person who had tasted freedom.⁷⁰⁴

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Change - “Contact with other groups can be a major source of change.”


After independence the Haitians were isolated in their new nation. The French knew more change would come if the other islands heard the battle cry of freedom. They feared the spread of the Enlightenment ideology that had fueled their own revolution just a few years earlier. All leaders of slaveholding societies attempted to prevent tales of Haitian revolt from spreading to their own lands – including England and the United States.⁷⁰⁵ Thomas Jefferson in 1799 referred to Toussaint L’Ouverture and the other leaders of the slave uprising as the “cannibals of the terrible Republic.”⁷⁰⁶

Independence, however, did not bring an end to the struggle against poverty, ruin, and exclusion. Today, Haiti’s most serious underlying social problem, the huge wealth gap between the impoverished Creole-speaking black majority and the French-speaking minority, 1% of whom own nearly half the country’s wealth, remains unaddressed.⁷⁰⁷ The reality is that social conditions have not changed in almost 400 years.

Population

Haiti’s total population reached 9,996,731 in 2014.⁷⁰⁸ Haiti presents the highest rates in maternal mortality rates and infant mortality rates in the Western Hemisphere, comparable only to the poorest African countries or war torn countries. Life expectancy is only 63.1 years, also one of the worst in the world (the US life expectancy by comparison is 79, 5 years - a much higher life expectancy than Haiti’s).

Haiti’s population is very young, with 34% of people between 0-14 years and only 5% between 55-64 years.



Source: CIA World Factbook

Haiti’s High Youth Dependency Ratios - Dependency ratios are a measure of the age structure of a population - the number of individuals that are likely to be economically “dependent” on the support of others. Dependency ratios contrast the ratio of youths (ages 0-14) and the elderly (ages 65+) to the number of those in the working-age group (ages 15-64). Haiti’s total dependency ratio was 64.2% (estimated) in 2014. Haiti also presents an extremely high youth dependency ratio of 56%. The youth dependency ratio is the ratio of the youth population (ages 0-14) per 100 people of working age (ages

15-64). A high youth dependency ratio indicates that a greater investment needs to be made in schooling and other services for children.

Source: CIA World Factbook

Ethnicity and Race Relations

Presently, most Haitians are of African descent, with 5% being of white or of mixed white and African descent (mulattos).⁷⁰⁹ The country's elite tends to be represented by this small mixed minority, while the poor majority tends to be of African descent.

The lighter skinned elite perpetuated the colonial supremacist values, which are still found among the many members of the Haitian elite today. Social factors that differentiate the elite are light skin color, the use of French in speech (as opposed to Creole), Western dress, and the straightening of hair - all clear social markers in Haitian society.⁷¹⁰ Nonetheless, despite these class differences, most Haitians tend to identify themselves as a single nation and are proud of their cultures and heritage as citizens of the world's first black republic.⁷¹¹

Gender Relations and Family

The most common marital relationship among peasants and the urban lower class is known as *plasaj*, a common-law marriage.⁷¹² Formal marriages in Haiti are expensive and therefore rare. These unions are as stable as traditional marriages and children born of them are considered legitimate.

In urban areas, men's main duty is to earn cash for household needs, but the high unemployment rate means that most Haitian men find little or no work.⁷¹³ Many spend their days watching soccer games on television or playing dominos; often leaving the household altogether.⁷¹⁴ Nuclear families are a rarity in Haiti, and the reality is that women in Haiti do everything in the home plus try to earn money since many fathers provide little financial help.

Haitian women are often called the *poto mitan* (the central pole that holds the voodoo temples) of Haitian society by politicians who want to praise women in exchange for the female vote.⁷¹⁵ In the countryside women help on the fields and sell surplus at the market, while in large cities they work as servants or as seamstresses in factories.⁷¹⁶ Women became involved in the grassroots movement that brought President Jean-Bertrand Aristides to power in 1990. Later in the decade Ertha Pascal-Trouillot was elected Haiti's first female president, along with Claudete Werleigh, the first female prime minister.⁷¹⁷

Violence Against Women

This shift in gender roles turned deadly in the period after the coup that ousted President Aristide in 1991. Raoul Cedrás, the new leader and former commander in chief of the army, hired hundreds of henchmen who tortured and murdered women and men indiscriminately, but added rape as an instrument of terror – thousands of rapes were committed.⁷¹⁸

Gender-based violence remains a serious problem in Haiti and even the United Nations refugee camps had to deal with this threat, as registered in the UN reports after the 2010 earthquake.⁷¹⁹

Violence against women – According to Human Right Watch, gender-based violence is a widespread problem.⁷²⁰ Draft revisions to Haiti’s criminal code, which at time of writing were awaiting approval of the Council of Ministers before introduction to Parliament, include acts of gender-based violence, such as rape and sexual assault, not currently in the code.⁷²¹

Women seeking accountability for sexual violence crimes encounter multiple obstacles, including reproach by members of the public or threats.⁷²² In one high-profile case, a woman pressed charges against a former justice minister, claiming he had raped her in 2012.⁷²³ She subsequently reported receiving multiple death threats, which led her to withdraw her criminal complaint.⁷²⁴

Family

As the basis of its support structure, the family structure includes extended family members, who are also considered as part of the family unit.⁷²⁵ As such, it is common for a household to have several family members from different generations. Family members who migrate tend to send remittances home and continue to consult family members regarding important life decisions.⁷²⁶

In a country with so many socioeconomic issues, children are considered assets rather than liabilities, and are, therefore, important elements of the culture’s support network.⁷²⁷ To many Haitians, having a child outside of wedlock or with an unsuitable partner is better than having no child at all.⁷²⁸ Children perform several household duties by the age of seven or eight. In rural settings, these duties include fetching water or taking care of livestock.

Children’s Domestic Labor – The Restavèk System

Given the widespread poverty, and without a stable government to provide social services, child labor is prevalent in Haiti, and it is estimated that 21% or 2,587,205 children ages 5 to 14 work.⁷²⁹ Additionally, Haitians have created their own system of survival by way of Restavèks – a word that comes from the Creole and French meaning “to stay with.”⁷³⁰ According to Human Rights Watch, the use of child domestic workers - known as Restavèks - continues.⁷³¹ The majority of whom are girls, are sent from low-income households to live with wealthier families in the hope that they will be schooled and cared for in exchange for performing light chores.⁷³² Though difficult to calculate, some estimates suggest that 225,000 children work as Restavèks.⁷³³

These children are often unpaid, denied education, and physically or sexually abused.⁷³⁴ Haiti’s labor code does not set a minimum age for work in domestic services, though the minimum age for work in industrial, agricultural and commercial enterprises is set at 15.⁷³⁵ While Haitian law outlaws the practice of Restavèks, enforcement is almost non-existent.⁷³⁶ Haiti’s weak justice system stems in part from a lack of political will to oversee law enforcement procedures.⁷³⁷ The Restavèks practice is “so ingrained in Haiti that too many people do not even know they are breaking the law.”⁷³⁸ Haiti’s history, in which widespread practices of slavery and foreign exploitation, combined with political and financial instability, has led to the continued economic vulnerability of Haitian citizens.⁷³⁹

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Reciprocity

The Operational Culture General (OCG) Concept of Reciprocity is observed in the Restavèks system. In principle, placement of a Restavèk involves a parent turning over childrearing responsibility to another household in exchange for the child’s unpaid domestic service.⁷⁴⁰ The system is widely used

in Haiti, but as seen in the OCG Chapter, “there can be negative aspects of building a reciprocal relationship.”⁷⁴¹ This negative aspect of reciprocity is seen in the Restavèks system in Haiti, as it has an increasingly significant negative connotation, including that such children are dependent and servile.⁷⁴² Many Restavèks children are exploited and this has a lasting effect on their education, health, mental well-being and overall development.⁷⁴³

Text extracted from “Restavèk: The Persistence of Child Labor and Slavery,” submitted by Restavèk Freedom to the United Nations:⁷⁴⁴

Synthia’s Story – A true Restavèks account, a recent story of a child assisted by Restavèk Freedom:⁷⁴⁵

“The name was changed to protect her privacy. Synthia celebrated her 15th birthday recently. This was the first time anyone had celebrated her birth. Her mother died when Synthia was an infant, and she was taken to live with her mother’s oldest sister for three years and then sent to live with her godmother, who was her mother’s youngest sister. She was never sent to school by her godmother and had to remain at home to do all the work. She was never shown any love or affection and would get beatings for not working fast enough or if she took too long to fetch the water, and she would get beatings if anything was misplaced around the house. She was in charge of all household work, including taking care of the younger children. During an emotional recount of one incident, she described the fear that she encountered as she was sent on a late night errand. The area where she lived is known for some of the worst gang members and thieves of Haiti, so naturally, as a young girl, she was afraid. Because it was late at night she had difficulty finding the item she was sent to purchase. By the time she arrived at the merchant, she was closed. Synthia knew that she would be beaten but she also knew that she had no control over the situation. When she arrived the beating was severe and she was made to sleep outside for the night. Synthia wanted to end her life. She tells Restavèk Freedom that the only thing which stopped her was the fact that she was in school and felt loved by the child advocate from our organization and that she would miss her. Synthia has been removed from this situation and is now in a loving and supportive environment. She often comments that she feels as if she is in a dream. She is very intelligent and wants to study computer engineering.”⁷⁴⁶

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Change

The Operational Culture General (OCG) Concept of Change is also observed in the increasing negative aspect of the Restavèks system. As seen in the OCG chapter, “During times of conflict or in a disaster, the usual methods for getting through the day may stop working for the local population, and people may begin to tinker with cultural patterns.”⁷⁴⁷ Another facet of the practice that has changed over time is the placement of children due to the death of a family member.⁷⁴⁸ According to a 2004 study, a majority of Restavèks placements occurred within one year of the death of another household member, usually a parent. Therefore, this practice is propelled by the lack of solutions for a growing number of orphans, which was severely aggravated after the 2010 earthquake.⁷⁴⁹

Language

During the colonial period, French was spoken by mostly whites and educated mulatto freedmen, while Creole was spoken by the vast majority of the black population.⁷⁵⁰ French was also the language not only of government and commerce, but also of culture and refinement. However, French was understood by less than 10 percent of the population.

Although the 1987 constitution gave both French and Haitian Creole official status, French remains the language of prestige and social mobility. It is estimated that only 5-10% of the Haitian population speaks French fluently. As such, the inability to speak French can serve as a social barrier to the less educated.

English has emerged as an important language of business due to the development of assembly industries and because of the massive Haitian diaspora to the US during the Duvalier regime (1957-1986).⁷⁵¹ As Haitians returned to Haiti from the United States, they came back fluent English speakers. A combination of these factors facilitated the introduction of English words into the Creole lexicon. As a result, for many Creole speakers, learning English appears more practical than learning French, and English poses fewer psychological and social obstacles.⁷⁵²

Education

The Haitian government approved the use of Creole in education as part of wider education reforms in 1978. However, the controversies between the use of French or Creole remained, as many groups opposed the use of Creole as the language of instruction. They preferred for their children to continue learning French so they could achieve higher social status:

“Bilingual families believed that the use of Creole in the schools was eroding their linguistic advantage in society, by reducing the importance of French. In general, the upper class believed that by offering instruction in Creole, the schools would increase poor people's access to education; however, many poor people also opposed the reform. The poor tended to view education more as a means of escaping poverty than as a means for learning, so many parents were most concerned about having their children learn French.”⁷⁵³

Haiti has only a 48.7% literacy rate, the lowest one in the Western Hemisphere.⁷⁵⁴ Literacy is slightly higher for the male population, 53.4% and only 44.6% for female population. The country has one of the lowest school enrollment rates in the world, with 76% at the primary level and only 22% at the secondary level.⁷⁵⁵ Additionally, 85% of the teachers are not qualified to teach at the primary school level.⁷⁵⁶

Even before the devastating 2010 earthquake, which destroyed 23% of the schools and other infrastructure, nearly 500,000 children were not enrolled in school and one-half of Haitian children did not have access to primary education.⁷⁵⁷

The World Bank estimated that 8,000 to 10,000 primary teachers were needed to absorb the out-of-schools students.⁷⁵⁸ With the Bank financing and government support, a teacher training program has been established and will continue to depend on donor assistance.⁷⁵⁹

Recommended Reading:

For more information on education in Haiti:

“Haiti Improves Access to Education with a New Government Strategy,” *The World Bank* (November 21, 2012). Available at:

<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/11/21/haiti-education-strategy>

Gabriel Demombynes, Peter Holland and Leon Gianmarco, “Students and the Market for Schools in Haiti.” *The World Bank* (A Policy Working Paper). Available At

<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/12/13233160/students-market-schools-haiti>

Uniquely among Latin American and Caribbean countries, Haiti has a largely non-public education system, which largely contributed to exclude the poor.⁷⁶⁰ In 2011, President Martelly made education a cornerstone of his government program and launched the Universal, Free, and Compulsory Education Program.⁷⁶¹ Since 1998, primary school enrollment has been boosted by these concerted efforts and in 2012 Haiti displayed a 112% increase in enrollment (this figure exceeds 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition).⁷⁶²

Political Structure

The Republic of Haiti has a republican type of government. It became independent from France on January 1, 1804. The country has had 23 constitutions; the latest of which was adopted in 1987 and amended in 2012.⁷⁶³ Haiti's civil law system is strongly influenced by Napoleonic Code.

The chief of state is the head of the executive branch; presidential elections are determined by popular vote for a five-year term (no consecutive terms).⁷⁶⁴ Thus, Presidential elections are held in 2015, 2020, etc. The Legislative branch consists of a bicameral National Assembly (Senate and Chamber of Deputies).

There are 10 administrative divisions or departments called *départements*: Artibonite, Centre, Grand' Anse, Nippes, Nord, Nord-Est, Nord-Ouest, Ouest, Sud, Sud-Est.⁷⁶⁵



Source: University of Texas, Perry Castañeda Collection

Judicial System

The constitution guarantees defendants the right to a fair public trial, including the presumption of innocence and the right to be present at trial, but in practice these rights are often denied.⁷⁶⁶ Moreover, the government is not required to provide free counsel, and many Haitians cannot afford representation on their own.⁷⁶⁷ Overall, the judicial system reflects the same shortcomings found in other Haitian societal structures:

“The judiciary, like most of the government, suffers from widespread corruption. Threats of violence often render judges and juries unable to make impartial decisions. Bribes not only sway judges but also taint potential witnesses. In addition to corruption, the judicial system suffers from shortages of both funding and qualified personnel. The combination of corruption and inefficiency has resulted in a serious backlog of criminal cases and an overflow in the country’s jails. Nearly 80 percent of incarcerated men and women still await their initial trial, despite efforts in 2005 to reduce pretrial detention.”⁷⁶⁸

Historical Overview

“Governing such a racially polarized society would have required immense political skills, which unfortunately, history shows it was not the case.” **Philippe Girard, Historian**

Haitians have had a lengthy experience with brutal, corrupt, and authoritarian regimes. Much of the 200 years of Haiti’s existence has been marked by political instability and leaders who sought to retain their power for as long as possible.⁷⁶⁹

One of Haiti’s longest and most brutal and corrupt authoritarian regimes became known as the Duvalier Era began in 1957 with the election of Dr. François Duvalier (Papa Doc). In 1964 he declared himself President-for-Life and formed the infamous paramilitary *Tonton Makout*. The group’s pervasive influence throughout the countryside bolstered recruitment, mobilization, and patronage for the regime.⁷⁷⁰

Duvalier entrenched his rule through terror (an estimated 30,000 Haitians were killed for political reasons during his tenure), **emigration** (which removed the more activist elements of the population along with thousands of purely economic migrants), and limited patronage.⁷⁷¹ At the time of his death in 1971, François Duvalier designated his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc), as Haiti’s new leader, until his ousting in 1986.⁷⁷²

Suggested Video:

Video with a historical overview of Haiti:

“A Brief History of Haiti.” By ABC 100114.

Available at:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZQ0w-5qIdA&feature=related>

Emigration: “To leave one’s place of residence or country to live elsewhere.”

(Source: Merriam-Webster Dictionary)⁷⁷³

Baby Doc’s corruption schemes and diversion of public funds, along with his failure to act upon his rhetoric endorsing economic and public-health reform, left the regime vulnerable to unanticipated crises that were exacerbated by endemic poverty, including the outbreak of Acquired Immune

Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) in the 1980s.⁷⁷⁴ These crises left behind them a country economically ravaged by their avarice; a country bereft of functional political institutions and devoid of any tradition of peaceful self-rule.⁷⁷⁵

One historical event that served as a turning point and fomented popular mobilization against the Duvalier regime originated from an unlikely source: the Pope. Widespread discontent began in March 1983, when Pope John Paul II visited Haiti and declared that “Something must change here,” and he went on to call for a more equitable distribution of income, a more egalitarian social structure, more concern among the elite for the well-being of the masses, and increased popular participation in public life.⁷⁷⁶ This message revitalized both laymen and clergy, and it contributed to increased popular mobilization and to expanded political and social activism.⁷⁷⁷



Jean-Claude Duvalier “Baby Doc” (Source: Wikipedia, Photo by Marcello Casal Jr / Agência Brasil)

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Mobilization - “The outcome of mobilization can lead to tensions, but it also can help resolve them.”

The Operational Culture General (OCG) Concept of Mobilization can be observed in this period of Haitian history. As seen in the OCG chapter, “During times when tensions are high and the potential for conflict is great, mobilization can be an indicator of danger.”⁷⁷⁸ Indeed, in 1985, two years after the Pope’s visit, a popular revolt began in the provinces, with street demonstrations and raids on food-distribution warehouses; the protests spread to the entire south of the country.⁷⁷⁹ A crackdown by police and army units failed to dampen the momentum against the dynastic dictatorship.⁷⁸⁰ In January 1986, the unrest in Haiti alarmed the Reagan administration, which began to pressure Duvalier to renounce his rule and to leave Haiti.⁷⁸¹

While the country adopted a **new constitution in 1987** that established a democratic system of government, general elections ended in an Election Day bloodbath that cost the lives of 22 voters in a Port-au-Prince school.⁷⁸²

The **new Constitution**, approved March 1987, was suspended June 1988 with most articles reinstated March 1989; the constitutional government was ousted in a military coup in September 1991. Although in October 1991 military government claimed to be observing the constitution, the country only returned to constitutional rule in October 1994. The constitution, while technically in force from 2004-2006, was not enforced. The country returned to constitutional rule in May 2006.

(Source: CIA World Factbook – 2015)

A new political figure emerged in the country in the late 1980s, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a leftist Catholic priest who favored the poor, and who was sponsored by Liberation Theology and was a vocal patriot, with a PhD in Theology. “Stopping the *Macoutes*” – the Duvalier regime’s ultra-violent paramilitary – was his rallying cry. He also had an ability to summon political symbols drawn for Haiti’s culture:

“He called his movement *Lavalas* after the Creole name for flash flood. Like those torrential rivers that flush all the garbage away after a tropical downpour, Aristide would rid Haiti of the layers of corruption and oppression inherited from the country’s past. He also used terms the Haitian peasants would easily understand, such as *rache manioc* (pull out the

manioc) and *dechoukaj* (uprooting), both of them metaphors for the need to clear the political field and start anew.”⁷⁸³

By 1990 Haiti democratically elected Aristide in an unusually peaceful election.⁷⁸⁴ The peace however, did not last, as violent political and social confrontation returned, and on September 29, 1991, Aristide was ousted by a coup supported by the army and forced into exile.⁷⁸⁵

The 1991 coup marked a massive exodus from Haiti toward Florida, mostly via unsound boats lacking supplies and overloaded with passengers.⁷⁸⁶ Haitians were fleeing the reign of terror imposed by Raoul Cédras, Aristide’s former commander in chief of the army, now Haiti’s new ruler, who had overthrown Aristide. His post-coup repression claimed the lives of about three thousand victims in three years.⁷⁸⁷



Aristide and President Clinton
(Source: Wikimedia)

Once again the Haitian narrative that foreigners are to blame for Haiti’s problems, a rhetoric that has been largely exploited by Haitians politicians, was used by Aristide. He blamed the U.S. for masterminding the coup, excluding from the rhetoric his mistakes - such as irresponsible, inflammatory political speeches and his inability to implement development policies.⁷⁸⁸ This oratory became central to his *Lavalas* credo, as Aristide demanded from exile that he be reinstated as President with the help of a U.S. intervention.⁷⁸⁹

After the coup, the Organization of the American States (OAS) imposed a trade embargo which only served to destroy what was left of Haiti’s economy, without achieving the main objective of forcing Cédras out. The embargo contributed to an even larger number of people fleeing Haiti by boat and food shortages that caused the death of about one thousand Haitian children per month.⁷⁹⁰

Fragile Democracy

Haitians witnessed the first democratic transfer of power between two elected presidents in 1996.⁷⁹¹ Democratic institutions have historically been weak, and significant political gridlock has existed, while elections have usually led to increased political instability and violence in the short-term.

Given the weak state of Haiti’s democratic institutions, Haitians tend to greatly mistrust the government, particularly the justice system, perceiving it as dysfunctional and corrupt.⁷⁹² Frustration with the government and justice system has led to the emergence of vigilante groups that attempt to take justice into their own hands, killing criminals and abusive authorities, thus further weakening the state’s ability to control violence. As a result, crime is a serious concern in Haiti, with car-jacking, kidnappings, armed robberies, gender-based violence, and home invasions being issues of concern.⁷⁹³

Security

After military interference in politics, including dozens of military coups, President Aristide disbanded Haiti’s army in 1995.⁷⁹⁴ Haiti’s National Assembly created a new civilian police with the help of the United States and the United Nations. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was authorized to complete the disarmament and demobilization of any remaining militias.

In December 2011 President Martelly created a special commission to consult with domestic and international communities to assess possible restoration of the country's military.⁷⁹⁵ In May 2012 the commission issued a preliminary report detailing the extensive human and financial resources needed to reestablish an armed force.⁷⁹⁶ This commission did not develop or issue any further findings, and its mandate concluded with the creation of a Ministry of Defense.

The United Nations in Haiti

MINUSTAH - United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

The UN mission succeeded a Multinational Interim Force (MIF) authorized by the Security Council in February 2004 after President Bertrand Aristide departed Haiti for exile in the aftermath of an armed conflict which spread to several cities across the country.⁷⁹⁷ In the following years, the mandate of MINUSTAH, its concept of operations and the authorized strength were adjusted by the Security Council on several occasions to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground and to the evolving requirements as dictated by the political, security, and socio-economic situation prevailing in the country.⁷⁹⁸

Brazil has led the MINUSTAH mission, with a mandate that includes assisting in monitoring, restructuring and reforming the Haitian National Police; to help with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs; and to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public safety and public order in Haiti.

As of October 31, 2014, there were 7,255 uniformed United Nations personnel in Haiti from 49 countries.⁷⁹⁹ Current UN authorization expires in October 2015.

Haiti's political instability is further exacerbated by natural disasters and other problems that stem from the physical environment. The 2010 earthquake, for example, killed approximately 17% of the country's civil service, and destroyed much of the government's physical infrastructure, including the presidential palace, the parliament building, and 28 of 29 ministry buildings.⁸⁰⁰

Many Haitians resent the presence of UN troops in their country, seeing it as an "occupation."⁸⁰¹ This resentment culminated with more violent protests in 2011, when media reports indicated a cholera outbreak in the country had been linked to a U.N. base.⁸⁰²

Belief Systems

Haitians are a cultural group and also a nation, and the majority of Haitians share similar values, beliefs, and traditions. While socioeconomic differences and variations exist in terms of language and traditions, Haitians share a similar ancestry and heritage, with the greatest cultural differences occurring between socioeconomic classes, rather than geographic areas.⁸⁰³

Identity

Haitians have a unique French-African culture that distinguishes them from other countries in the Caribbean, and they take great pride in this cultural heritage. Anthropologists have been studying for

Recommended Readings:

For more information on Haiti's Armed Forces:

"Haiti – Armed Force."

Globalsecurity.org.

Available at:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/haiti/armed-forces.htm>

decades the formation of the “black culture” in Haiti. They investigated the question of “African survivals,” as a point of departure, which held that Africans brought to the New World probably shared some basic cultural principles.⁸⁰⁴ These include the great variety of languages and cultures from which they came:

“Thus the importance of music and dance in ritual activity was something that a variety of Africans might have had in common and that might have affected how they built up new cultural practices in a slave regime.”⁸⁰⁵

A different approach to the study of black culture in the Americas and in Haiti is to view black culture as a result of local processes of adaptations such as the history of slavery, racism, oppression, and particular forms of labor (such as plantation economy).⁸⁰⁶

Identity and History

Haitians tend to blame the legacy of slavery and colonialism for their current woes: first they were plundered by the Spanish conquistadors, then exploited by the French who brought in the brutal slave system, and finally devastated by the long war of independence against France.⁸⁰⁷ Even after independence, Haiti lived under the political and military shadow of the United States, whom it also blames for ruining Haiti’s rice and pig industry due to unfair U.S. competition.⁸⁰⁸

This common Haitian perception of “history as an inescapable curse,” promotes a belief that one’s own actions will make little difference, which in turn makes it difficult to foster a spirit of enterprise.⁸⁰⁹

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Identity

The Operational Culture General (OCG) Concept of Identity can be observed in Haiti. As seen in the OCG chapter, “Identity is often used by leaders to manipulate behavior. Understanding how identity can be “mobilized” is critical for anyone who is part of a mission involving close contact with the population.” To this day, the view that foreigners are to blame for Haiti’s problems is largely exploited by Haiti’s politicians, who frequently use theories about the colonial legacy as a convenient excuse to justify their own inability to implement development policies.⁸¹⁰

Religious Beliefs

Regardless of religious faith, many Haitians believe that God ultimately decides matters such as life and death, and health and illness. This belief is known as *fatalism* and manifests in how people make health decisions. For example, some Haitians believe that illness can be caused by supernatural factors.

Because Haitians rely on the government for very little, Haitians value relationships with their family unit or community, with such relationships contributing to individual’s sense of self and security.⁸¹¹ As such, loyalty to one’s group is highly valued, and rules that conflict with the needs of the family are often ignored. In this collectivist society, responsibilities tend to be shared, and many decisions are made through the consensus of the group.

Respect for an older person is also considered essential in Haiti. In fact, direct eye contact with elders or with people of authority is usually avoided.⁸¹² Respect and obedience for one's parents are values that are instilled from a young age. As a result, Haitian children tend to be obedient and respectful.⁸¹³

Religion

Haiti is approximately 80% Roman Catholic, 16% Protestant (Pentecostal 4%, Adventist 1%, other 1%), while only 1% claim no religion affiliation and 3% do not identify.⁸¹⁴ In a reflection to its African roots, approximately half of the population also practices *voodoo* (also referred to as *voudou*, *voudoun*), which mixes Catholic and African beliefs in a form of religious syncretism.⁸¹⁵

According to voodoo beliefs, *Bondye* is the supreme deity, and even though *Bondye* (which is Creole, but originates from the French “*Bon Dieu*” or “Good God”) is not directly involved with human life or activities, *Bondye* gives power to the *Loa* (or *Lwa*, *Lowa*), which are deities involved in human affairs.⁸¹⁶

Voodoo specialists are called *houngan* and female specialists are called *manbo*, and they mediate between humans and spirits through divination and trance.⁸¹⁷ They diagnose illnesses and reveal the origins of other misfortune.⁸¹⁸ They can also perform rituals to appease spirits or ancestors or to repel magic.⁸¹⁹ Many voodoo specialists are accomplished herbalists who treat a variety of illnesses.


Voodoo practitioners worship the *Loa* and every *Loa* is associated with the image of a Catholic saint; additionally, each *Loa* also corresponds to one of the natural elements (fire, water, air, earth).⁸²⁰ *Loas* can be good (*Rada*) or evil (*Petro*) and feasts are offered to the *Loa* in an effort to appease them, as failure to do so can cause misfortune or illness.⁸²¹

The Haitian belief system of voodoo revolves around family spirits, and each family has a specific *Loa* that protects it – which is inherited through maternal and paternal lines:

“*Loa* protect their families from misfortune. In return, families must “feed” the *loa* through periodic rituals in which food, drink, and other gifts are offered to the spirits. There are two kinds of services for the *loa*. The first is held once a year; the second is conducted much less frequently, usually only once a generation. Many poor families, however, wait until they feel a need to restore their relationship with their spirits before they conduct a service. Services are usually held at a sanctuary on family land.”⁸²²



A sequined Vodou "drapo" or flag by the artist George Valris, depicting the Loa Loko Atison (Source: Wikipedia)



Voodoo paraphernalia on sale, Port-au-Prince, Haiti (Source: Wikipedia, photo by Doron)

Duvalier Era: Papa Doc use of Voodoo to consolidate his power - Duvalier was an astute observer of Haitian life and a student of his country's history and his medical experiences in the provinces had acquainted him with the everyday concerns of the people.⁸²³ He knew about their

predisposition toward paternalistic authority, the ease with which their allegiance could be bought, and the central role of Voodoo in their lives.⁸²⁴

“Duvalier exploited all of these points, especially Voodoo. He studied Voodoo practices and beliefs and was rumored to be a *boungan*. He related effectively to *boungan* and *bokò* (voodoo sorcerers) throughout the country and incorporated many of them into his intelligence network and the ranks of the *tonton makouts*. His public recognition of Voodoo and its practitioners and his private adherence to Voodoo ritual, combined with his reputed practice of magic and sorcery, enhanced his popular persona among the common people (who hesitated to trifle with a leader who had such dark forces at his command) and served as a peculiar form of legitimization of his rapacious and ignoble rule.”⁸²⁵

The 2010 earthquake drove a wedge between Haiti’s religions. Christian groups made inroads among shaken Voodoo followers who saw the steady flow of aid through Christian missions, while many remained frightened by a disaster they saw as a warning from God.⁸²⁶ Voodoo priests saw conversions and voodoo denial as a threat “these people are rejecting their ancestors and history. Voodoo is the soul of the Haitian people. Without it, the people are lost.”⁸²⁷

THROUGH THE LENS OF: Change - “Contact with other groups can be a major source of Change:”

The Operational Culture General (OCG) Concept of Change can be once again observed in Haiti. As Voodoo followers have come in contact with Christian groups, many have converted to Christianity. Voodoo has been mixing with Catholic beliefs for centuries, and many practiced Catholicism alongside Voodoo. But Protestantism is a relatively new religion in the island, and is less tolerant than the Catholics in relation to the continuing of syncretic beliefs and practices.⁸²⁸ As more Haitians convert to Protestantism, many other Voodoo traits such as fatalism will be challenged.

Conclusion

This case study presented the Haitian culture through the analytical tool of the Five Dimensions of Operational Culture, as discussed in the Operational Culture General document. It has also viewed the Haitian culture through the lenses of the other OCG concepts including identity, holism, change, variation, mobilization, and reciprocity.

Haitians have witnessed numerous turning points over time, from French colonial times, to their own fight for independence and statehood, and numerous environmental disasters that have transformed their lives and landscape. Change has also been evident with regards to religious beliefs, due to the recent spread of Protestantism, and migration prompted by growing economic and political challenges. Our review of Haiti has shown that variation, particularly with regards to high income levels and wellbeing, is a privilege enjoyed by only the wealthy few, as much of the country lives under the poverty line.

Across Haiti’s history, mobilization has been a factor of change, from the numerous slave rebellions, to the country’s fight for independence and statehood, vigilante groups that emerged from resentment of abusive authorities and rising crime, as well as the many protests carried out by Haitians taking to the streets to express their frustrations. Finally, through so many difficulties, the Haitian family stands

as a strong support structure in which reciprocity between and loyalty to family members is firmly grounded.

You might have noticed that the case study does not include all, or even many, of the concepts discussed in the Operational Culture General document. This is only natural; a comprehensive body of literature devoted to the study of a single culture is rare. In fact, Marines are frequently called upon to operate in areas where current information on local culture is scarce. What the OCG and the chapters in this document do is help Marines learn about their assigned region and acquire skills and concepts that will assist them in operating effectively in complex cross-cultural situations in any part of the globe when information is scarce or rapidly changing.

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